unsettled, rendered, perhaps, the free navigation of the Mississippi, for the moment, of little advantage to her, particularly as her right to reach it was at least equivocal; and as, by another treaty, she could carry on trade with our Indians.

This navigation might, indeed, for a long time to come, be of little use to her for all the (160) legitimate purposes of transit and intercourse; but every change that could take place in this respect must increase its importance to her; while every change in the fishing liberty (161) would be to the disadvantage of the United States.

The freedom (162) of the Mississippi, however, is not to be estimated by the mere legitimate uses that would be made of it. The unrestrained and undefined access which would have been inferred from the article which we proposed, (163) would have placed in the hands of Great Britain and her subjects all the facilities of communication with our own citizens, and with the Indians inhabiting the immense regions of our western territory. It is not in the nature of things that these facilities should not have been abused for unrighteous purposes. A vast field for contraband (164) and intrigue would have been laid open, and our western territories would have swarmed with British smugglers and British emissaries. The revenue would have been defrauded by the illicit introduction of English merchandise, and the lives of our citizens, and the security of a valuable portion of our (165) country exposed to Indian hostilities, excited by an uncontrolled British influence. (166) If our in

structions to guard against such an influence forbid us to renew the British liberty to trade with our Indians, we certainly violated the spirit of those instructions in offering the means of exercising that influence with still greater facility and effect than could result from that liberty.

What was there in the fishing liberty, either of gain to us, or loss to Great Britain, to warrant, in consideration of it, a grant to her of such means of fraud and annoyance? What justice or equality was there in exposing to all the horrors of savage warfare the unoffending citizens of an immense tract of territory, (167) not at all benefited by the fishing privilege, merely to provide for the doubtful accommodation of a (168) few fishermen, in a remote quarter, entirely exempt from the danger?

Such have been the reasons which induced me to differ from a majority of my colleagues with regard to the article in question, and which I trust will be (169) thought sufficient, at least, to vindicate my motives.

The unfeigned respect which I feel for the integrity, talents, and judgment of those gentlemen, would restrain me from opposing them on slight grounds, and a deference for their opinions makes me almost fear that I have erred in dissenting from them on the present occasion. I can but rejoice, however, that the article, as

tled, rendered, perhaps, the free navigation of the Mississippi, for the moment, of little advantage to her; particularly, as her right to reach it was, at least, equivocal; and, as by another treaty, she could carry on trade with our Indians.

This navigation might, indeed, for a long time to come, be of little use to her for all the (160) legitimate purposes of transit and intercourse; but every change that could take place in this respect must increase its importance to her, while every change in the fishing liberty (161) must be to the disadvantage of the United States.

The freedom (162) of navigating the Mississippi, however, is not to be estimated by the mere legitimate uses that would be made of it. The unrestrained and undefined access, which would have been inferred from the article which we proposed, (163) must have placed in the hands of Great Britain and her subjects, all the facilities of communication with our own citizens, and with the Indians inhabiting the immense regions of our western territory. It is not in the nature of things that these facilities should not have been abused for unrighteous purposes. A vast field for contraband (164) and for intrigue would have been laid open, and our western territories would have swarmed with British smugglers and British emissaries. The revenue would have been defrauded by the illicit introduction of English merchandise, and the lives of our citizens, and the security of a valuable portion of our (165) country, would have been exposed to Indian hostility, excited by an uncontrolled British influence. (166) If our instructions of the 15th of April, 1813, already cited, forbid us, in order to guard against such an influence, to renew the treaty of 1794,"allowing the North West Company and British traders to carry on trade, with the Indian tribes within our limits, a privilege, the pernicious effects of which have been most sensibly felt in the present war," we certainly violated the spirit of those instructions in offering the means of exercising that influence with still greater facility and effect than could result from that privilege.

What was there in the fishing liberty, either of gain to us or loss to Great Britain, to warrant, in consideration of it, a grant to her of such means of fraud and annoyance? What justice or equality was there, in exposing to all the horrors of savage warfare, the unoffending citizens of an immense tract of territory, (167) not at all, or but faintly, benefited by the fishing privilege, merely to provide for the doubtful accommodation of a (168) few fishermen, annually decreasing in number, in a remote quarter, and entirely exempt from the danger.

