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band, a judicious father, a faithful friend, a charitable neighbor, industrious in his calling, a sincere well wisher to his species, and still he may omit a strict performance of his duties as a citizen. He may even boast of his political apathy. So that it appears necessary we should know all our civil obligations." It is clear, therefore, and this point is stated forcibly and eloquently by our author, that it is of the highest importance, that every citizen should know, and be fully impressed with the necessity of performing his duties as a citizen.

In regard to the second question above stated, whether politics are susceptible of being treated in an ethic point of view, Mr. Lieber answers, that the state is an institution for a distinct moral end, and, in the attainment of this end, every action of government is the legitimate object of moral science. The political conduct of the citizens, therefore, is distinctly susceptible of the moral character, and, of course, of being treated as a branch of ethics. This chapter is thus concluded:

"It is one of the chief objects of this work, to show how the principles of ethics are applicable to politics. If there is, at present, in some countries so great a confusion of ethico-political ideas, that the observer would well nigh lose his hope, let us not forget that nations may rise from a state of political torpor or immorality, and assume a station worthier of the nature of man. Who would deny that England, of to-day, stands, as to politics and public political opinion, far above the times of Charles II, and the political corruption under James II? Who would deny, that France has politically improved, if we compare her as she is, with the times of the Regent, and of Louis XV? Who can deny that the probity of the papal church government has vastly improved since the times of the reformation, if we compare it to what it was under the popes of the fifteenth century?

"What minister of state would now dare to take a pension from a foreign monarch, or what judge a present or bribe? Yet nothing

was more common, perhaps, all over Europe in the seventeenth century.

"Much, however, seems yet in an unsettled state. Very doubtful, and, at times, decidedly immoral principles are publicly, sometimes unwittingly, proclaimed. Our task is to proceed in this branch, as mankind proceeded with regard to ethics in general. Let us gather what is acknowledged as stable, let us ascertain why it is so, and on these principles rest our further conclusions."

In the last chapter of the first book, Mr. Lieber considers the question, whether religion or common sense dispenses with ethics in politics; and he establishes the principle, that they neither dispense with a proper knowledge of those sciences, nor with constant exertion and industry.

The second book, which makes the greater part of the volume, is devoted to the subject of the state, and is intended as an introduction to the science of political ethics, proper, which will make the subject of the second part of the work. The following are the reasons given by our author for presenting us with his own views in reference to political science, previous to entering upon the special topics of his work :

"If we are desirous of doing our duty, we must know it, and we cannot know it, without an accurate appreciation of the relations which may call for its exercise. In political ethics, therefore, it will be necessary, before all, to have a distinct idea of what the state essentially is. I have given my views of this greatest institution in the next book. I shall be obliged to treat in it many problems properly belonging to natural law, but the reader will find that this apparent deviation from the subject strictly before us was necessary. We cannot thoroughly discuss and investigate the duties of the citizen, for instance, when in the opposition, his obligation as to unwise, unjust or depraving laws, his rightful conduct as executive officer, in a word, all his ethic relations growing out of the state, without first inquiring into the essence of this institution; and as I cannot, without many reservations, subscribe to any

extant political theory, I shall be obliged to give my own views, before I proceed to treat of political ethics proper."

Our limits will not admit of an extended and full analysis of the contents of the second book of Mr. Lieber's work;much less of an examination of all the doctrines, which it contains, connected with and incident to the author's theory of the state. We shall therefore do little more than present our readers with this theory in the author's own language. We commend it to the serious and candid consideration of all political inquirers. If we are not greatly mistaken, it is a new and original view; and, besides the merit of originality, possesses also the higher merit of truth.

