reservation gives to the grantor but a life estate in the land. Richardson v. York, 2 Shepley, 216. 6. (Same.) If one be bound to convey land, "the title to be a good and sufficient deed," a good title by deed should be conveyed. Brown v. Gammon, 2 Shepley, 276. 7. (Same.) Definite boundaries, given in a deed, will limit the generality of a term, previously used, which if unexplained would have included a greater quantity of land. Allen v. Allen, 2 Shepley, 387. 8. (Same.) Thus, where the description was, my homestead farm, being lot No. 13, in range 4;" it was held, that nothing passed by the deed excepting lot No. 13, although the grantor occupied other land adjoining that lot. Ib. 9. (Boundary.) Where a boundary line in a deed of conveyance is described as measuring a certain number of feet, "more or less," and there is nothing in the deed itself or in the subject to which it applies, to explain the description, the number of feet mentioned is to be deemed the precise length of the boundary line. Blaney v. Rice, 20 Pick. 62. 10. (Same.) Where a deed of a part of a tract of land described such part as running back from a street 85 feet, more or less, and bounded in the rear on land of the grantor, being a part of the same tract, and the grantor, some time afterwards, but before he had sold any more of the land, prepared and put on record, a plan of the land, in which the part granted was laid down as 88 feet in depth from the street, it was held, that the case came within the rule of fixing a monument or abuttal soon after a conveyance, and that the grantee took according to the plan. Ib. 11. (Same.) Where the owner of land lying between and abutting on two parallel streets granted a part of it, describing it as fronting on one of the streets, and running back 85 feet, "more or less," and subsequently granted another part, describing it as fronting on the other street, and running back 80 feet, and bounded on the first part, when according to the measurements there would be a narrow strip between the two parts, but the second deed referred to a plan on which the dividing line was laid down as 80 feet from the street last mentioned, it was held, that the second grantee took 80 feet in depth, according to the plan, and no more. Ib. 12. (Description by reference.) Where a deed from V. to P., conveying several parcels of land described by metes and bounds, contained the clause, "meaning and intending hereby to convey all the real estate which I derived under the deeds recorded in Suffolk registry of deeds," (citing several deeds by book and leaf) "to all which deeds reference is to be had,” it was held, that a parcel of land conveyed to V. by a deed thus referred to, and no otherwise described in the deed from V. to P. than by such reference, passed by the deed from V. to P. Foss v. Crisp, 20 Pick. 121. 13. (Fraudulent.) A conveyance made to defraud creditors is good as against the grantor and his heirs; and if they subsequently convey the same land to a grantee, who has constructive or actual notice of the prior conveyance, such grantee must, in order to avoid the prior conveyance, prove that he was a purchaser for a valuable consideration. Clapp v. Tirrell, 20 Pick. 247. 14. (Same-consideration.) The clause in a deed acknowledging payment of the consideration is mere prima facie evidence, and may be controlled and rebutted by parol evidence; and where the deed is impeached on the ground of fraud, it is the lowest species of prima facie evidence; inasmuch as the same motives which would lead parties to make a fraudulent conveyance would induce them to insert, in the strongest terms, an acknowledgment of the payment of the consideration. Ib. 15. (Prescriptive title to a messuage.) The owner of two ad adjoining messuages fronting easterly on a street, conveyed the southerly messuage, in 1703, by a deed, in which, after stating that on the southerly side of that messuage "there is a gate and passage-way of about five feet wide leading from the street into the yard of the said messuage," he 66 reserves unto himself, his heirs and assigns for ever, free liberty of ingress, egress and regress through and upon the said gate or passage-way, for carrying and recarrying wood or any other thing through the same and over the yard or ground of the said messuage hereby granted, into and from the housing and land of the grantor for the use and accommodation thereof, without damnifying or annoying thereby the grantee, his heirs or assigns. And it is mutually agreed, that whensoever the grantee, his heirs or assigns, are minded to make or add any addition of building backward, he or they shall only make the breadth to extend equal with the breadth of the back of the chimneys of said tenement hereby granted." It was held, that although the owner of the northerly messuage had enjoyed the passage-way for a period long enough to give a prescriptive title, yet that as the use had been consonant with the deed, the easement must be deemed to have been under and not adverse to the reservation, and must be explained and limited by the terms of the reservation. Atkins v. Bordman, 20 Pick. 291. 