no Allies in the Principalities, they defeated the Russians in three pitched battles, and the latter were obliged to evacuate these provinces.

Had the Turks been left to themselves to defend Kars, a similar result would probably have taken place, as may be seen by the measures taken to obtain the contrary result.

On the 5th October, 1853, Lord Stratford de REDCLIFFE writes from Constantinople to Lord CLARENDON:

A spirit of self-devotion, unaccompanied with any fanatical demonstrations, and showing itself amongst the highest functionaries of the State, bids fair to give an extraordinary impulse to any military enterprise which may be undertaken against Russia by the Turkish Government. The corps of Ulemas are preparing to advance a considerable sum in support of the war. The Grand Vizier, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, &c., &c., have resigned their horses for the service of the artillery. Reinforcements continue to be directed towards the Danube and the Georgian frontier. Several steam frigates are to be sent immediately into the Black Sea."

On the 24th October, 1853, Lord CLARENDON writes to Lord STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE:

Considering the assurances of support already given, and the measures adopted by Great Britain, it is indispensable that all progress of hostilities should be suspended by the Porte."

Accordingly Lord STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE writes back on the 5th November, 1853:

"I have succeeded in dissuading the Porte from sending a detachment of line of battle ships and sailing frigates into the Black Sea, and also in obtaining the transmission of orders to OMER PASHA to postpone any attempt which he may have in contemplation, to pass the Danube at the head of his army; and to SELIM PASHA, on the Asiatic frontier, to keep as much as possible on the defensive for the present.

"But I cannot answer for the exact execution of these repressive instructions." Three weeks afterwards the Sinope massacre took place. On the 11th November, 1853, Sir H. SEYMOUR had written from St. Petersburg:

"We (that is himself and Count NESSELRODE) conversed upon the means of putting an end to this unfortunate war. What fell from Count NESSELRODE went to confirm what I had actually been told as to the feeling of the Government, being that no serious negotiation could be conducted until the Turks, calmed by a defeat, should have been driven out of the Principalities.

"I remarked that Her Majesty's Government, being always disposed to peaceable measures, looked more to the object than to this or that plan of bringing about an amicable arrangement."

Consequently Lord CLARENDON writes to Lord STRATFORD De REDCLIFFE on the 30th January, 1854:

"I have to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government expects the Porte clearly to understand that so long as this country remains at peace wit Russia no aggression on the Russian territory by the naval force of the Sultan can be permitted."

On the 28th March, 1854, England declared war against Russia, and at the same time suspended the seizure of enemies' goods in neutral vessels, so as to allow the Russian trade to be carried on without interruption.

On the previous 12th March a treaty had been made between England, France, and Turkey, which was ratified on the 8th May. The first article bound the Allies "to co-operate with the Sultan for

"the defence of the Ottoman territory in Europe and Asia against "Russian aggression."

Article 2 bound the Sultan not to conclude any armistice or negotiate for peace without the consent of the Allies.

Article 4 gave the Allies the power of acting without the "slightest "control" on the part of the Ottoman authorities, and required, moreover, "that if a numerous portion of the allied troops are in line "with the Ottoman troops, no operation can be executed against the enemy without it having been previously concerted with the com"mandant of the allied forces."

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OMER PASHA being now "in line" with the "allied troops," could not advance to the relief of Silistria, and was forced, with 90,000 men, to remain inactive at Shumla.

But this time there was no defeat to "calm the Turks."

On the 22nd June, 1854, the Turks had repelled the invaders.

Turkey in Europe was now clear of the Russians; Turkey in Asia only was threatened by them. The Allies, instead of defending Turkey in Asia, according to the Treaty, or allowing the Turks to do so, organised an expedition to attack the territory of Russia, and took a Turkish force with them to the siege of Sebastopol.

The Turks being thus occupied in Europe an Englishman was sent

to Kars.

Sir WILLIAM FENWICK WILLIAMS, the man selected for this mission, entered the army in 1824, was British Commissioner in the Conference previous to the Treaty of Erzeroom in 1847, and in 1848 was appointed British Commissioner for the settlement of the TurcoPersian Boundary. In that capacity he survived, in common with the Russian Commissioner, those of Turkey and Persia, who died on the same day. The boundary still remains unsettled. The Russian Commissioner, Count MOURAVIEFF AMOURSKI, was the commander of the Russian army of Asia Minor in 1854.

Sir F. WILLIAMS arrived at Erzeroom on the 14th September, 1854, and afterwards proceeded to Kars.

On the 17th November, 1854, Sir F. WILLIAMS complained to Lord CLARENDON that HUSSEIN PASHA, the Chief of the staff at Kars, set him aside. HUSSEIN PASHA had served with great credit under OMER PASHA, who was indeed at this moment anxious to have him again under his command. After much effort on the part of Sir F. WILLIAMS, HUSSEIN PASHA was recalled to Constantinople. The Porte, however, refused to put him on his trial, saying that as he was not a subordinate of Sir F. WILLIAMS he could not be guilty of insubordination towards him. On receiving a memorandum to this effect, Lord CLARENDON wrote to Lord STRATFORD that it 66 can be con"sidered in no other light than a charge against General WILLIAMS "of having stated what is untrue."

