Page images
PDF
EPUB

JURISPRUDENCE.

I. DIGEST OF ENGLISH CASES.

COMMON LAW.

Selections from 6 Adolphus and Ellis, Parts 3 and 4; 3 Clark and Finelly, Part 4; 3 Nevile and Perry, Parts 2 and 3; 4 Bingham's New Cases, Part 3; 3 Meeson and Welsby, Part 4; 4 Meeson and Welsby, Part 1; and 2 Moody and Robinson, Part 1.

ADVERTISEMENT FOR REWARD. Where a party who had been robbed of bank-notes published an advertisement, whereby he promised that "whoever should give information by which the same should be traced, should, on conviction of the parties, receive a reward of 201." to be paid on application to him :-Held, that the only party entitled to the reward was he who first gave information whereby the notes were traced to the robber, so as to ensure his conviction:-Held also, that such information need not be communicated in the first instance to the party robbed, but that it was sufficient if it were given to a person authorized to act upon it in the apprehension of the offender; as to a constable. Lancaster v. Walsh, 2 M. & W. 16.

ARBITRATION. (Award-Excess of authority by arbitrator.) By an agreement for the sale of lands, it was stipulated that the title should be made out to the satisfaction of a third person. A question arose between that person and the vendor, as to the validity of the title; and by an order of the court, "the settlement of all questions on any agreement" existing between the

parties was referred to an arbitrator. He awarded that the vendor should convey the lands to the vendee, and should execute a bond to the vendee, to be forfeited on eviction of the latter from the premises by reason of any defect of the title :Held, that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority in so awarding, and that the award was bad. Ross v. Boards, 3 N. & P. 382.

ATTORNEY. (Liability of in trespass, for irregular arrest.) Where a writ of capias ad respondendum has been set aside for irregularity, the attorney who sued it out is liable in trespass. (1 Str. 509: T. Raym. 73; 2 W. Bl. 845; 3 B. & Ad. 343.) Codrington v. Lloyd, 3 N. & P. 442.

2. (Production of client's title deeds by.) A witness is not bound to produce, in obedience to a subpoena, a will which he holds as attorney for a devisee claiming under it; although it be suggested that it is a will of personalty as well as realty, and ought therefore to be deposited in the ecclesiastical court. Doe d. Carter v. James, 2 M. & Rob. 47.

BILLS AND NOTES. (Alteration of.) The addition of the name of a second surety to a joint and several promissory note, with consent of all parties, after it has issued, is not a material alteration, so as to render an additional stamp necessary, or to affect the right of the co-surety to contribution. Cattin v. Simpson, 3 N. & P. 248.

2. (Same.) The holder of a bill is bound to prove that any alteration in it has been duly made. When therefore a bill, the appearance of which left it uncertain whether it had been altered before or immediately after its issue, was submitted to a jury, with a direction that if from its appearance they believed the alteration was made before the bill was completed and while the ink was wet, they should find for the plaintiff; the court set aside the verdict so found, on the ground that the plaintiff ought to have shown by extrinsic evidence that the alteration was properly made. (M. & M. 116.) Knight v. Clements, 3 N. & P. 375.

3. (Notice of dishonor.) The holder of a bill gave the following

written notice to the indorser on its dishonor :-" Messrs. H. are surprised to hear that Mrs. G.'s bill was returned to the holder unpaid." On the same day the indorser came to the holder and expressed his regret, and promised that he would write to the other parties; by whom or by himself the bill should be paid: Held, sufficient notice to render him liable. Houlditch v. Cauty, 4 Bing. N. C. 411.

4. (What is a promissory note.) "I have received the sum of 201. which I borrowed of you, and I have to be accountable for the said sum with interest." Held to be an agreement, and not a promissory note. Horne v. Redfearne, 4 Bing. N. C. 433. 5. (What is a bill of exchange.) An instrument drawn by A. on B., requiring him to pay to the order of C., twenty-one days after date," without acceptance," a certain sum, is a bill of exchange, and may be so described in an indictment for forgery. Reg. v. Kinnear, 2 M. &. Rob. 117.

BOND. (How discharged.) The obligees of a joint and several indemnity bond for 20001. sued one of the obligors, but after declaration, and while the damages were unliquidated, accepted from him 2157., "being the amount which they had agreed to accept in discharge of the damages and costs in that action." Held, that such payment was not a discharge of the whole damages on the bond, so as to prevent the obligees from bringing another action upon it against the other obligor. (2 B. & Ad. 889.) Field v. Robins, 3 N. & P. 227.

