periodical in which it appeared is one which chronicles the follies of the day, and it augurs well in one sense, at least, that men dealing mostly with the lighter incidents of social life, should be moved to go through the task of ransacking and comparing official papers to ascertain the justice or injustice of a war.

I need say nothing as to the figures presented. If anything were wanting to the gloom of this ghastly Ashantee expedition, it is the villainy of our professing to undertake it in the interests of commerce and civilisation, whilst we have actually goaded the Ashantees into attacking us, because, in violation of treaties, we have imposed duties of five hundred per cent. on their trade. Your millions must be lavished, and the miserable remains of your army expended; another crime must be laid on your overburdened souls, that African palm oil may not compete with Russian tallow.

Your obedient servant,

STEWART E. ROLLAND.

THE ASHANTEE WAR

(From Vanity Fair, November 8th.)

The final cause of the troubles with the King of ASHANTEE is nothing less than his desire to be allowed to trade directly with the outer world. This desire has always been resisted by the coast tribes under our protection (especially the Fantees), as may be seen from the despatch of Administrator USSHER, dated 21st of March, 1871. "The King and Chiefs of Assin (which lies between Ashantee and the coast) are," he says, "determined to resist the opening of the Ashantee road. Their object is to prevent the Ashantees passing down, so that they may remain brokers and carry on a limited but profitable trade with Ashantee to the exclusion of the rest of the Protectorate." All the rest of the coast tribes pursued the same object, with the sole exception of the Elminas, and that is why the King of ASHANTEE always attached so much importance to Elmina, which had from time immemorial been his friend, his tributary, and his sole outlet to the coast.

Now as the object always put forward by England on this coast was "the promotion of commerce" it was manifestly the business of the English authorities to befriend the Ashantees and to further their efforts to carry on their commerce and to free it from the crushing charges placed upon it by those broking tribes. Instead of that, the whole history of the Gold Coast administration since these troubles began has been one of unfriendliness to the Ashantees and of support given to the broking tribes against them. We are given to understand moreover that England has been made to take precisely the same action as those very tribes, that is to levy enormous and prohibitory charges on the Ashantee trade by way of customs duties. That being an important point there is naturally scarcely any information on it to be found in the published official papers, but the accounts of Revenue and Expenditure presented to Parliament last year do nevertheless indicate that this policy has been pursued. In 1867 the receipts from Customs Duties levied on the Gold Coast were 41387. 8s. 1d., in 1868 they were more than doubled to 98467. 13s. 8d., in 1869 they had risen to 17,2567. 15s. 8d. and in 1870 they were no less than 20,2727. 1s. 9! or nearly five times what they had been in 1867. Now according to th and Navigation Accounts, the computed real value

of all imports and exports together was in 1867, 653,2751., in 1868, 759,2057., in 1869, 913,2297. and in 1870, 721,5417., so that this enormous increase in the duty could not have arisen from the increase of the imports and exports, which have remained as will be seen nearly stationary. It must therefore have arisen from an increase in the duties themselves; so that while professing to encourage trade we appear to have been laying heavier duties upon it each year. Some further information ought to be obtained on this point. If it be true as is asserted that the duties we levy, added to the "brokerage" or black mail of our friends the coast tribes, often amount to a charge of five hundred per cent. the Ashantees have certainly reason to complain of our insincerity in professing to wish for the development of commerce in their part of the world.

RUSSIA AND PERSIA.

(From the Morning Advertiser, Dec. 16, 1873.)

A telegram of no small importance has come to us by way of Vienna, and subsequently directly, which we fear is almost too good to be true. It was announced a day or two ago that, in consequence of the non-commencement of the railway to Teheran by the date agreed upon in October last, the Shah had revoked the Concession to Baron REUTER; and though this news is, if true, of the very deepest importance to us, not a single newspaper noticed it or ventured to comment on it. Since the conquest and annexation of Khiva, everything that takes place in Persia, politically and commercially, is of the very utmost consequence to us. There is nothing now between India and Russia but Persia; and it is a disgrace and a folly inconceivable to see the total want of information and utter supineness with which both the Government and the English people regard events that are taking place in the East. If the Shah really has revoked the Concession to REUTER, and it would really seem that he has done so, then that is the best news that we in England have heard for many a long day, since it shows that the Shah is quite conscious of his position as regards Russia, is anxious to keep well with us, and has seen the political danger of the REUTER Concession, and taken the first opportunity he could take of getting out of it; and it shows pretty clearly that the Shah has no desire to make common cause with Russia, as it is sought to make us believe. It is easy enough to throw dust in the eyes of the British public, so lost in gossip and devoured in mere money-making, that all right judgment in such graver concerns is blunted, prevision destroyed, and sense of danger eaten up in the gratification and preoccupation of the moment. With a system so lax and irresponsible as ours, it is easy enough to put the screw on a Government so faineant and malleable, if any screw were required; but it is not, for the traditions of office for the last fifty years show how very much easier it is for a Minister to fall in with the designs of Russia than to oppose them. In dealing with constitutional Governments and peoples lost in the toils and turmoils of civilisation, Russia finds her work easy enough; but it is not so easy to blind Eastern Princes, who are not civilised, and who see themselves in immediate danger of being swallowed up by Russia. As easy might it be to convince the rabbit of the kindly and pacific intentions of the boa-constrictor-as easy to induce the lamb to enter into alliance with the wolf. But a great purpose is to be served by making us believe in the alliance between Russia and Persia. If we can be got to entertain that notion, an excuse will be afforded for our being unfriendly, and in time hostile, to Persia; and Persia, being repulsed by us, is of necessity driven back into the arms of Russia in spite of herself. A