Such have been the reasons which induced me to differ from a majority of my colleagues with regard to the article in question, and which, I trust, will be (169) deemed sufficient, at least, to vindicate my motives.

The unfeigned respect which I feel for the integrity, talents, and judgment, of those gentlemen, would restrain me from opposing them on slight grounds, and a deference for their opinions makes me almost fear that I have erred in dissenting from them on the present occasion. I can but rejoice, however, that the article, as

proposed by us, was rejected by Great Britain; whatever were her reasons for rejecting it; whether, as above suggested, (170) she suspected some tacit reservation, or want of faith on our part, or supposed, from the price we at once bid for the fishing privilege, that we overrated its value, and might concede for it even more than (171) the navigation of the Mississippi, with all its accessary advantages.

(172) We are still at liberty to negotiate for that privilege in a treaty of commerce, should it be found expedient, and to offer for it an equivalent, fair in its comparative value, and just in its relative effects. In any other way, I trust, we shall not consent to purchase its renewal.

I have the honour to be, with profound respect,
Şir, your faithful and obedient servant,

JONA. RUSSELL.

My argument to demonstrate the abrogation of the treaty of 1783, by the present war, and the consequent discontinuance of the fishing privilege, will, I trust, not be ascribed to any hostility to those who were interested in that privilege. I have been always ready, and am still ready, to make every sacrifice for the preservation of that privilege which its nature and utility can justify; but I have conscientiously believed that the free navigation of the Mississippi was pregnant with too much mischief to be offered indirectly under our construction of the treaty, or directly, as a new equivalent for the liberty of taking and curing fish within the British jurisdiction.

We had three other ways of proceeding:

First. To contend for the indestructibility of the treaty of 1783, thence infering the continuance of the fishing privilege, without saying any thing about the navigation of the Mississippi, which would have reserved our right of contesting this navigation on the grounds I have mentioned, specially applicable to it.

Secondly. To have considered the treaty at an end, and offered a reasonable equivalent, wherever it might be found, for the fishing privilege.

Thirdly. To have made this liberty a sine qua non of peace, as embraced by the principle of status ante bellum.

To either of these propositions I would have assented, but I could not consent to grant to revive the British right to the navigation of the Mississippi, in order to procure or preserve the fishing liberty.

proposed by us, was rejected by Great Britain, whatever were her reasons for rejecting it; whether, as above suggested, (170) she might have suspected some tacit reservation, or want of faith, on our part; or supposed, from the price we at once bid for the fishing privilege, that we overrated its value, and might concede for it even more than (171) the free navigation of the Mississippi, with all its accessary advantages.

(172) Let me not, in any thing which I have said, be misunderstood. In judging on the interests of the great whole, I am not disposed to undervalue the interests on any of the constituent parts. No one can more highly appreciate than I do, a branch of industry which not only adds to national wealth, but seems to create it. Nor can any one more warmly admire the usefulness and patriotism of those citizens who are engaged in it, and who have never ceased to deserve well of the republic. In times of peace they bring home, amidst conflicting elements, the treasures of the deep to enrich their country; and in times of war they contribute, by their skill and intrepidity, to her defence and glory. But, in our country, where all are equal, the essential security and prosperity of the many must be preferied to the convenience and minor interests of the few. In giving this preference, I will frankly confess I had to silence early prepossions and local predilections, and to listen to the councils of a more enlarged patriotisin; and to this patriotism I dare appeal for my vindication, not only with those to whom I am officially responsible, but with those with whom I am more immediately connected in society, and whose interests may be considered to have been unfavourably affected by the views which I have deemed it to be my duty to adopt. I have always been willing to make any sacrifice for the fishing privilege, which its nature, or comparative importance could justify, but I conscientiously believe that the free navigation of the Mississippi, and the access to it which we expressly offered, were pregnant with too much mischief to be offered, indirectly, under our construction of the treaty; or, directly, as they were in fact offered, as a new equivalent for the liberty of taking and drying fish within the Pritish jurisdiction.

