5. (Given for contingent liability.) When a promissory note is given to compromise a contingent liability, the note can never be avoided by showing that the maker of the note was not in fact or in law liable. Holcomb v. Stimpson, 8 Vermont, 141. 6. (Given by husband to wife.) A promissory note, executed by a husband to his wife, during coverture, is void, and cannot be enforced, even for the benefit and in the name of a third person, to whom the husband has afterwards promised to pay it. Sweat v. Hall, 8 Vermont, 187. REAL ACTION. (Evidence in writ of right.) It cannot be pleaded in bar to a writ of right, that in an action of an inferior degree between the same parties, in which the right of possession of the demanded premises was put in issue, this right depended entirely on the mere right of property, and that the question of the mere right of property was submitted to the jury, and decided against the demandant, and that judgment was rendered according to the verdict. Arnold v. Arnold, 17 Pick. 4.

2. (Evidence in writ of entry.) The tenant in a writ of entry cannot, under the general issue, give in evidence the title of a third person, and claim to hold as his servant. Mechanics Bank v. Williams, 17 Pick. 438. RECORD OF DEEDS. (Fraudulent.) When a town clerk copies a deed delivered to him for record, on a book which has ceased to be a book for recording for a number of years, and does not insert the names in the alphabet, for the purpose of concealment and fraud, such deed is not recorded, and is no notice to after purchasers, or attaching creditors. Sawyer et al. v. Adams, 8 Vermont, 172.

REFERENCE. (Testimony.) In a case referred by agreement of parties, it is no ground of setting aside the report that the referees admitted irrelevant or illegal testimony, if it had no tendency to mislead their minds, and did not in fact mislead them. Learned v. Bellows, 8 Vermont, 79.

2. (Setting aside report.) Reports of references are not to be set aside for every circumstantial error, but only where they adopt

a rule of action and misapply it; and in this respect it is immaterial whether it be a rule of law, or of equity, or of arithmetic. Ib.

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RELEASE. (Of all demands, &c.) A general release of all demands, notes and accounts," will not be construed to include a suit pending, especially when, from testimony aliunde, it appears such was not the intention of the parties. Learned v. Bellows, 8 Vermont, 79. REPLEVIN. (Joint-owner.) One joint owner of a personal chattel cannot, either at common law or under the statute of Connecticut, maintain replevin against another joint owner, for an amotion of the joint property, by virtue of a writ of attachment against a third person. Prentice et al. v. Ladd, 12 Conn. 331. RES GESTA. Where the defendant, in an action of trespass

quare clausum fregit, justified under a claim of title in C, under whom he entered and did the acts complained of; the title depended upon the place of the dividing line between the plaintiff and C; and it appeared, that while C was in possession, the adjoining proprietor, wishing to dig a ditch in the dividing line, inquired of C where the line was; that C pointed out the place to him; that he dug a ditch there; and that C afterwards told him, that he had seen such ditch, and it was in the line; it was held, that C thereby participated in the act of digging the ditch, and his declarations accompanying such act were admissible as part of the res gesta. Deming v. Carrington, 12 Conn. 1. RIVER. (Rule for dividing an island formed in a river.)

Where an island is so formed in the bed of a river not navigable, as to divide the channel and lie partly on each side of the thread of the river, it will be divided between the riparian proprietors on the opposite sides of the river, according to the original thread of the river. Deerfield v. Arms, 17 Pick. 41. 2. (Same.) Land formed by alluvion in a river is, in general, to be divided among the several riparian proprietors entitled to it, according to the following rule: Measure the whole extent of their ancient line on the river, and ascertain how many feet each proprietor owned on this line; divide the newly formed river

line into equal parts, and appropriate to each proprietor as many of these parts as he owned feet on the old line; and then draw lines from the points at which the proprietors respectively bounded on the old, to the points thus determined as the points of division on the newly formed shore. Ib.

3. (Same.) This rule is to be modified under particular circumstances; for instance, if the ancient margin has deep indentations or sharp projections, the general available line on the river ought to be taken, and not the actual length of the margin as thus elongated by the indentations or projections. Ib. SALE. (Evidence.) The plaintiff sold three fourths of a vessel to A, and the remaining fourth to L, but subsequently the vessel was reconveyed to him by the vendees. In an action by the plaintiff, against an officer who had attached the vessel at the suit of a creditor of A, it was held, that evidence tending to show fraud in the reconveyance by L, was inadmissible for the purpose of showing that the reconveyance by A was fraudulent. Boyd v. Brown, 17 Pick. 453.