16. (Estate tail.) The owner of certain real estate, in 1793, conveyed it to his daughter "and to her heirs born of her body," "to have and to hold the same " to her "and her heirs forever," and covenanted with her "and her heirs as aforesaid," that he would warrant and defend the same to her "and her heirs as aforesaid," against the lawful claims of all persons. It was held, that a present estate tail passed to the daughter by the deed; and that consequently, upon her death, it descended to her eldest son, to the exclusion of her other children. Corbin v. Healy, 20 Pick. 514. COVENANT. (Action on.) Where one man conveys land to another, and at the same time the grantee gives a bond to the grantor, conditioned that the grantee should reconvey the premises on demand, and should permit the grantor to enjoy the premises until the conveyance back: the grantee can maintain no action against the grantor on the covenants of the deed. Hatch v. Kimball, 2 Shepley, 9. 2. (Same.) Where the grantor, by deed of warranty, of a hun dred acre lot by metes and bounds, at the time of the grant, owned 7500 acres of land subject to a mortgage of 6000 acres thereof in common; in an action by the grantee upon the covenants of the deed, he is entitled to recover nominal damages, the mortgage not having been extinguished. Randall v. Mal lett, 2 Shepley, 51. 3. (Damages.) In an action for a breach of a covenant against incumbrances, the plaintiff may recover in damages the amount of money fairly and justly paid by him to remove an incumbrance, although it was paid after the action was commenced. Brooks v. Moody, 20 Pick. 474. DECLARATION. (On penal statute.) In an action founded upon a penal statute or ordinance, it is not sufficient to lay the offence charged in the very words of the statute or ordinance, unless they expressly serve to allege the very fact with all necessary additions and without uncertainty or ambiguity. The special circumstances necessary to individuate the offence must be stated distributively and not disjunctively. Duck v. Burgess, 7 Watts, 181. DEED. (Delivery.) A grantor, upon signing a deed, put it before the grantee, saying "there is no go back from that," and the witnesses then subscribed their names; a note, which was to be the consideration of the deed, was not handed to the grantor, but the two papers were taken up by the grantee and the parties went to a magistrate, in order that he might take the acknowledgment. The acknowledgment was accordingly taken and certified, but the grantor withheld the deed from the grantee, and the grantee did not then assert or claim that it had been previously delivered, and the grantor, in his answer to a bill in equity, denied that it had been delivered. It was held, that a delivery had not been proved. Mills v. Gore, 20 Pick. 28. 2. (Mistake in survey.) Where a tract of land is surveyed into sections or lots, by lines actually run and marked upon the land, and one of the sections or lots is subsequently sold and conveyed, and in the conveyance described as bounded upon the adjoining sections or lots, it is not competent to a grantor or those claiming under him, to allege subsequent to such conveyance, that in the survey of the tract a mistake occurred, by which a larger quantity of land was included in the section sold, than was originally intended, and thereby deprive the grantee or those claiming under him of a portion of the land, conveyed; although the mistake is clearly shown as well by a map of the survey made and filed shortly after the division of the tract in a public office, as by parol proof, exhibited on the trial. Van Wyck v. Wright, 18 Wend. 157. 3. (Same.) Even had the conveyance of the section sold refer red to the map on file, the actual survey and not the map would have controlled in settling the rights of the parties. Ib. 4. (Same.) It is a settled rule that a conveyance is to be construed in reference to its distinct and visible locative calls as marked or appearing upon the land, in preference to quantity, course, distance, map or any thing else. Ib. 5. (Same.) A deed as to the extent of the premises conveyed, must receive the same construction which would have been given to it immediately after its execution; the subsequent development of facts unknown to the parties at the time of the conveyance, and in reference to which of course they cannot have contracted, cannot affect its construction. Ib. 6. (Same.) It was competent to the original proprietors, as between themselves, to have corrected any mistake which happened in the original survey, or subdivision of the tract, but after third persons have acquired rights in conformity to the survey as actually made, the error cannot be corrected to their prejudice without their assent. Ib. 7. (Same.) Whether in such case the mistake be made by the sub-surveyor or by the principal surveyor, it is equally conclusive upon the proprietors. Ib. 8. (Same.) An obliteration of the line to which the grantee claims, and a correction thereof by an offset, unless within a reasonable distance of the premises conveyed, is not sufficient to charge the purchaser with notice. In this case the correction |