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themselves, were rendered so, by reason of the existence of certain extrinsic facts, a reference to those facts, and the mode in which the words were used, notwithstanding there was no averment that they were spoken with reference to any fact whatever. Ib. SLAVE. (Rights of owner of) The owner of a slave, born in a slave-holding state, has no right, by comity, to hold such person in slavery in Connecticut. Jackson v. Bulloch, 12 Conn. 38. 2. (Same.) There is nothing in the constitution of the United States applicable to slaves, voluntarily brought into Connecticut, by their masters. Ib. 3. (Same.) Slavery, to some extent, has been recognised, by the laws of Connecticut. Ib. 4. (Same.) The constitution of Connecticut does not vary the relation of master and servant, as by law established, at the adoption of that instrument. Ib. 5. (Same.) By the statute of 1774, prohibiting the importation of slaves into Connecticut, and the statute of 1784, declaring that no person of color born after that time, should be held in servitude after they arrived at the age of twenty-five years, the legislature intended to provide for the final extinction of slavery in that state. Ib. 6. (Same.) The design of the former statute was to prevent the increase of slaves in Connecticut, by importation from abroad. Ib. 7. (Same.) To bring the case of a slave brought into Connecticut and left there, by the master, within the prohibition of that statute, it is not necessary to show an intention of the master to reside there permanently, or to suffer the slave to remain there permanently. Ib. 8. (Same.) A slave-holder, who is an inhabitant of another state, can claim no greater privileges in Connecticut, with respect to his slave, than the citizens of that state. Ib. 9. (Same.) Therefore, where A, born in the state of Georgia, in 1813, was, by the laws of that state, the slave of B, an inhabitant of that state, claiming to have his domicil there ; in June, 1835, B came into Connecticut, with his family, for a temporary
residence, bringing A with them; his family remained there at board, until June, 1837, A being constantly with them and in their service; from the 20th of October, 1835, to the 2nd of May, 1836, and from the 22nd of October, 1836, to the 28th of March, 1837, B was absent from Connecticut, at his residence in Georgia; and he intends to return there, and take A with him; on a writ of habeas corpus, brought by A, it was held, that A, under these circumstances, was brought into and left in Connecticut, within the prohibition of the statute of 1774; that A, being within the purview, and not within the exception of the statute of 1784, was free, by the laws of Connecticut; that the foreign domicil of B and his animus revertendi gave him no peculiar privilege with respect to A ; and consequently, that B could no longer hold A in servitude. [By three judges against two.] Ib. SOLICITOR AND COUNSEL. (Scandal and impertinence.) A counsel, who signs a scandalous or impertinent pleading, is personally answerable for the costs of the proceedings to expunge the scandalous or impertinent matter; and an unsuccessful attempt to collect such costs, from the party for whom such pleading was not put in, will not discharge the counsel from liability. Cushman v. Brown, 6 Paige, 539. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. (Title.) The court of chancery will not decree the specific performance of a contract to purchase, where the vendor is unable to give a valid title to the premises, unless it appears from the contract, that the understanding of the parties was that the purchaser should take the risk of the goodness of the title which the vendor was to give. Winne v. Reynolds, 6 Paige, 407. 2. (Same.) But a specific performance will be decreed, when the vendor is able to perform his agreement in substance, although there is a trifling variation in the description of the premises, or a trifling incumbrance on the title which cannot be removed, which is a proper subject of compensation to the purchaser. Ib. 3. (Requisites to.) To entitle a party to a specific performance of an agreement for the sale of real estate, the contract must be certain in its terms and mutual in its character. German v. Machin, 6 Paige, 288.
STATUTE. (Creating an offence.) The rule that where a statute creates an offence unknown to the common law, and in the enacting or prohibitory clause points out the mode of proceeding under it, that mode alone can be pursued, is not applicable to beneficial statutes in civil cases. The Hartford and New Haven Rail Road Company v. Kennedy, 12 Conn. 499. TENANTS IN COMMON. (Rights of, as against co-tenants.) A tenant in common of a well has a right to send his servant down into it for the purpose of cleaning it out, if he has reason to suppose that the bottom is filthy; and if obstructed in so doing, by his co-tenant, he may maintain an action against him, although in point of fact the well did not require to be cleansed. Newton v. Newton, 17 Pick. 201. 2. (Disseisin.) Where one tenant in common of land conveys the whole estate in fee, with covenants of seisin and warranty, and the grantee enters and holds exclusive possession thereof, such entry and possession are a disseisin of the co-tenant. Kittredge v. Locks and Canals, &c. 17 Pick. 246. TENDER. (Insufficient, for not including costs.) A tender of the amount due on a joint and several promissory note, by a surety, while an action brought by the holder against the principal is pending, will not discharge the surety from his liability, unless he also offers to indemnify the holder against the costs of such action. Hampshire Manufacturers' Bank v. Billings, 17 Pick. 87. TIME. (Imperative or directory.) Where a duty is required by statute to be performed on a certain day, and the object contemplated by the legislature cannot otherwise be carried into effect, the time prescribed must be considered as imperative; but if there is nothing indicating that the exact time is essential, it is to be considered as directory. Colt et al. v. Eves, 12 Conn. 243. 2. (Same.) Therefore, where a city charter required, that a certain number of jurors should be chosen on the 1st Monday of July, and they were not chosen until the 8th of August, it was held, that this provision was directory, and a jury empanneled from the jurors so chosen was a legal jury. Ib.
