ply her with money to be used at her own discretion, on the credit of the husband, and yet be required to apply trust funds? Can any good reason be assigned, why on a bill in chancery brought by her or her representatives, (perhaps by the husband), his liability should be more extensive, than in a case where he had furnished her with funds on the credit of the husband? By introducing into the system principles thus heterogeneous, the simplicity of the law is destroyed, and the difficulty of a just administration of its rules is increased. The design of the revisers was not to disturb the analogies of the law, or to impose new burdens and duties on trustees, or to increase the extent or the duration of their liability. They were dismayed by the intricate learning of uses and trusts, and feeling themselves unprepared to meet the arduous task of encountering its "refinements, distinctions and abstruseness," they vainly resolved to make an effort to sweep away the mass altogether, to make the system intelligible and consistent.

They did not probably at all contemplate any change in the duties and liabilities of trustees, or in the general rules of property relating to trusts; and their sole object was to destroy entirely the subject of the abstruse science, which, though it furnished so many convenient modifications of estates, that could not otherwise be carried into effect, was nevertheless full of refinements and nice distinctions.

It will be very possible for the courts to carry into effect the design of the statute in relation to devises and certain executory trusts; but in all cases of executed trusts and of conveyances by deed executing an estate, we believe that in the modes which we have suggested, the statute may be evaded, and that it will be necessary for courts to carry trusts into effect, to a certain extent, to prevent great injustice. In the case of Coster v. Lorrillard,' the court of errors

have decided that a trust to receive and pay over rents and profits was not an active trust within the statute. This decision however was made upon a devise in trust; and a very different question might arise upon a trust executed, created by a conveyance at common law.

We cannot concur in the objections made by the revisers to uses and trusts, nor in the reasons assigned for abolishing them. The two principal objections are, 1, that limitations intended to take effect on a future day may be defeated by a disturbance of the seisin, arising from a forfeiture or change of the estate of the person seised to the use; 2, the difficulty of determining whether a particular limitation is to take effect as an executed use, as an estate at common law, or as a trust.

We have already shown, that uses and trusts are the only mode in which a conditional limitation can be carried into effect, when the estate of the person seised to a use is maintained; but on high considerations of public policy, it has always been considered necessary to preserve the free power of alienation. All contingent estates therefore have been considered liable to be be barred by the tenant of the freehold. Estates held to uses have in this respect rested upon the same foundation as all other estates, and the objection urged against uses and trusts might more properly be made against the free power of alienation, as its effect and consequences were understood before the late changes made on this subject by the New York statutes. These changes are very important, and are designed to prevent contingent estates from being destroyed by an alienation or forfeiture of the precedent estate. We propose to consider the injurious tendency of this change in the policy of the law on a future occasion.

The other objection is founded upon the consideration of the difficulty of determining the intention of parties to conveyances to uses. The remedy proposed by the revisers is

certainly remarkable, for, instead of prescribing or collating rules by which the intention should be determined, they have provided that conveyances to uses should have no effect whatever. But we apprehend the difficulty of determining the manner in which a particular limitation should take effect did not arise so much from any uncertainty inherent in conveyances to uses, as in the numerous and peculiar modifications of property which were designed to be created. This uncertainty of intention would not be avoided by changing the forms of conveyances. Those forms were adopted as well fitted to give effect to various dispositions of property, which the wants of a wealthy community required. The policy of the statute is to destroy those modifications which were before admissible, and to give effect to direct conveyances by the forms of the common law. If the various modifications of property which have become usual in modern times are permitted to continue, then the difficulty of determining the nature of those estates, will be as great as at present under the system of uses and

trusts.

But there are great advantages attending the variety of constructions which are capable of being given to conveyances to uses. Many conveyances have been supported by raising a use, when they could not have taken effect at common law; and the intentions of parties have often been happily carried out by some of the modifications admissible under the system of uses, when direct effect could not be given to them as estates at common law.

It is possible, that the declared intention of the legislature to abolish uses and trusts may have the effect of bringing these forms of conveyance into disuse. The manner in which such conveyances will be regarded by the courts, in cases not directly within the provisions of the statute, may be doubtful, and conveyancers will be induced to adopt the forms which are favored by legislation, if it is possible thus

to carry the intention of parties into effect. The insufficiency of direct, naked grants to carve out the various modifications of property which the community will require will soon however be obvious, and the legislature could not perform a more beneficial duty than to repeal at once the crude, ill-considered, and most defective system, which they were unfortunately induced to promulgate.

We are aware that the changes which have been made by the New York legislature on various subjects, signally unfortunate as they have been, may be urged as examples of the danger of digesting the body of the law by legislative enactment, and of the evils resulting from any change or reform in its principles; but we cannot admit the force of the objection, except as applied to a defective and badly executed system of laws, or to unwise changes which are subversive of true principle.

The argument is ill founded, until it can be shown that no possible change would be an improvement and that the system as administered is perfect.

The instance, which we have thus given, of the partial failure of an attempt at law reform, is to be regretted, as it may tend to throw discredit on any project for real improvement. The true lesson to be learnt from this example is, to avoid all fundamental changes, and especially such as affect rules of property and such as leave the system incongruous and impracticable.

S. F. D.

ART. V.-LIFE OF LORD STOWEL.

[This sketch of the life of lord Stowel is compiled from a biographical notice in the seventeenth volume of the (London) Law Magazine.]

WILLIAM SCOTT was born on the 8th of October, 1745, at Heworth, a small village about four miles from New-Castleupon-Tyne, where his father resided and carried on the

business of a coal merchant. He was the eldest son of the family, the earl of Eldon being a younger brother; and it is a remarkable circumstance, that a tradesman in very moderate circumstances in the north of England, should have been the father of two such distinguished ornaments of the legal profession. Both the Scotts, in their boyhood, enjoyed the inestimable advantage of a learned, faithful and judicious teacher, the Rev. Hugh Moises, whose merits lord Stowel subsequently commemorated in a beautiful Latin epitaph. He soon perceived the promising talents of his pupils, and it was principally owing to his earnest recommendations, that they were both sent to the university. William became a member of Corpus Christi college in the university of Oxford in 1761, and took his bachelor's degree on the 20th of November, 1764, and in the following month was elected a probationary fellow of University college, and shortly after, a college tutor in the same university, succeeding in that office, the celebrated sir William Jones. He had not at this period attained his majority, and his receiving these marks of distinction at so early an age proves, that he had already earned a high literary reputation. He took his master's degree in 1767, and in 1772, that of bachelor in civil law, having determined to pursue the civil law as a profession. A new university honor, however, awaited him, and detained him for some time longer in the quiet retreats of literature. He was elected in 1774 Camden reader of ancient history. The course of lectures which he prepared in discharge of the duties of his professorship won for him a very high reputation, was attended by very numerous audiences, and called forth the approbation of Dr. Parr and of a far greater and more fastidious critic, Gibbon. In 1776, he withdrew from his duties as tutor, but continued to reside at the university for three years longer, devoting himself to his professional studies and interesting himself in the concerns of the university. In 1779, he took the