Common Pleas.-The People ex rel. Paul Corlis agt. Henry T. Smith. discontinue on the mere ground of his disinclination to proceed further in his action, especially when a counter-claim has been set up in the answer, and no reply has been made, and liberty to reply is not asked. Cases may occur which would justify a court in making such an order. But such cases must present some grounds to justify the inference that the plaintiff would suffer some substantial prejudice if the order was not granted. On the other hand, it is obvious that the granting of such an order might deprive a defendant of a substantial right. If a counter-claim should be outlawed, at the date of such an order, it would be manifestly unjust to grant it. Other cases readily suggest themselves in which it would be improper to grant such an order as a matter of course. It is unnecessary to undertake to state any rule by which all applications may be determined. It is sufficient to say, that after a counter-claim has been set up, and admitted of record, the court will not allow the plaintiff to discontinue his action, as a matter of course; special grounds must be shown in favor of the application; they must make a case, rendering such an inference proper, to prevent a plaintiff from being inequi tably prejudiced in his rights or remedies, and which, at the same time, will not work any practical wrong to the defendant. The motion must be denied. Common Pleas. [At Chambers.] Before JUDGE DALY. THE PEOPLE, ex rel. PAUL CORLIS against HENRY S. SMITH. The Marine Court has no jurisdiction to issue an execution against the person. This was a certionrari issued to the keeper of the Eldridge street (Debtors') Prison, to certify the cause of detention and imprisonment of the relator. It appears, from the return made by the keeper, that the relator was held by him under a commitment in execution in the nature of a "Ca Sa," issued by the Marine Court of this city, in an action brought by one Keady against the relator for money collected by the relator as agent of the plaintiff, and fraudulently misapplied. The Marine Court rendered judgment against the relator, and an execution issued against his property; being returned unsatisfied, the commitment under which he was held was issued. (See Laws Relative to the City of New York, p. 490.) N. Y. Supreme Court-Merrill agt. Grinnell. A. R. Dyett, for the relator, asked for his discharge, on the ground that the Marine Court had no jurisdiction in such an action to issue an execution or final process against the person. He cited and relied upon Brown v. Treat, 1 Hill, 225; Laws 1831, Chap. 287, §§ 1, 29, 20 to 33, 47; Code, § 53, 54, 65; §§ 179 of the Code had no application to the Marine Court. (See § 8 of Code.) DALY, J.-Held that the Marine Court had no jurisdiction to issue the process, and discharged the relator accordingly. New York Supreme Court. [August Special Term.] Before Justice MITCHELL. MERRILL against GRINNELL. PLEADING-COMPLAINT AMENDMENT. The place of trial should be clearly stated in the complaint. An irregularity in omitting the place of trial in the complaint is not cured by reference to the summons. This was a motion to amend the complaint. The facts appear in the opinion of the court. MITCHELL, J.-It is essential for many purposes of the suit that the place of trial should be clearly stated in the complaint. It determines where motions are to be made, as well as where the trial is to be had. Both parties must be at a loss to know where to proceed until that be distinctly settled. The omission of a statement so important in its consequences is not like a mere irregularity, and the defendant would be entitled to have it corrected in the same way, even after an answer put in. The obtaining of time to answer is not therefore a waiver of the irregularity. The statement of the name of the court in the summons has been held to dispense with the statement of it in the complaint; but the mere name of a county in the summons does not necessarily show that it is put there to indicate where the place of trial is to be. It may have been to show where the attorney issuing the summons resided, and this probably was its object in this case. Until the complaint was served, the plaintiff could have selected any county for the placc of trial, notwithstanding this name on the summons. The irregularity in omitting the place of trial in the complaint, is not, therefore, cured by reference to the summons. The complaint must be amended or struck out as irregular. The amendment may be made without costs. English Law and Equity Reports. ENGLISH LAW AND EQUITY REPORTS. The xxii volume of this valuable series is now in the hands of the booksellers. We have looked through it with the feeling with which we have often before approached a new volume of law reports, that all the difficult points must by this time be settled, and that every conceivable variety of facts had already been the subject of adjudication; so that it was not possible that the volume should contain anything new