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3. (Same-advancement.) Where a parent makes an advancement to his child, and honestly and fairly retains in his hands sufficient property to pay all his debts, such child will not be bound to refund the advancement, for the benefit of the creditors, although it should afterwards happen that the parent does not pay his debts which existed at the time of the making of such advancement. But where the debtor makes a voluntary conveyance of his property, without any valuable consideration, and for the purpose of defrauding creditors, it seems that a court of equity may follow the property into the hands of the voluntary donee, for the benefit of such creditors, although the donee was not privy to the intended fraud. Van Wyck v. Seward, 6 Paige, 62.

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4. (Fraudulent grantee.) Where a creditor of a fraudulent grantee of real estate takes from him a mortgage on such estate, as a further security of the previous debt, but without notice of the fraud, such creditor is not protected against the prior equity and legal lien of judgment creditors of the fraudulent grantor, whose judgments were recovered subsequent to the fraudulent conveyance, but prior to the mortgage. hattan Co. v. Evertson, 6 Paige, 457. 5. (Embezzlement.) Where a president or other officer of a monied corporation, who has the custody of its funds, appropriates the same to pay his own debts, or for other private purposes, without authority of the directors of the corporation, it is a criminal embezzlement of the fund entrusted to his care; and his creditor who receives the money in payment of his debt, knowing it to be thus embezzled, is a participator in the fraud and felony, and may be compelled to refund the money thus received. Reed v. Bank of Newburgh, 6 Paige, 337. 6. (Proxy.) A stockholder who has given another a proxy to vote upon his stock, even for a valuable consideration, is justifiable in revoking the proxy, when it is about to be used for a fraudulent purpose. lb.

FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. (Agreement to be performed within

a year.) An agreement which may be performed within a

year, is not required, by the statute of frauds and perjuries, to be in writing; but to bring the case within that statute, it must appear from the express terms of the agreement, that it is not to be be performed within a year Russell v. Slade et al., 12 Conn. 445.

HEIRS AND DEVISEES. (Remedy at law.) Where a bill is filed by the heirs at law against the devisee in possession, to set aside a will of real estate, on the ground of the testator's incapacity, or that the devise was the result of undue influence, it will be a valid objection, upon demurrer to the bill, that the complainants have a perfect remedy at law, and that the court of chancery has no jurisdiction of the case. Bowen v. Idley, 6 Paige, 46.

HIGHWAYS.

(Damages for laying out.)

Damages were

awarded and paid to a person, on account of a road laid out through his land; and said road, before being opened or made, was re-surveyed and altered, on the application of such person, but no part of said road was removed from his land. The report of the committee making such alteration was silent on the subject of damages. Held, that these facts alone did not entitle the town to recover back the damages so paid. Stiles v. Middlesex, 8 Vermont, 436.

2. (Same.) It seems that no part of such damages can be recovered back, by reason of the discontinuance of the road, after it has been opened and used as a highway. Otherwise, if it is discontinued and abandoned before it is opened or made. Ib. HUSBAND AND WIFE. (Property of wife protected.) Where the husband has violated the marriage contract, or has been guilty of an act which entitles the wife to a decree for a divorce, or a separation, and for alimony, she is in equity entitled to a restoration of the property, which the husband holds by virtue of his marital rights. And the court of chancery, upon the bill of the wife filed for the purpose of obtaining a divorce or separation, will not only protect her right to such property as against the husband himself, but also as against judgment creditors, and others who do not stand in the situation of bona fide purchasers

without notice, of her equitable rights and of her intention to enforce them by a suit for a divorce or separation. Van Duzer v. Van Duzer, 6 Paige, 366.

2. (Divorce.) Where the husband, a few months after his marriage, abandoned his wife and left the state, and the wife after the expiration of seven years married a second husband, who died four or five years before the first husband filed his bill for a divorce, founded upon such second marriage, the bill was dismissed. Valleau v. Valleau, 6 Paige, 207.

3. (Same.) If the wife, after the husband has abandoned her and been absent more than five years, marries a second husband, the first husband cannot obtain a divorce, on the ground of her adultery with the second husband subsequent to such marriage, unless he can establish the fact, that at the time of the second marriage, the wife knew that her first husband was living within five years then next preceding. Ib.

