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be inferred from the uttering and guilty knowledge. Reg. v. Hill, 8 C. & P. 274.
LARCENY. (What is a felonious taking.) The prisoner hired a horse and gig with a felonious intent to convert them to his own use, and drove them away to the town of R., where he offered them for sale under their value, but did not sell them ; and Tindal, C. J. held, that as there had been no actual conversion, but only an offer to sell, the offence did not amount to larceny. Regina v. Brooks, 8 C. & P. 296.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. (Acknowledgment.) The following letter from the defendant to the plaintiff’s attorney was held not to be a sufficient acknowledgment of a debt to take the case out of the statute of limitations:—“Since the receipt of your letter (and indeed for some time previously), I have been in almost daily expectation of being enabled to give a satisfactory reply to your application respecting the demand of Messrs. M. against me. I propose being in Oxford tomorrow, when I will call upon you on the matter.”
The construction of a doubtful document, given in evidence
to defeat the statute of limitations, is for the court, and not for the jury. If it be explained by extrinsic facts, they are for the consideration of the jury. (2 T. R. 760; 3 Bing. N. C. 883.) Morrell v. Frith, 3 M. & W. 400.
MASTER AND SERVANT. (Dismission before the end of the time.) Where a servant was retained for a year, his wages to be paid quarterly, he was dismissed at the end of a month from the commencement of the second quarter; he then, before the expiration of the quarter, brought an action of indebitatus assumpsit for work and labor; money was paid into court sufficient to satisfy for the work done: it was held, that the defendant was entitled to a verdict, as at all events the plaintiff could not maintain an action until the end of the quarter.
Semble, an action of indebitatus assumpsit, for work and labor
done, cannot be maintained by a servant, although he may have been ready and willing to perform the labor, and may have been improperly dismissed from the service. Smith v. Hayward, 2 N. & P. 432.
MURDER. (Incitement to commit.) If two persons incite each other to commit murder together, and the means employed to produce death take effect upon one only, it is murder in the survivor. Reg. v. Alison, 8 C. & P. 418. PARTNERSHIP. (Joint action by partners.) A. & B. carried on business together as solicitors in partnership, and held themselves out as such, and the defendant employed them in that capacity. By the agreement under which A. and B. entered into business together, B. was to receive annually out of the profits the sum of 300l., but he was not to be in any manner liable to the losses of the business, and was to have a lien on the profits for any losses he might sustain by reason of his liability as a partner: Held, that A. & B. were properly joined as plaintiffs in an action for work and labor, as the money, when recovered, would be the joint property of both until the accounts were ascertained and the division took place. Bond v. Pittard, 3 M. & W. 357. POWER. (Erecution of, by will.) A married woman had power, under her marriage settlement, to appoint certain lands to uses by her last will and testament, “signed and published in the presence of, and attested by, three or more creditable witnesses.” The reversion in the same lands, subject to certain life estates, was also vested in her. She made a will, containing a devise of all her property real and personal, but not referring to the power. The attestation stated the will to be signed, sealed, and delivered by the testatrix in the presence of three witnesses, whose names were subscribed : Held, that the will was a due execution of the power. Delivery is equivalent to publication of a will. Curteis v. Kenrick, 3 M. & W. 461. RAPE. (Assault.) If a man get into bed with a married woman by fraud, and have connection with her by her consent, under a belief that he is her husband, it is not a rape, but the prisoner may be convicted of an assault, under the stat. 7 Will. 4 and 1 Vict. c. 85, s. 11. Regina v. Saunders, 8 C. & P. 265; Rex W. , id. 286. ROBBERY. (Property.) A servant sent to sell goods of his master, was robbed of the price of the goods on his way home: Held, that the money could not be laid to be the property of the master, as it had never been in his possession. Reg v. Radich, 8 C. & P. 257. SCHOOLMASTER. (Action for salary by.) A schoolmaster retained the plaintiff as a teacher of the French language, on a yearly engagement, at a certain salary, with board and lodging, and dismissed him for absenting himself for two days. In an action for salary, the defendant pleaded that the plaintiff wrongfully absented himself an unreasonable time, to wit, for two days: Held, after verdict for the defendant, not to be a sufficient reason for dismissal, as it showed neither moral misconduct nor any injury accruing to the defendant from the absence of the plaintiff. Fillieul v. Armstrong, 2 N. & P. 406. SHEEP-STEALING. (Killing sheep with intent to steal.) The prisoner cut the throat of a sheep with intent to steal it, but was interrupted in the act; the sheep afterwards died; and the judges, upon a case reserved, held that he might be convicted of killing the sheep with intent to steal it. Reg. v. Sutton, 8 C. & P. 291. WITNESS. (Examination of, on interrogatories.) The fact of a plaintiff not proceeding promptly in a cause, is no answer to a rule for examining a material witness on interrogatories, who is going abroad. Weekes v. Pall, 6 D. P. C. 462. 2. (Attachment.) If the attorney of the party who has subpoenaed a witness gives him leave to be absent until a particular time, and in the interim the cause be called on in the witness's absence, he is not liable to an attachment for contempt. Farrah v. Keat, 6 D. P. C, 470.
