Eloquence defined....its more general forms exhibited ...

every obstacle, and procures the speaker an irresistible power over the thoughts and purposes of his audience. It is this which hath been so justly celebrated as giving one man an ascendant over others, superior even to what despotism itself can bestow; since by the latter the more ignoble part, only the body and its members, are enslaved; whereas, from the dominion of the former nothing is exempted, neither judgment nor affection, not even the inmost recesses, the most latent movements of the soul. What opposition is he not pre

customs.

defect, and that both from the nature of the thing, and from the customs which obtained among both Greeks and Romans. First, from the nature of things; for to persuade, presupposes in some degree, and therefore may be understood to imply, all the other talents of an orator, to enlighten, to evince, to paint, to astonish, to inflame : but this doth not hold universally; one may explain with clearness, and prove with energy, who is incapable of the sublime, the pathetic, and the vehement; besides, this power of persuasion, or, as Cicero calls it," posse voluntates hominum impellere quo velis, unde "velis, deducere," as it makes a man master of his hearers, is the most considerable in respect of consequences. Secondly, from ancient All their public orations were ranked under three classes, the demonstrative, the judiciary, and the deliberative. In the two last, it was impossible to rise to eminence, without that important talent, the power of persuasion. These were in much more frequent use than the first, and withal the surest means of advancing both the fortune and the fame of the orator; for, as on the judiciary the lives and estates of private persons depended, on the deliberative hung the resolves of senates, the fate of kingdoms, nay of the most renowned republics the world ever knew. Consequently, to excel in these, must have been the direct road to riches, honours, and preferment. No wonder, then, that persuasion should almost wholly engross the rhetorician's notice.

...with their different objects...ends....and characters.

pared to conquer, on whose arms reason hath conferred solidity and weight, and passion such a sharpness, as enables them, in defiance of every obstruction, to open a speedy passage to the heart.

It is not, however, every kind of pathos, which will give the orator so great an ascendancy over the minds of his hearers. All passions are not alike capable of producing this effect. Some are naturally inert and torpid; they deject the mind, and indispose it for enterprise. Of this kind are sorrow, fear, shame, humility. Others, on the contrary, elevate the soul, and stimulate to action. Such are hope, patriotism, ambition, emulation, anger. These, with the greatest facility, are made to concur in direction with arguments exciting to resolution and activity; and are, consequently, the fittest for producing, what, for want of a better term in our language, I shall henceforth denominate the vehement. There is, besides, an intermediate kind of passions, which do not so congenially and directly either restrain us from acting, or incite us to act; but, by the art of the speaker, can, in an oblique manner, be made conducive to either. Such are joy, love, esteem, compassion. Nevertheless, all these kinds may find a place in suasory discourses, or such as are intended to operate on the will. The first is the perest for dissuading; the second, as hath been already hinted, for persuading; the third is equally accommodated to both.

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GUIDED by the above reflections, we may easily

Eloquence defined....its more general forms exhibited...

trace that connection in the various forms of eloquence, which was remarked, on distinguishing them by their several objects. The imagination is charmed by a finished picture, wherein even drapery and ornament are not neglected; for here the end is pleasure. Would we penetrate farther, and agitate the soul, we must exhibit only some vivid strokes, some expressive features, not decorated as for show (all ostentation being both despicable and hurtful here), but such as appear the natural exposition of those bright and deep impressions, made by the subject upon the speaker's mind ; for here the end is not pleasure, but emotion. Would we not only touch the heart, but win it entirely to cooperate with our views, those affecting lineaments must be so interwoven with our argument, as that, from the passion excited, our reasoning may derive importance, and so be fitted for commanding attention; and, by by the justness of the reasoning, the passion may be more deeply rooted and enforced; and that thus, both may be made to conspire in effectuating that persuasion which is the end proposed. For here, if I may adopt the schoolmen's language, we do not argue to gain barely the assent of the understanding, but, which is infinitely more important, the consent of the will *.

To prevent mistakes, it will not be beside my pur

*This subordination is beautifully and concisely expressed by Hersan in Rollin. "Je conclus que la veritable eloquence est celle qui persuade; qu'èlle ne persuade ordinairement qu'on touchant ; "qu'elle ne touche que par des choses et par des idées palpables."

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....with their different objects....ends....and characters.

pose further to remark, that several of the terms above explained, are sometimes used by rhetoricians and critics in a much larger and more vague signification, than has been given them here. Sublimity and vehemence, in particular, are often confounded, the latter being considered as a species of the former. In this manner has this subject been treated by that great master Longinus, whose acceptation of the term sublime is extremely indefinite, importing an eminent degree of almost any excellence of speech, of whatever kind. Doubtless, if things themselves be understood, it does not seem material what names are assigned them. Yet it is both more. accurate, and proves no inconsiderable aid to the right understanding of things, to discriminate by different signs such as are truly dif ferent. And that the two qualities above mentioned are of this number is undeniable, since we can produce. passages full of vehemence, wherein no image is presented, which, with any propriety, can be termed great or sublime t. In matters of criticism, as in the

For an instance of this, let that of Cicero against Antony suffice. "Tu istis faucibus, istis lateribus, ista gladiatoria totius cor"poris firmitate, tantum vini in Hippiæ nuptiis exhauseras, ut tibi necesse esset in populi Romani conspectu vomere postridie. O rem non modo visu fœdam, sed etiam auditu! Si hoc tibi inter cœnam, "in tuis immanibus illis poculis accidisset, quis non turpe duceret ? "In cætu vero populi Romani, negotium publicum gerens, magister

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equitum, cui ructare turpe esset, is vomens, frustis esculentis vi"num redolentibus, gremium suum et totum tribunal implevit.” Here the vivacity of the address, in turning from the audience to the person declaimed against, the energy of the expressions, the reVOL. I.

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petition,

Eloquence defined....its more general forms exhibited....

abstract sciences, it is of the utmost consequence to ascertain, with precision, the meanings of words, and, as nearly as the genius of the language in which one writes will permit, to make them correspond to the boundaries assigned by nature to the things signified. That the lofty and the vehement, though still distinguishable, are sometimes combined, and act with united force, is not to be denied. It is then only that the orator can be said to fight with weapons, which are at once sharp, massive, and refulgent, which, like Heaven's artillery, dazzle while they strike, which overpower the sight and the heart in the same instant. How admirably do the two forenamed qualities, when happily blended, correspond in the rational to the thunder and lightning in the natural world, which are not more awfully majestical in sound and aspect, than irristible in power *.

petition, exclamation, interrogation, and climax of aggravating circumstances, accumulated with rapidity upon one another, display, in the strongest light, the turpitude of the action, and thus at once convince the judgment, and fire the indignation. It is therefore justly stiled vehement. But what is the image it presents? The reverse in every respect of the sublime; what, instead of gazing on with admiration, we should avert our eyes from with abhorrence. For, however it might pass in a Roman senate, I question whether Ciceronian eloquence itself could excuse the uttering of such things in any modern assembly, not to say a polite one. With vernacular expressions, answering to these, "vomere, ructare, frustis esculen "tis vinum redolentibus," our more delicate ears would be immoderately shocked. In a case of this kind, the more lively the picture is, so much the more abominable it is.

* A noted passage in Cicero's oration for Cornelius Balbus, will

serve