"The state is a society. What is a society? A society is a number of individuals, between all of whom exists the same relation-the same, as to its principle, however modified it may be in other respects, or it is a number of individuals who have the same interest, and strive unitedly for it. The individuals or members of a society exercise, therefore, a more or less intense influence upon one another. The catholic church is a society; between all members, the cardinal and lowest layman, exists the relation of religion and the same religious discipline. These fundamental relations constitute the peculiar character of the society, and are called its ties. Societies may be temporary unions with stated objects, or they may rest on relations not entirely, or not at all controllable by the members-on given relations, with general objects chiefly to be learned from the fundamental relations themselves between the members. By way of greater distinction, I would call the former associations, companies, the latter, by way of excellence, societies. Insurance companies, charitable societies, academies of science, are associations; nations, states, communities, are societies."

This passage is followed by an enumeration of the different relations, in which man may be placed, and a specification of the chief relations, which exist between man and man. One of these is "the relation of right. The society founded

upon this relation is the state." Mr. Lieber then proceeds to consider the question, "what is right," and, at the same time, further developes his idea of the state, in the following paragraphs:

"Man, it has been shown, is a moral individual, yet bound to live in society. He is a being with free agency-freedom of action, but as all his fellow-men with whom he lives in contact, are equally beings with free agency, each making the same claim of freedom of action, there results from it the necessity, founded in reason, i. e. the law, that the use of freedom by one rational being must not contradict or counteract the use of liberty by another rational being. The relation which thus exists between these rational beings, this demand of what is just made by each upon each, is the relation of right, and the society founded upon this basis, which exists because right (jus) in its primordial sense exists and ought to exist between men, which has to uphold and insist upon it, which has to enforce it, since every man has a right to be a man, that is, a free-acting or rational being, because he is a man―this society is the state.

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Right is that which I claim as just, because necessary to me as man, and granted by me to others; it is the condition of men's union, that by which man's individuality or personality on the one hand, and sociality on the other can coexist. This is the most comprehensive meaning of the word, and applies to what I have called the society of comity as well as to the state. We say, as to social intercourse, every man has a right to call on another. What, then, are the rights, in particular, on which the state is built? Are the relations of social intercourse unimportant? Far from it; in many cases they are of utmost importance to the whole well-being of man; and even outweigh the relations of which the state takes notice by positive law. A negro may, according to the constitution of some of the United States, vote, and is not legally prevented from obtaining any the highest office, or from becoming among other things teacher in a university; he has the political right or the right guaranteed by the state. Yet there is for the present no earthly chance for a colored man to become

mayor of Boston, because the society of comity denies him the right; the white race feel repugnance at close association with him; the difference of race has established in a degree a difference of sympathy. Should then not the state enforce this right of the negro? Enforce what? Oblige whites to invite the African ? Would not the whites complain of interference with their right of being perfectly independent at home? And here we have arrived at the proper distinction.

"The state is founded on those rights, which are essential to all members, and which can be enforced. Political enfranchisement was for a long time not as important to the Jews in Europe as social enfranchisement; in fact, they justly considered the former but as the stepping-stone to the latter; still the latter could be made no state relation, it could not be legislated upon. Frequently it will happen, that social rights finally become acknowledged by the state; so will rights originally belonging to catallactic society. We call rights, by way of excellence, those rights on which the state is founded, or enforcible rights.

"The state then is that society which has to protect the free action of every one, as its first basis, and as all the other enumerated relations imply action (for with the exception of the relation of consanguinity, all manifest themselves in some way or other by action) each of these relations becomes likewise a relation of right, either claiming to be enforced or to be protected against infringement. If a father amuses his children with soap bubbles it is an action of a very private character indeed; yet the moment that another would wilfully interfere, the state is bound to protect the father. A cat is generally speaking a subject of no public interest, but actions have been brought and sustained against the wilful destroyers of a favorite cat. The exchange of my labor or superfluity for other commodities must be protected. My fancies, my very follies, if they do not interfere with the rights of others must be protected. However droll a will may be, if not immoral, it must be protected. In this sense the state is the society of soci eties. The state does not beg, invite, request, implore-the state demands, it speaks through laws, laws which command, that is,

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