CHARITY. (Breach of trust.) Where one of several trustees, being himself the acting trustee, had applied some of the funds of the charity to his own use, but continued to pay interest on them, and the other trustees, upon such misapplication coming to their knowledge, took no steps to compel such acting trustee to replace the capital: Held, that one of the other trustees, who did not immediately succeed the delinquent party as acting trustee, but who, when that office came to him by rotation, took steps for recovering the fund which had been divested, and succeeded in recovering the greater part, was not separately liable to make good the default. Attorney-General v. Holland, 2 Y. & C. 683. 2. (New scheme—Increase of allowance—Meaning of “gentleman.” By will, dated in the year 1665, an estate was devised upon trust that poor decayed gentlemen of certain families, or of a certain county, should receive out of the rents and profits a yearly allowance of 10l. Since that time the rents of the estate had increased from about 50l. to 500l. The legal estate had never been conveyed from the first set of trustees to their successors: Held, that this was a proper case for a reference as to where the legal estate was, and for a new scheme with a view to an increase in the allowances, and for the purpose of defining the meaning of the term gentlemen; the master being directed to include in the definition “magistrates, esquires, members of the three learned professions, graduates of the universities, attorneys, surgeons, apothecaries, and the like.” Ib. CONTEMPT. (Cross bill—Waiver.) Filing a cross-bill against a party who is in contempt in the original cause is a waiver of such contempt. Best v. Gompertz, 2 Y. & C. 582. 2. (Right of plaintiff in contempt to prosecnte his suit.) A plaintiff who is in contempt to an attachment, for nonpayment of the costs of a motion in the cause, is entitled to the process of the court to compel an answer from the defendant, unless the latter have specially applied that proceedings may be stayed till the contempt is cleared. Quare, whether such order is of course upon such application ? Wilson v. Bates, 3 M. & C. 197. DELIVERY UP OF INSTRUMENTS (Apparent illegality.) There is no jurisdiction in equity to compel the delivery up of an instrument upon the ground of illegality, where such illegality, if any, is apparent on the face of the instrument. Seeming departures from this principle explained.—Simpson v. Lord Howden, 3 M. & C. 97. Allowing demurrer which had been overruled by the master of the rolls, with reference to another of its grounds. 1 Keen, 983.
INJUNCTION. (Use of marks in trade.) The boxes of tinplates made at particular works at Carmarthen had for sixty years and upwards been branded with the mark M. C. A., a lessee of those works, who as such had used that mark, and who had also purchased the stock in trade and goodwill of the previous tenants of the same works, before the expiration of his lease removes his manufactory to another place, called Margam, where he continued to use the same mark, to which he afterwards added the word “Margam.” At the expiration of his lease, the Carmarthen works were advertised by the owner as those to which the M. C. mark belonged, but they were not let till nine years afterwards, when the works, which had been suspended for twelve years, were reopened by B. and Co., who resumed the mark M. C. with the addition of “Carmarthen.” An injunction which had been granted by the vice-chancellor to restrain the revived firm at Carmarthen from using the mark was dissolved by the lord chancellor, on the ground that the question of the right, which was doubtful, ought to be tried at law. (As to law on the subject of such marks, see Sykes v. Sykes, 3 B. & C. 541.) Principles on which the court proceeds in granting injunction in such cases, Motley v. Downman, 3 M. & C. 1.
LAPSE OF TIME. (Judgment debt barred.) Where a judgment creditor, whose debt was originally subject to an outstanding term, had made no claim except upon the personal representative of the deceased debtor for twenty-eight years previous to the filing of the bill, his claim was held barred in equity, in spite of the presumption of non-payment which was raised by the apparent insolvency of the debtor. Grenfell v. Girdlestone, 2 Y. & C. 662.