TROVER. (One entrusted with property.) If one entrusted with property for a particular use, which becomes impracticable, lend the property to another who had knowledge of the facts, this is in both a conversion of the property. Rice v. Clark, 8 Wermont, 109. 2. (Same.) If a person entrusted with property for a particular use be guilty of any abuse of the property in that use, he is not on that account liable to an action of trover. Ib. 3. (License.) A person, who, under color of a license, takes property for another purpose, or who takes property after the license is recalled, is liable in trover. And it makes no difference that the plaintiff might have elected to hold it as a sale and delivery to a third person, instead of a conversion by the defendant. Holland v. Cutter et al., 8 Vermont, 275. 4. (Assertion of ownership.) In trover, the mere assertion of ownership of property without in any way interfering with the property, or with the owner's right to control it, is evidence of a conversion. Irish v. Cloyes et al., 8 Vermont, 30. 5. (Demand and refusal.) A demand and refusal is such evidence of a conversion, in trover, as cannot be judged or removed, by showing a subsequent attachment or by a distress made upon the same property and sale upon plaintiff's debt, but this will go in mitigation of damages. 1b. TRUST, TRUSTEE, AND CESTUI QUE TRUST. (Duty of trustee.) Where a person undertakes to act for another, he is not allowed to deal in the subject matter of such agency on his own account and for his own benefit. And if such agent takes a conveyance in his own name, of an estate which he undertook to obtain for another, he will in equity be considered as holding the estate in trust for his principal, for whom he undertook to act as agent in the purchase. Sweet v. Jacocks, 6 Paige, 355. TRUSTEE PROCESS. (Attorney.) An action cannot be sustained against one as trustee, under the statute, merely because he is attorney for the absconding debtor, and has in his care a debt in the course of collection, against another person. Hitchcock v. Edgerton, 8 Vermont, 202.
2. (Pensioner.) The money of a pensioner, in the hands of his agent, or attorney, appointed to receive his pension from the disbursing agent, and received on that account, is not liable to a trustee process. Adams v. Newell et al., 8 Vermont, 190. VARIANCE. (In name.) In an action of debt brought by S. B. jun., on a judgment, the declaration set forth the record of a judgment in favor of S. B., but the record produced, set forth a judgment recovered by S. B. jun. Held, that this was a variance. Boyden v. Hastings, 17 Pick. 200. VENDOR AND PURCHASER. (Notice—registry.) If a purchaser with notice of a prior unregistered deed, or other claim upon real estate, afterwards conveys the same to a subsequent bona fide purchaser who has no such notice, the latter is entitled to protection against the prior equitable claim to the property. Varick v. Briggs, 6 Paige, 323. 2. (Same.) And a purchaser with notice, from a prior purchaser who was entitled to protection as a bona fide purchaser without notice, is himself entitled to protection against the previous equitable claim which was invalid as against his grantor. Ib. 3. (False assertion by vendor.) A false assertion by the vendor as to the mere value of the property he is about to sell, without any misrepresentation or deception as to any other matter of fact, is not a sufficient ground for relief to the purchaser, either at law or in equity. The law presumes that each party to a contract of sale relies upon his own judgment as to the value of the property sold, where the facts on which the value of such property depends, are equally known to both. Speiglemeyer v. Crawford, 6 Paige, 254. WARRANTY. (Against claims.) In a case of warranty against all claims of a certain character, in case of a suit brought against the covenantee, he must notify the covenantor, or the judgment will be considered strictly res inter alios acta. Castleton v. Miner, 8 Vermont, 209. 2. (Same.) The warrantor may in such case contest the judgment on its original merits, and by showing it without just foundation, compel the covenantee to bear the loss of a payment made under it, as a voluntary payment. Ib.