came, on the 23d September, 1601, but too late, too few for that period, and landed at as illjudged a spot as could possibly be pointed out to them by the enemy. For, in the first place, the harbour of Kinsale, defended neither by sufficient forts or batteries, must necessarily fall into the hands of the English, and become a convenient depot for the supplying the besiegers with provisions, arms, ammunition, and reinforcements of troops, from the seaports of England and Ireland. Thus the best chance the Irish had of ruining the besiegers, by cutting off their supplies, was in a great measure defeated, by the unfortunate position of their allies, so contiguous to the haven, neither strong by nature or art. "Had the invasion been made at that critical period, when the insurgents of the North were in the full tide of success, and given strength and countenance to the disaffected in every quarter of the kingdom, the English power, already shaken, even to its foundation, could scarcely have sustained it for a moment. But now the Northerns lay cooped within their own immediate demesnes, dispirited by ill-success, and wasted by famine. The insurgents of Leinster were broken and subdued. Those of Connaught reduced to such weakness, by pouring their forces, upon fruitless expeditions, into the northern and southern provinces, that the bare appearance of an enemy was sufficient to drive the wretched remains into their inaccessible haunts. In Munster, the rebellion had been broken, and its chief leaders held in captivity; many partizans

had fallen by the sword in different quarters; nor was it an inconsiderable loss to the insurgents, that Pierce Lacy had been lately slain upon the borders of Ulster."

Mountjoy immediately took the field, sent pressing demands for provisions, men, and ammunition to England, and stated the course he intended to pursue with the Irish as follows: "Besides the foreign enemy, the Spaniard, with whom we are first to deal, and the known traitors and rebels already in arms, there are two other sorts of people here, which if we do not carefully provide for, they will soon adhere unto the rest, and make their party so strong, as in judgement we cannot see how we shall be able to encounter it, unless by good providence it be prevented, which is the mark we aim at. The one of these two sorts is the subject, who hath lands and goods to take to, for whom we must provide defence, else with his livelihood we are sure to lose him, and therefore we will omit nothing that our means will stretch to, that may preserve, cherish, and content him. The other sort are such as have no living, nor any thing that will afford them maintenance, and yet hitherto have not shewed themselves disloyal, though all of them be swordsmen, and many gentlemen by descent, and are able to draw after them many followers. To this sort we hear for certain the Spaniards make offer of great entertainment; and if we should not in some manner do the like, we cannot in reason look but they must and will fall to their party. We have therefore out of this necessity resolved,

to take as many of them into her majesty's entertainment, as we have any hope will truly stick unto us, being confident that we shall make good use of them against the Spaniards; for we mean thoroughly to put them to it, though if we should fail in our expectation, and find them cold or slack in serving with us, yet will it be a great countenance to the service to shew the persons of so many men on our side, where otherwise they would have been against it: and of this we can assure your lordships, that when they have served our turn against the Spaniards, until we have freed ourselves of them, we can without danger ease her majesty of that charge, and will no longer hold them in entertainment. In the mean time they shall spend little of the queen's victual, but being paid of the new coin, provide for themselves, which may be with less oppression of the country, than if in that sort they were not entertained, for then they would spoil all, and put out such as otherwise will continue in subjection."*

On the 21st of October, Mountjoy invested Kinsale. Rincorran, a castle commanding the harbour, surrendered on the 1st of November. On the 13th he states his reasons for undertaking the siege, and its difficulties, thus: "It was not my opinion only, but my lord president's, that if I did not suddenly make head to this force, most of this province would have revolted; and if we had suffered the force of Spain

* Letter of Mountjoy and council to the lords in England, dated 3d October, 1601.

to have been masters of the field but six days, as easily they might have been, if we had not fought well to prevent it, I assure myself that all the towns of this province would have revolted, and the current of that fortune would have run so violently through all Ireland, that it would be too late to have stopped it. For the second, the difficulties of a winter siege in this country (where, by reason of the great numbers of the besieged, we are forced to keep strong and continual guards) will soon waste a greater army than ours, if God do not mightily bless us; for the weather is so extream that many times we bring our centinels dead from the stations, and I protest even our chief commanders (whose diligence I cannot but mightily commend) do many of them look like spirits with toil and watching, unto the which we are with good reason moved, since there be many examples that where an enemy can sally out with two or three thousand men they have defeated armies that have been treble our number. But now besides these ordinary difficulties, which in all winter sieges do waste or make unprofitable the greatest part of an army, when we are to make our nearest approaches to force them, we cannot do it without great loss; for although the town be weak against the canon, yet can we plant the canon no where, but they have places that do absolutely command it, so that the town is weak to defend itself, yet exceeding strong to offend, which is the best part that art can add to any fortification, and this is so well provided by nature, that from

one hill they beat into any ground that we can lodge in near them."*

"The 13th day of November, 1601, our fleet recovered the mouth of Kinsale harbour, but could not get in, the wind being strong against them. The 14th day the fleet with much difficulty warped in, and recovered the harbour, whence the admiral and vice admiral came to the lord deputy at the camp.... The 17th day the weather continued stormy, so as neither that day nor the next we could land our ordnance or do any thing of moment....Hitherto nothing could possibly be attempted against the town. more than had been done; for, considering that the country stood upon such fickle terms, and so generally ill affected to our side, that almost the least blow, which in the doubtful event of war might have lighted upon us, would have driven them headlong into a general revolt; and further that our army consisted for a third part (at the least) of Irish." The siege continued without intermission till the 23d, when "the lord president advertised, that O'Donnel, by advantage of a frost (so great as seldom had been seen in Ireland) had passed a mountain, and so had stolen by him into Munster, whereupon he purposed to return with the forces he had, to strengthen the camp.... The first of December it was resolved in a council of war, that some foot should be drawn out of the camp, to give the Spa

* Letter to the English secretary from Mountjoy, dated 13th November, 1601.

+Moryson's Hist. of Ireland,