or valuable. But we have been uniformly disappointed, and we fear that happy day for lawyers when there will be no necessity of purchasing the new reports will not dawn on the present generation. There are many cases in this volume which an advocate would not wish to meet for the first time, when engaged in an argument, and when cited by a more faithful and learned brother on the opposite side, with a client at his side and before a judge well acquainted with the adjudication. Of this character are the learned discussions to be found in this volume on maritime liens, the statute of frauds, the good will of partnership, libel, blank acceptance of bills of exchange, marine policies, false pretences, (a very important discussion as to what constitutes the procuring of property by false pretences,) domicil, &c. We might easily extend the list; but in respect to these, we have been surprised at the degree of originality and novelty involved in the discussions. We notice with pleasure that the learned editors, Messrs. Bennett & Smith, continue to enhance the value of these volumes by notes referring to the American cases. E. GIBBS' PRACTICAL FORMS AND PRECEDENTS. By Montgomery Gibbs, of the New York Bar. The second edition of this useful work has just been published by Lewis & Blood, law booksellers and publishers, 73 Nassau street. We have examined the work, and are satisfied it merits all the commendations it has received. Few works contain, in an elaborate, concise and condensed form, so much general and really useful information on subjects of vital importance to lawyers, commissioners, notaries, justices of the peace, and to the whole mercantile community. Every importer, jobber, commission merchant, all who do business with merchants in the several States of the Union, should possess a copy of the work. It will be found a perfect vade mecum in all matters relating to collection of debts, the exemption laws, the statutes of limitations, the legal rates of interest, and penalties for usury in the United States. Complete rules and directions for proceedings in the patent offices, with a digest of important decisions. The powers and duties of notaries public in relation to bills and notes, with a digest of Gibb's Practical Forms and Precedents, &c. decisions in relation thereto. Forms and instructions for bounty lands, laws and forms concerning naturalization, and many subjects of utility to the general business community. The information in this work is accurate and reliable, and when we say it is a duodecimo of but 280 pages, and can be procured for $1 50, we may strongly recommend every man of business to possess himself of a copy. DUER'S REPORTS. The second volume of these valuable Reports will shortly be issued. WHITTAKERS' PRACTICE. SECOND EDITION, 2 VOLS. We are pleased to find that the second edition of this valuable work is now ready to issue. THE New York Legal Observer. VOL. XII.] NEW YORK, OCTOBER, 1854. [MONTHLY PART. INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE ROMAN LAW. By LUTHER S. 12mo., pp. 242. It must be admitted that the lovers of the civil law, whether in England or America, have had but an ungrateful task in their endeavors to promote its cultivation. Great efforts have been made, both here and in Great Britain, to popularize the study of the Roman jurisprudence, but as yet with little effect. The Institutes have been translated, Domat's huge folios have been put into English dress, the greatest of English and American jurists-Holt, Mansfield, Broughham, Story, Kent-have declared their high estimate of the civil law, but, nevertheless, for the mass of English and American lawyers, the Roman law still remains a sealed book, a dead letter; and from the time of the great baronial chorus nolumus leges Angliæ mutare to our own days, the efforts of the admirers of the ancient jurisprudence have had but little practical result. This has been owing partly to the difficulties resulting from the necessity of arriving at the civil law through the medium of a foreign and a dead language-partly to the oi barbaroi feeling, the mingled contempt and aversion which the English and those of us who imbibe English feeling and English prejudices, have, heretofore, always more or less manifested for the law, the learning, the literature of the continent partly to the hostility of a Protestant people to a system of jurisprudence mainly obtaining in Catholic countries; but more than all, to the fact that we lawyers are eminently a practical race; to the feeling that each man's task in his profession is an Herculean one, and that to master the municipal law of our own country, requires all our efforts and energies. This feeling is, to a great extent, just and true; still it is impossible to deny that, to understand, to comprehend the law, to master it as a science, a knowledge of history, and especially of the history of the law, is indispensable-that the great branches of equity and admiralty deduce their principles directly from the civil law, and that it is |