-

you

similar position was that when the Circassian delegates visited England to ask our assistance, and their answer, when it was suggested that they would get no help from us, was rather applicable to the present case :66 If do not assist us on the Kuban, you will have to fight us at Herat," was the reply. That ill deed was accomplished. Circassia was sacrificed, Khiva was sacrificed, and now comes Persia's turn. By this light we see what all this talk about the concession of the Attrek Valley means. We know when we read newspaper paragraphs about the assistance to be lent to Persia by Russian troops for the invasion of Khorassan (a province of her own) what that means, ridiculous as the fiction is. We know, too, what the quasi attention of the Czarewitch to the Shah, when he was in London, meant. It was all part of a miserable scheme for pretending alliance and friendship with Persia which does not exist, and which cannot exist. Let us try and realise the Shah's position, and think what friendship we should have for Russia. But we are expected to do the jackal's work as usual, and, having our feelings and understandings played upon by such means as telegrams and newspaper paragraphs, to be made to whip in Persia for the Czar, if we are lost enough and mad enough to do it, as indeed we may be. But if we can form any judgment from the telegram we have alluded to, the task is not going to be quite so easy as was at first anticipated when this Concession under misapprehension was extracted.

It is clear that the Shah does not go well in harness, and the position or Russia is so ticklish in Central Asia that the most delicate driving is required. Persia might be of great use to us, if we honestly cultivated friendly relations with the Shab, and set ourselves to assist him in developing the strength of his Empire, so that he might set invasion or hostility from the north at defiance. We do not want Persia ourselves. It is of no use to us, we have quite as much territory now in India as we can conveniently manage; but the last thing we should wish for is a weak State on our frontiers which can be made use of by an enemy. Persia, strong, independent, and confident in our good faith and alliance might be of great value to us in trade, and beyond all might keep Russia at a distance from us for ever. The great blunder that Germany made fifty years ago was in permitting and assisting in the partition and demolition of Poland. It is for us to take care that Persia does not prove our Poland. But to prevent this, Englishmen of all classes must pay more attention to Indian affairs than they do. We cannot afford to lose India. The loss of India would but herald the downfall of England; and India, according as we deal with her, is either our strong or our weak point. We have committed a gigantic blunder or worse in the Khivan business, though Russia is by no means on the velvet there which is generally reported and believed. Her losses have been much more important than is supposed, and her position is decidedly critical. Indeed, had England at any time but raised her finger, Russia could not have done even what she has. But we know what the policy of the Colonial Office is; and though it is not expressed quite so openly as it was some time ago, owing to the sharp indignation then evoked, yet it is not altered by one tittle, and the abandonment of Canada, Australia, and India is the cherished theory of heartless theorists and praganatical political prigs as much as ever it was. One of the principal objects which Russia has is to establish a line of trade through Georgia, viâ Tiflis, Reshd, and Teheran, to the Persian Gulf. The REUTER Concession, which involved the line of rail from Reshd to Teheran, was a most important link in that chain. Any one who chooses to look at the map will see that from the Black Sea to Reshd the entire line runs through Russian territory, and