4. (Impotence.) The court will not annul a marriage on the ground

of impotence, where there is a probability of capacity, and where from the testimony in the case, there is good reason to believe that the disability of the defendant may be removed by a slight surgical operation, without any danger whatever to the subject of such operation. Davenbagh v. Davenbagh, 6 Paige, 175. 5. (Mortgage, partnership.) The wife having joined with her husband in a mortgage of his real estate, to secure a partnership debt due from him and his copartner, upon a written stipulation given by the co-partners to her that the mortgage should be paid out of the partnership funds; and the firm having afterwards failed and assigned all their property and effects to the mortgagee and another person to pay other debts of the firm; held, that the mortgage was not a specific equitable lien upon the partnership funds as against the other debts due from the firm, and that the wife's contingent right of dower in the mortgaged premises was liable to be sold, if her husband's interest in the premises was not sufficient to satisfy the mortgage. Paton v. Murray, 6 Paige, 474.

INDICTMENT. (General verdict of guilty supported by one

sufficient count.) Where upon an indictment, a general verdict of guilty is returned, and one count in the indictment is good and sufficient to warrant the judgment given, it is not a cause for reversing the judgment on error, that there is another count, which is defective. Jennings v. Commonwealth, 17 Pick. 80. 2. (Construction of.) Two indictments charging the defendant with setting fire to a barn, whereby a dwelling-house was burnt in the night, the one alleging it to be the barn of A and B, the other alleging it to be the barn of A and C, were held, not to be for the same offence. Commonwealth v. Wade, 17 Pick.

395.

3. (Right of prisoner.) A prisoner indicted for a capital crime is entitled to be furnished with a list of the witnesses examined before the grand jury, but not of those which the counsel for the government propose to examine at the trial. Commonwealth v. Walton, 17 Pick. 403.

INFANCY. (Ratification of contract.) The ratification of a contract made by an infant, and the acknowledgment of a debt barred by the statute of limitations, stand on different grounds and are governed by different principles. In the former case, there was not originally any legal right capable of being enforced, and a new liability is assumed; in the latter, the debt continues from the time it was contracted, and the acknowledgment merely rebuts the presumption created by the statute. Therefore, to constitute a ratification of an infant's contract, there must be an express promise to pay the debt after he arrives at full age; while a bare acknowledgment of the debt is sufficient to take a case out of the statute of limitations. Wilcox v. Roath, 12 Conn. 550.

2. (Same.) Where it appeared in an action on a promissory note, to which infancy was pleaded, and a ratification after full age was replied, that the note being presented to the defendant, after he became of full age, for the purpose of having it settled, the defendant took it and said he would immediately write the plaintiff about it; and afterwards, in answer to an inquiry made by the plaintiff in a letter to the defendant, whether he considered

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the plaintiff's claim worthy of his attention, he replied in a letter to the plaintiff "I do consider your claim as worthy my attention, but not as meriting my first attention," and then went on to say that his business was in an unsettled state, but that as soon as he could bring it to a close, he would give to the plaintiff's claim the attention due to it; it was held, that this evidence did not show a ratification. lb.

INNUENDO. (Office of) An innuendo cannot extend the meaning of the words beyond their true import, unless something is otherwise put upon the record for it to explain; it being merely explanatory of the matter previously expressed, and of that only. Mir v. Woodward, 12 Conn. 262.

2. (Same.) But where new matter is introduced, by an innuendo, which is not warranted, by the introductory matter, if it is not necessary to support the action, it may be rejected as surplusage. lb.

3. (Same) The words charged as libellous in this case, being explained, by an innuendo, as meaning "that the plaintiff had packed a jury, and had been guilty of mal-practice in packing a jury; it was held, that the innuendo was warranted by such words.

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4. (Same.) Where the plaintiff sues in a particular character, and in the innuendo, he explains the words charged as applying to him in that character, he is bound to prove that they were so used.

Ib.

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5. (Same.) So too, where the words are ambiguous, and admit of different applications, if the innuendo limit and confine them to a particular sense, the plaintiff is bound to prove, that they were used in that sense. INSOLVENT LAW. (Recording of certificate of discharge.) It is not essential to the validity of a discharge under the insolvent law of Connecticut that the certificate should be recorded; but it takes effect from the delivery. The object of the statute in directing it to be recorded, and in making a copy evidence, was, to render the evidence of the discharge more complete. Witter v. Latham, 12 Conn. 392.

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