COMPUTATION OF TIME. Goods were sold on the 5th of October, to be paid for in two months: Held, that an action for the price could not be commenced until after the expiration of the 5th of December. (15 Ves. 248; 9 B. & Cr. 134, 603; 4 Nev. & M. 378.) Webb v. Fairmaner, 3 M. & W. 473. CONTRACT OF SALE. (Sale or return.) The defendant sold the plaintiff two horses for 807., and the money was paid on an agreement that the plaintiff might return them within a month, allowing 107. off the 807., and that if he kept them beyond the month he should pay 107. more: Held, that the plaintiff, having returned them within the month, was entitled to recover back

the 707. in an action for money had and received. Hurst v. Orbell, 3 N. & M. 237.

CORPORATION. (Assumpsit, when maintainable by.) A corporation, created for the purpose of supplying gas, may maintain assumpsit for the breach of a contract by the defendant to accept gas from year to year at a certain yearly sum, the consideration being alleged to be the promise of the plaintiffs to supply it on those terms; such promise by the company, though not under seal, is valid, and is a good consideration. And it makes no difference as to the right of a corporation to sue on a contract entered into by them without seal, whether the contract be executed or executory, nor whether the promises be express or implied. (6 Ad. & E. 829.—Overruling East London Waterworks Company v. Bailey, 4 Bing. 283.) Church v. Imperial Gas Light Company, 6 Ad. & E. 846.

DEFECT OF FENCES. Where cattle have escaped from an adjoining close into that of the defendant, through defect of fences which he is bound to repair, he is not justified in driving them out in the highway and leaving them there, though that may be their best way back.

Quære, whether he would be justified if he had re-conducted them to the close from which they had escaped. Carruthers v. Hollis, 3 N. & P. 246.

DEVISE. (For life or in fee.) Devise as follows: “I give to my sons Joshua and James my estate that I now occupy, tegether with the factory thereon, except the house I now occupy, and twenty yards back, with the cottages thereon, which I give to my daughters A. and M. jointly." And after charging with certain payments "his estate heretofore given to his son," the will proceeded; "I give and bequeath to my son Joshua that estate at H. occupied by F., which I hold under lease from S., during the term of my lease: " Held, that the sons took a fee in the factory, and the daughters a fee in the house and cottages. (4 Taunt. 176; 7 East, 259.) Doe d. Knott v. Lawton, 4 Bing. N. C. 455.

2. (Construction of—Lawful heir, who meant by.) T. Selby, who

had no relations of his own name, devised his property, which had been purchased by himself, his father, and his grandfather, to his right and lawful heir at law (for whom he directed advertisements to be published) charged with legacies, to be paid in twelve months after his death: and if no heir was found, then to W. L., on condition that he changed his name to Selby. The testator had several relations on his mother's and grandmother's side, to whom he left large legacies: Held, on error (reversing the judgment of the court of common pleas), that by his “lawful heir" the testator meant not necessarily an heir of the blood of the Selbys, but any heir capable of inheriting the whole of his property. Davies v. Lowndes, 4 Bing. N. C. 478.

3. (Description of devisee.) A testatrix devised lands (after the death of devisees for life) to the second son of J. K. in fee. At the time of making the will, J. K. had had three sons, but two of them had died previously; the third, W., survived the testatrix. Afterwards, and in the testatrix's life-time, J. K. had a son, who died in her life-time, and another son, John, who survived her: Held, that John took under the devise. (1 Ves. sen. 294.) King v. Bennett, 4 M. & W. 36. DOMICILE. (Adoption of foreign law—Evidence.) The principle of the "comitas gentium," by which the personal property of a person who died while domiciled in another country is held subject to the law of the country of the domicile, does not extend to the adoption of the rules of evidence which prevail in that country.

Accordingly, where a party domiciled in England, in a deed executed by him, referred to a will which he had previously made relating to some money in a Scotch bank, and afterwards made a general will, which was admitted to be a revocation of the former one, though apparently not framed with the intention of altering the disposition which he had previously made of the Scotch money: Held, that the Scotch court was entitled to look at the former will for the purpose of aiding the construction of the deed by which it was referred to, though it would not have been producible for that purpose in an English court of law.

« PreviousContinue »