therefore the line on to Teheran could only be made in the Russian interest. If, then, this important link has fallen through, and the Shah really has seen that a connexion between Russia and his capital by rail is not to be desired, and has therefore annulled it, that is of the utmost consequence to us, and is a Christmas-box in the way of news such as we have rarely received. A direct route through Russian territory to India would be Russia's own private route both for trade and military purposes. Such a route is inimical to us, and ought to be discouraged at all hazards. We do not want an exclusive Russian trade between the Crimea and the Persian Gulf; but what we ought to do is, with the assistance of Turkey, to establish a counter-line of commerce viâ Iskanderm and Aleppo through the Euphrates Valley to the Persian Gulf, either by rail or canal, whichever is most suitable, for the Euphrates itself must be navigable for a very considerable part of the route to the Persian Gulf; and this line, being through Turkish territory, would be safe from Russia, and it would give us two strings to our bow, in case of any disagreement or difficulty at Suez. It would enrich Turkey and Persia, and put out of joint the Russian route via Tiflis. In all probability we never shall do this; because it is contrary to the interests of Russia, and we always carefully protect them, even to our own injury; but it is none the less what we ought to do. The Euphrates Valley Railway scheme has been burked now for a long series of years, and probably will continue to be, just as the Suez Canal was when it was an English scheme. English capital cannot be raised for it, but it will be raised to carry out the Russian project fast enough. Of course the act of the Shali will be combated by every possible means and argument. "No infringement of the convention on REUTER's part has taken place, and the Shah is not justified," &c., &c. But the fact, occurring as it does so immediately after the Concession, is one of great significance and of paramount importance, and therefore very little open fuss is made about it.

The Levant Herald publishes the following letter:TEHERAN, November, 25.-The harvest has been abundant this year in all parts of Persia, more especially in the important province of Adjerbeidjan. But, on the other hand, brigandage has assumed such proportions that great difficulty must now arise in suppressing it. Several of the mail couriers have been robbed on the highway, among others the English mail to Ispahan, and the Russian courier between Teheran and Resht. It is, moreover, a painful fact that troops sent to quell the evil have in many cases made common cause with the brigands, for the simple reason that the unlucky Persian soldiers have received no pay for the last fifteen months.

The Government has definitively determined to annul Baron Reuter's concession for the construction of railways and public works, for which it will have, no doubt, to pay a rattling indemnity to the enterprising Baron. This concession, and other attempts to introduce European civilisation and progress into Persia, have raised up two distinct and opposite parties in the State, each of which has zealous representatives at Teheran, and in all the principal towns in the kingdom. At the head of the party in favour of progress is ex-Grand Vizier, Mirza Hussein Khan, who is known in consequence as Feringhi, or "The Frank," while the retrograde party, the Persian Tory party, comprise all the princes of the royal family, the principal ecclesiastics, and no inconsiderable part of the population. Both parties have now fully entered upon the struggle, and the opponents of progress, I regret to say, appear to gain ground-so much so that t

Shah, alarmed at the difficulties and dangers involved in the changes he desired to accomplish, is now said to have resolved to make no alteration in the ancient order of things.

Last week a very imposing ceremony took place at the palace in presence of all the princes aud dignitaries of the kingdom. The Shah publicly presented a diadem of great value to his favourite wife (who is understood to have been one of the chief promoters of the intrigue against the ex-Grand Vizier), and at the same time decreed that she should bear the glowing but somewhat pretentious title of " Melik Afak" (the Universal Queen).—Pall Mall Gazette, January 1, 1874.

SIR,-Were I to treat this subject as a lawyer I should simply give extracts from the great Compilation of St. Louis and the Ordinances of FRANCIS I. and HENRY IV., in order to show that the seizure of enemies' property at sea was the right and the heritage of France when at war, and that it was also her most sacred duty.

But those who desire to learn the truth have these sources of information within their reach and under their hands. What use then would it serve to give an exposition of them? These laws exist, and this history is written; and yet you have arrived at the point at which you now are; that of having undergone a terrible defeat by refusing to employ this force and by not fulfilling this duty. You have arrived at it by a process of false logic, namely, that of substituting a generality in the place of examination, and of extinguishing memory by uttering a proposition. Instead of concentrating all your means of carrying on a war against your enemy, you busied yourselves with speculations on the liberty of commerce. That which appears to me, then, important to do, is to give a sketch of the operation which has deprived you of your maritime strength; an operation in substance diplomatic, in its accidental and external character only military. This operation is known in history as the Crimean War.

Strategical details come thus within the scope of a legal publication, because the movements of troops and the phases of law are so entangled that it becomes impossible to comprehend them separately. It is for this reason that both are misunderstood. This law, moreover, relates solely to war, and it is in the practice of it that maritime power resides; that power which exceeds all others, according to the Roman proverb :-" He who commands the sea is master of affairs."

* Translated from La Revue des Institutions et du Droit. Grenoble: Baratier Frères et Dardelet, Grande Rue 4. Paris Durand et Pedone Lauriel, Rue Cujas 9.