Lord CLARENDON having thus correctly asserted that the Porte had made a charge of falsehood against Sir F. WILLIAMS, did not propose inquiry, but at once passed judgment against the Porte. He wrote:

"As Her Majesty's Government place entire reliance on the statements of

Brigadier-General WILLIAMS, and as they have sincerely at heart the interests of the Sultan, they desire to protest against those interests which are identified with the interests of England being confided to men like HUSSEIN and SHUKRI PASHAS."Kars Blue Book, p. 216.

HUSSEIN PASHA's continued and distinguished military services have been appreciated by the Sultan, and he is now Grand Vizier.* Among the officers whom Sir F. WILLIAMS found at Kars was ISMAIL PASHA, a Hungarian officer, better known by his original name, General KMETY. On the 29th December, 1855, General KMETY defeated the Russians before the walls of Kars. Sir F. WILLIAMS, who took no part in the battle, did take upon himself to forbid the pursuit of the Russians. When Sir F. WILLIAMS returned to England he omitted in his speeches all mention of General KMETY, and when the latter appealed to him in a letter he vouchsafed no answer. To this silence General KMETY replied in a pamphlet, from which we make an extract:

"The Turkish army, profiting by the enthusiasm which prevailed, and taking advantage of the inequalities of the ground, and the darkness which reigned during the early part of the night before the rising of the moon, should have undertaken an attack on the night after the victory by several light movable columns, directed from different sides upon Ainalli, to surprise the enemy's troops, which, some 3,000 or 4,000 strong, after having been beaten back from the Ingliz Tabias, had returned to that village, and were then encamped.

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This camp was distant more than four hours' march from the main camp at the enemy's head quarters near Tchivilli Karfa, whereas it was only an hour and a half distant from us.

By dispersing the camp at Ainalli, the victory would have been utilised, and the least result would have been that the enemy would not have had sufficient force to continue his blockade, shutting us up within a circumference of ten hours' march.

By omitting this enterprise, the glorious victory remained unfruitful, as to any result it had upon the war; as must be the case with all victories which are not, as General CLAUSEWITZ says, 'immediately used in the military household.”

General KMETY assumes that Sir F. WILLIAMS overrated the Russians, but if he had only committed an error of judgment he would have done one of two things. He would either have frankly confessed it, or he would have endeavoured to show that his judgment was correct. For a soldier to keep silence under such an appeal as General KMETY's is inconceivable, except upon the hypothesis that the consciousness of bad faith prevented him from speaking on the subject.

If Sir F. WILLIAMS designed to betray Kars, he was only carrying out the purposes of his Government.

On the 30th June, 1855, Lord STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE attended a Conference at the house of the Grand Vizier. The Russians, to the number of from twenty to thirty thousand, had encamped before Kars. The Turkish army was estimated at 18,000 men. Lord STRATFORD writes:

"It was clear to all present that, whether the Russians besieged or turned Kars, the Turkish army required an effort to be made for its relief with all practicable despatch, and that of three possible modes of acting for that purpose, the only one likely to prove effective was an expedition by Kutais into Georgia. To send reinforcements by Trebizond would be at best a palliative To establish an entrenched

* He has since been dismissed, and is now commanding the Sultan's forces in Herzegovina.

camp at Redout Kaleh would, at this unhealthy season, be equivalent to consigning the troops to destruction.

"The real question was, whether a force numerically sufficient, and in all respects effective, could be collected in time at Kutais to make an excursion into Georgia, and threaten the communications of the Russian army, placing it, indeed, between two hostile forces should the Turkish army still be in a condition to take the field.

"It was for the Turkish Ministers to solve this problem, and they proposed that the expeditionary force should be composed of 12,000 men from Batoom and the neighbouring stations; of the troops made over to General VIVIAN, and estimated at 10,000 of all arms; of General BEATSON'S Irregular Cavalry; of 10,000 men to be detached from the army in Bulgaria as the complement of the Turkish Contingent; of 5000 more derived from the same source; of an Egyptian regiment of horse now here; and of another regiment expected from Tunis. To these the Seraskier proposed to add 2000 Albanians by way of riflemen. These several forces completed, according to the figures, would present a total of 44,400 men, not perhaps to be reckoned with prudence at more than 36,000 effectives."-Kars Blue Book, page 221.

To this letter Lord CLARENDON, on the 14th of July, telegraphed the following answer :

"The plan for reinforcing the army at Kars, contained in your despatches of the 30th of June and 1st instant, is disapproved. The reasons will be sent by messenger to-day against employing the Turkish Contingent until it is fit for service.

case.

