APPENDIX I. [This document seems to have governed the conduct of the Duc de Choiseul in his propositions first made to Mr. Pitt; and I append as serving to elucidate that correspondence.] Extract.-Paris Documents XVII. (page 1131.) MEMOIR ON THE BOUNDARIES OF CANADA. 'Tis supposed that the plenipotentiaries named for the future Congress, are incapable of adopting the frivolous ideas entertained in France respecting our possessions in Canada; statesmen have notions different from the simple vulgar. The French are too volatile and too superficial to trouble themselves about the future; but Ministers whom wisdom has selected and ability directs, will of themselves observe that the interests of commerce, the progress of navigation, the good of the State and the King's glory necessarily require that the restitution of Canada be laid down as a preliminary in the Treaty of Peace. In more favourable conjunctures, we would be justified in demanding of the English, damages corresponding to the enormous depredation of our marine, as well commercial as national; but the circumstances which will exist at the conclusion of the peace, are to decide the sacrifices we shall be obliged to make, or the advantages which are possibly to result therefrom. Commerce has changed the face of Europe; it is now evident that, in the long run, the more commercial nation will become the more powerful. We can no longer dispense with America, without falling sensibly from our state of splendour. On the restitution of Canada depends the fate of the rest of our colonies. These principles, clearer than the day, once admitted, that restitution ought to form the basis and foundation of the Treaty of Peace. Р But will the work of our Ministers be durable? For want of local knowledge, will. they be in a condition to manage beneficially the interests of the King and nation in this regard? Will they prevent the subterfuges in which English trickery will not fail to envelop them? If the English desire peace, do they desire it to be lasting? Will they renounce that system of maritime despotism which constitutes the sole object of their policy? Will they not preserve a constant hankering to render themselves masters of the whole of America? And will they not allow it to appear when we shall be least on our guard? Incapable of accomplishing that project now, in consequence of the exhaustion of their finances, will they not renew it at another time? In front of an enemy so active, so ambitious, so enterprising, conjectures are as good as demonstrations; the past cannot render us too cautious for the future. By a fatality which cannot be comprehended, the English were better acquainted than we before the war, with the topographical map of our possessions. Aided by similar help, what advantage do they not possess to cheat us? To this object, then, should be directed all the prudence and sagacity of our plenipotentiaries. BOUNDARIES. I limit their labours, respecting Canada, to four general objects: 1st. The entire property of both shores of the River and Gulf of St. Lawrence. 2nd. The property of the lakes and rivers which form the natural communication between Canada and Louisiana; they consist of Lake Ontario, Lake Erie, and the Ohio. 3rd. That neither of the two nations can form any establishments on the rivers watering the possessions of the other. 4th. That both colonies shall exist and increase by population, without covering their frontiers with advanced posts, which is a principle of jealousy, suspicion and distrust; an occasion always at hand, or a pretext often specious, for a rupture between the two nations. As for the first article-to cede to the English, as they pretend the entire peninsular of Acadia is to reduce ourselves evidently to a precarious possession. That peninsula is susceptible of an immense population; its position is one of the most advantageous, both for the erection of fortifications, and of posts there. Solid settlements of every description can be found there; agriculture can be followed with the greatest success. In vain would France flatter herself that she should preserve in peace the possession of the mouth of the river, if the English obtained the entire cession of that peninsula. Already masters of Newfoundland, they should grant us the property of a country whereof they would guard the entrance. The peace will scarcely be signed, when the activity of that ambitious people will be revived; soon will they be seen establishing themselves on the north side of that peninsula, and neglecting the remainder, if necessary, in order to transport to that quarter all their industry in favour of plantations. What service would not the plenipotentiaries be rendering the State, if by their ability, they would induce the English to consent to a division of that peninsula, so that France should preserve the property of the northern part, from Cape Canso to Minas ? But if their zeal become useless, if English firmness leave no hope on that point, they ought to be prepared to rather break all conference, than to give up an inch of ground on that continent. 'Tis evident that our colony would lose thereby all communication with the metropolis; we should no longer possess the free entrance of the river, except so far as the English would think proper. The lines of demarcation which separate the respective possessions on the map, annexed to this memoir,* are drawn in accordance with the * The map is wanting.-ED. largest sacrifices that it is possible for France to make. 'Tis for the plenipotentiaries to take advantage of favourable events, to obtain the best terms; but in all possible reverses, 'twill be more advantageous for the King and the State to renounce Canada, and consequently Louisiana, which cannot exist without it, than to cede an inch of territory beyond that division. The blue colour indicates the French possessions. The green, what can be ceded towards Hudson's Bayshould events require France to make further additional sacrifices. I have said, and repeat it, Louisiana cannot exist for us without Canada. But 'tis more advantageous for France promptly to cede these two colonies to the English, than to accept conditions worse than those indicated by the lines. drawn on that map. On this hypothesis, let the river Pentagouet be the boundary of the English possessions on the continent, on the N.E., and let them be precluded from settling only the right bank. Let the River St. John bound the French settlements, and let them be precluded from settling only the left bank. The territory between these two rivers shall perpetually remain neutral and undivided between both nations, as marked on the map by the yellow colour. The second object of the labour of our plenipotentiaries relative to Canada, regards the communication of that colony with Louisiana. The projects of the English would be accomplished beyond their hopes, were the freedom of that communication not stipulated and solidly established by the treaty of peace; 'twould be separating two colonies, which cannot sustain themselves except by their immediate affinity. Now that communication can occur only by the Ohio, every other route renders it very difficult, often even impracticable. 'Tis essential, then, to insist strongly on the entire possession of the Ohio. That river, navigable throughout all its course for very large craft, threatens Louisiana afar, and combines the advantage of distance in concealing preparations, with that of extreme rapidity of current for promptitude of execution. To make the Ohio the boundary of the respective colonies, is to surrender it entirely to the English. In fact, already the English population is advancing towards that river; it has only one step to take to clear the Apalachies, and that step would be taken on the day after the signing of the treaty. The left bank of the Ohio would be under English cultivation in less than four years, whilst our population would not reach that point in the space of a century. Who does not perceive in that explanation the approaching and inevitable fall of Louisiana ? The entire possession of the Ohio cannot, then, be too much insisted on, the Apalachies constituting the limits; but if events were such as to force us to give way on that important article, the only middle course to adopt is marked on the map by the yellow colour, viz., to leave the course of that river neutral, unsettled, without ownership, free to both nations to convey on it their goods for movable trade, with express reservation to France of the communication between both those colonies. The possession of lakes Ontario and Erie, which is the consequence of that communication, is a point of the greatest interest to us, the rather as for want thereof, those lakes assure another passage by the Miamis and Ouabache rivers, more difficult, more uncertain, but which furnishes nevertheless a resource in times of misfortune. I admit that very favourable events would be required to reduce the English to abandon the south shore of Lake Ontario, of which they are a long time in possession, through Fort Chouequen-a possession usurped, but constant, and, as it were, unopposed; an empty protest by the French Government, when the first foundations of that post were laid, is the only contradiction they have experienced. |