2. (Sale to prevent attachment.) A, the owner of a vessel, being

in embarrassed circumstances, gave a bill of sale of her to C, without any consideration, in order to prevent her from being attached by his creditors; and C, with the consent of A, conveyed the vessel to B, one of such creditors. It was held, that the title of B was valid as against the other creditors of A, it being too late for them, after the conveyance to B, to avoid the bill of sale from A to C. Ib.

3. (Delivery.) In the same case, it appeared that after the conveyance to B, the officer who had previously attached the vessel at the suit of other creditors of A, discharged the keeper and delivered the vessel, which was then lying at the wharf of A, to B. It was held, that this was a sufficient delivery, if made with the consent and in behalf of A. Ib.

SET OFF. (Mortgage.) Upon a bill to foreclose a mortgage,

or to obtain satisfaction of the amount due from the defendant, the latter may set off a debt due to him from the complainant, which would be a proper subject of set off in a suit brought by

the complainant, at law, to recover the amount due upon his mortgage. Chapman v. Robertson, 6 Paige, 627. SETTLEMENT. (Illegitimate child.) An illegitimate minor child, born in one town of a woman who has since acquired a settlement by marriage in another town, takes the settlement of its mother thus acquired. [By three judges against two.] New Haven v. Newtown, 12 Conn. 165.

SHERIFF. (Sale of office.) Where the deputy of a public officer is by law entitled to certain fees or perquisites, in virtue of his character of deputy merely, if he agrees to give to the officer appointing him a portion of such fees or perquisites, it is a purchase of the deputation; and the parties to such agreement are guilty of a violation of the statute against the buying and selling of offices. Becker v. Ten Eyck, 6 Paige, 68.

2. (Of another state.)

The sheriff of another state cannot pursue and retake a prisoner who has escaped from his custody, on civil process. Bromley v. Hutchins, 8 Vermont, 194.

SHIP. (Liability of vendor.) The vendor of a vessel is not liable for supplies, furnished after the delivery of the bill of sale, if the vessel ceases to be in his possession or employment, although she be mortgaged back to him, and remain enrolled in his name. Brooks v. Bondsey, 17 Pick. 441.

SHIPPING. (Common carrier.) The owners of a vessel, generally employed in the transportation of goods for hire, are liable as common carriers, to the owners of the goods received for transportation. Crosby et al. v. Fitch et al., 12 Conn. 410. 2. (Damages of the seas.) The usual exception in a bill of lading of the "dangers of the seas," does not vary or qualify the liability of the ship owners as common carriers. lb.

3. (Deviation.) If the master of a vessel, without reasonable necessity, depart from the usual route of vessels between the termini of the voyage, it is a deviation, of which freighters, as well as insurers, may take advantage. lb.

4. (Same.) Where it appeared that the usual route of vessels, from New York to Norwich in Connecticut, was through Long Island Sound in summer and winter; in the winter of 1836, the

navigation of the sound was obstructed by ice, for a longer period than usual; and in February, during that period, a vessel bound from New York to Norwich departed from such usual route, and performed her voyage in the open sea, on the south side of Long Island; it was held, that this was a deviation, without reasonable necessity, which rendered the ship owners liable for a loss occasioned by dangers of the sea. Ib.

5. (Same.) It being established that the usual route for vessels, bound from New York to Norwich, is through Long Island Sound, no usage for such vessels to perform their voyages on the south side of Long Island, when the navigation of the Sound is obstructed by ice, will justify the master of a vessel bound from New York to Norwich, during such obstruction, in taking the south side passage, instead of waiting in New York, until the usual navigation becomes free, unless such usage is general, and of so long standing as to have become generally known. Ib. 6. (Same.) Where the freighter, being informed of the course of the voyage taken, effected insurance on the goods shipped, and after a loss, demanded payment of the policy; it was held, that neither such insurance, nor demand of payment, furnished any evidence of the consent or acquiescence of the freighter in the course of the voyage. Ib.

SLANDER. (Evidence.) Under a count in an action for slander, alleging, generally, that the defendant charged the plaintiff with the crime of theft, it is competent for the plaintiff to give in evidence any words, which, although in their ordinary sense doubtful or even innocent, can be shown, by the aid of averments and innuendoes, under the circumstances, to be equivocal or ironical, and to be intended by the defendant, and understood by the hearer, to impute such crime to the plaintiff. Pond v. Hartwell, 17 Pick. 269.

2. (Declaration.) In an action for slander, a count setting forth generally, that the defendant charged the plaintiff with a crime, (naming it), is good. Allen v. Perkins, 17 Pick. 369.

3. (Evidence to explain words.) Under such a count, the plaintiff may prove, that the words spoken, although not actionable in