"Trebizond ought to be the base of operations, and if the Turkish army of Kars and Erzeroom cannot hold out at the latter place against the Russians, it might fall back at Trebizond, where it would easily be reinforced."-Kars Blue Book, page 226. The refusal is positive, the opinion given is evasive. "Trebizond ought to be the base of operations." Then why not say that the plan is approved liable to that change? What is contemplated, moreover, is, that the army of Kars should fall back on Erzeroom, that is to say, that Kars should fall. This telegram, therefore, contains the whole The British Government intended the fall of Kars. Why then was the opinion volunteered about making Trebizond the basis of operations? The answer to this is evident. The Author of Lord CLARENDON'S telegram was thoroughly acquainted with the mind of the British Ambassador at Constantinople. Lord STRATFORD had already refused to enforce on the Porte the insolent demands made by Lord CLARENDON in behalf of Sir F. WILLIAMS. He would resist a barefaced intimation that Kars was to fall. He was ready to discuss the question whether Trebizond ought to be the basis of operations. He writes to Lord CLARENDON, July 30:

"The unfavourable judgment passed by Her Majesty's Government on the plans which have been lately under discussion, with a view to the relief of the Sultan's army at Kers, has naturally increased the Porte's embarrassment. It was my duty to make it known to the Turkish Ministers, not only as an opinion, but, with respect to General VIVIAN'S Contingent, as a veto. A most serious dilemma is the immediate result, Her Majesty's Government not only withhold the Contingent, but express a decided preference for the alternative of sending reinforcements to Erzeroom by way of Trebizond. This opinion is not adopted by the Porte, or, indeed, any official or personal authority here. The Seraskier, OMER PASHA, General GUYON, our own officers, as far as I have the means of knowing, agree with the Porte and the French Embassy in preferring a diversion, on the side of Redout-Kaleh, as offering better chances of success, supposing, of course, that the necessary means of transport, supply, and other indispensable wants can be sufficiently provided. France is at the same time decidedly adverse to any diminution of force in the Crimea; and OMER PASHA, ready to place himself at the head of an Asiatic expedition, requires for that purpose a part of the troops now there."-Kars Blue-Book, page 255.

In the mean time a proposal had been made by Lord STRATFORD to Lord CLARENDON to alter the plan for the incursion into Georgia.

Lord CLARENDON having written to Paris to overcome the objection entertained there, telegraphed as follows on the 9th of August :General VIVIAN'S Contingent to go immediately to Eupatoria.

"The Turkish troops there 10,000 to 12,000 to go with OMER PASHA to RedoutKaleh.

The Turkish troops at Balaklava and Kertch not to be diminished in number. "The Turkish force to go to Redout-Kaleh under OMER PASHA, to be completed to its proper number by troops from Bulgaria or elsewhere, not from the Crimea."Kars Blue-Book, page 255.

On the 16th of August Colonel SIMMONS wrote about the proposed expedition on the part of OMER PASHA. From this letter we quote only one sentence:

"The Pasha doubts if the expedition will now be in time to save the garrison of Kars, but if not, it will, at any rate, prevent the enemy from establishing himself in the government of Erzeroom, and there organising measures for a further advance into the interior in the next campaign."-Kars Blue-Book, page 277.

The objections to the expedition faded as the time when it would have saved Kars, receded. On the 3rd of October, Lord CLARENDON approved of the expedition. This approval was conveyed in a despatch. The first disapproval of the scheme had been sent by telegraph.

On the 26th of November, Lord STRATFORD applied to Lord CLARENDON to forward part of the loan which the British Government had compelled Turkey to accept, but of which the whole 5,000,000l. had remained since August in the hands of the British Government.

On the 7th of December, Lord CLARENDON wrote to Lord STRATFORD approving the steps "taken with a view to the relief of Kars." But on the 25th of November, Kars had fallen. The Turks being thus "calmed by defeat," Russia agreed to an armistice.

Sir F. WILLIAMS was a prisoner; when he came back to England he proposed a testimonial to MOURAVIEF.

It is not difficult to understand the words quoted by Mr. CRAWSHAY, in our January number, from a Turkish officer who was at Kars during the siege, "We did not fear Russia, we trembled before the British "Government."

These words recall those of Lord HERBERT OF LEA, "We were "agreed with our enemy, but not with our Ally."

C. D. C.

Latent Resources of Turkey available for discharging her Debt.

A VERY remarkable letter has appeared in the Standard (September 10th), under the title of "Turkish Affairs." It is signed " An "Eleven Years' Resident," and bears evidence of being written by one who is acquainted to a most surprising degree with the state of affairs in Turkey. And what is still more surprising, the writer also understands Russia, as will be seen by some of the passages from his letter which we insert.

He proposes two measures as a means or paying off the debt and adding to the permanent wealth of the country. This debt has been illegally incurred (by the Mussulman law which forbids one genera