I will frankly avow, however, that my impressions were, and still are, that Great Britain, calculating on the success of the powerful expedition which she has sent against New-Orleans, confidently expected that she would have become the mistress of Louisiana and all its waters; and that she did not, in this event intend to abandon her conquest under the terms of the treaty of Ghent.

Her ministers had, almost from the commencement of the negotiation, not only affected to consider our acquisition of Louisiana as evidence of a spirit of agrandizement, but insinuated a defect in our title to it. Expecting, therefore, to obtain the free navigation of the Mississippi for nothing, she would not consent to part even with the fishing liberty as an equivalent. If she be disappointed in her views on Louisiana, and I trust in God and the valour of the west that she will be, I shall not be surprised if, hereafter, she grant us the fishing privilege, which costs her absolutely nothing, without any extravagant equivalent whatever.

At any rate, we are still at liberty to negotiate for that privilege in a treaty of commerce, and to offer for it an equivalent, fair in its comparative value, and just in its relative effects; and to negotiate for it in this way is evidently more wise than to demand it as a condition of peace, or to offer for it a price beyond its worth, and which, however excessive, runs the hazard of being refused, merely by the operation of those unaccommodating passions which are inevitably engendered by a state of war.

I have the honour to be, with the most profound respect, sir, your faithful and obedient servant, JONA. RUSSELL.

To the Hon'ble JAMES MONROE,

Sec'y of State of the United States, &c. &c. &c.

A true copy of a paper left by Jonathan Russell, esq. at the Department of State, 22d April, 1822, to be communicated to the House of Representatives of the United States.

J. Q. ADAMS, Secretary of State.

REMARKS

On a Paper delivered by Mr. Jonathan Russell, at the Department of State, on the 22d of April, 1822, to be communicated to the House of Representatives, as the duplicate of a Letter written by him at Paris, the 11th of February, 1815, to the then Secretary of State, and as the Letter called for by the Resolution of the House, of 19th April, 1822.

The first remark that presents itself upon this duplicate, is, that it is not a copy of the letter really written by Mr. Russell, at Paris, on the 11th of February, 1815, to the Secretary of State, and received by him. The latter was marked "private," and, as such, was not upon the files of the Department of State; and, although of the same general purport and tenor with the so-called duplicate, differed from it in several highly significant passages, of which the following parallel, extracted from the two papers, presents one example :

ORIGINAL.

"How far we conformed to this instruction, with regard to the general right to Louisiana, it is not necessary for me here to inquire; but certainly the majority believed (103) themselves permitted to offer a very explicit proposition with regard to the navigation of its principal (104) river. I believed, with them, that we were so permitted, and that we were, likewise, permitted to offer a proposition relative to the fishing liberty, and, had the occasion required it, to make proposals concerning the trade to the British East Indies. I was persuaded, that treating relative to these privileges, or discussing the obligation or expediency of granting or withholding them, respectively, violated, in no way, our instructions, or affected the general rights which we were forbidden to bring into discussion."

DUPLICATE.

"How far we conformed to this instruction, with regard to the general right to Louisiana, it is not necessary for me here to inquire; but certainly the majority believed (103) themselves to be permitted, their own construction to the contrary notwithstanding, to offer a very explicit proposition with regard to the navigation of its principal (104) river; now, this offer, I considered, for the reasons just suggested, not to be a violation of the instructions in question, but I considered it to be against both the letter and the spirit of our other instructions of the 15th of April, 1813. By these instructions, we were explicitly and implicitly directed to avoid any stipulation which might restrain the United States from excluding the British traders from the navigation of the lakes and rivers exclusively within our own jurisdiction.' This instruction applied with the greater force to the Mississippi, because, as it is believed, it was the only river to which it could apply.

"While I believed, therefore, that we were permitted to offer a proposition relative to the fishing liberty, and that in treating concerning this liberty, or in discussing our claim to it, we in no way violated our instructions, nor affected the general rights which we were forbidden to bring into discussion, I did believe, and do still believe, that