support of the officers, so as to render their commissions valuable." He pointed out "the insufficiency of their pay (especially in its present state of depreciation) for their decent subsistence; the sacrifices they had already-made, and the unreasonableness of expecting that they would continue patiently to bear such an over proportion of the common calamities growing out of the necessary war, in which all were equally interested; the many resignations that had already taken place, and the probability that more would follow, to the great injury of the service; the impossibility of keeping up a strict discipline among officers whose commissions, in a pecuniary view, were so far from being worth holding, that they were the ineans of impoverishing them." These and other weighty considerations were accompanied by a declaration from Washington, "that he neither could nor would receive the smallest benefit from the proposed establishment, and that he had no other inducement in urging it, but a full conviction of its utility and propriety."

Congress acted upon the proposed reforms with a general concurrence of sentiment, but before the army could receive the benefit of them, their distresses had reached the most alarming height. Of seventeen thousand men in the camp, but five thousand were able to discharge effective duty. Several times during the winter, they experienced little less than famine; and a total dissolution of the army was often threatened in consequence. "It was on this occasion," observes Dr. Thacher, "that a foreigner of distinction said to a friend of mine, that he despaired of our independence; for while walking with General Washington along the soldiers' huts, he heard from many voices echoing through the open crevices between the logs, no pay, no clothes, no provisions, no rum,' and when a miserable being was seen flitting from one hut to another, his nakedness was only covered by a dirty blanket. It will be difficult to form a just conception of the emotions of grief and sorrow, which must have harrowed up the soul of our illustrious patriot and philanthropist. In this darkening hour of adversity, any man who possesses less firmness than Washington, would despair of our independence."

It was at this period that the British government were disposed to make conciliatory proposals. The first certain intelligence of these offers was received by Washington in a letter from the British governor of NewYork, enclosing the proposals, and recommending "that they should be circulated by General Washington among the officers and privates of his army." These proposals were immediately forwarded to Congress, and on the day after their rejection an order was adopted, in which it was urged upon the different states to pardon, under certain limitations, such of their misguided citizens as had levied war against the United States. This resolution was transmitted to the British Governor, with a request, by way of retort, that he would circulate it among the Americans in the British army. The proposals of the British government had been made in consequence of a treaty which had just been concluded between France and the United States.

Sir William Howe had resigned the command of the British army, and was succeeded by Sir Henry Clinton. This officer received immediate orders to evacuate Philadelphia. Washington was uncertain what course

he would probably pursue. Deciding on a march to New-York, the British general crossed the Delaware about the middle of June. When this was known, a council of war was immediately called in the American camp. There was a great difference of opinions. Since the recent alliance with France, independence was considered secure, unless the army should be defeated. Under such circumstances a general engagement was not to be hazarded, without a fair prospect of success. This was the opinion of a majority of the general officers. Washington, however, was very desirous to risk an action.

When Sir Henry Clinton had advanced to Allentown, instead of pursuing the direct course to Staten Island, he drew towards the sea coast. On learning that he was marching in this direction, towards Monmouth court-house, Washington sent Brigadier Wayne with a thousand men to reinforce his advanced troops. The command of this body was offered to General Lee, who in the exchange of prisoners had been restored to the army. This officer was opposed to any engagement with the enemy at that time, and declined the service. It was accordingly given to the Marquis de La Fayette.

The whole army followed at a proper distance for supporting the advanced corps, and reached Cranberry the next morning. Washington increased his advanced corps with two brigades, and sent General Lee, who was now desirous of assuming the command, to take charge of the whole, and followed with the main army to give it support. On the next morning, orders were sent to Lee to move forward and attack the enemy, unless there should be very strong objections to the measure. When Washington had marched about five miles to support the advance corps, he found it retreating, by Lee's orders, and without having offered any opposition. He immediately rode up to Lee and requested an explanation; the reply was unsuitable and insolent. Orders were then given to form on a piece of ground which seemed to offer advantages as a position to check the enemy. Lee was asked if he would command on that ground; he consented, and replied "your orders shall be obeyed, and I will not be the first to leave the field."

Washington returned to the main army, which was soon formed for action. After several unsuccessful movements of the British troops, they retired and took the ground that had been before occupied by General Lee. Washington determined to attack them, and ordered two detachments to move round, upon their right and left sides. They did not arrive at their ground in season to commence the attack that night. They remained in that position till morning, General Washington reposing on his cloak under a tree in the midst of his troops. Before dawn, the British moved away in great silence. Nothing was known of their march till the next day. They left behind four officers, and forty privates, so severely wounded that it was not safe to remove them. Including prisoners, the whole loss of the British army was about three hundred and fifty. They pursued their march to Sandy Hook without farther interruption and without any loss of baggage. The Americans lost about two hundred and fifty men. Declining pursuit of the royal troops, they retired to the borders of the North river.

Shortly after the action, Congress resolved on a vote of thanks to General Washington, for the activity with which he marched from the camp at Valley Forge in pursuit of the enemy; for his distinguished exertions in forming the line of battle; and for his great good conduct in leading on the attack, and gaining the important victory of Monmouth. General Lee followed up his passionate language on the day of the battle, by writing two violent letters to Washington, which occasioned his being arrested and brought to trial. After a protracted hearing before a court-martial, of which Lord Stirling was president, Lee was found guilty, and sentenced to be suspended from any command in the armies of the United States for the term of one year.

Soon after the battle of Monmouth, the American army took post at the White Plains, and remained there and in the vicinity till autumn was far advanced, and then retired to Middlebrook, in New Jersey. During this period, nothing occurred of greater importance than an occasional skirmish. The French fleet arrived too late to attack the British in the Delaware. It was determined, therefore, that a joint expedition, with the sea and land forces, should be made against the British posts in Rhode Island. General Sullivan was appointed to the conduct of the American troops; Count D'Estaing commanded the French fleet. The preparations for commencing the attack had been nearly completed, when a British fleet appeared in sight. The French commander immediately put out to sea, to come to an engagement. A violent storm arose, and injured both fleets to such an extent, that it was necessary for the one to sail for Boston, and the other to New-York, to refit.

General Sullivan had commenced the siege, in the expectation of being shortly seconded by the French fleet. The determination of D'Estaing to return to Boston excited general alarm. It left the harbors of Rhode Island open for reinforcements to the British, from their headquarters in New-York. The very safety of the American army was endangered by it. Every effort was made to induce the French commander to change his intentions, but without effect. This affair produced a great deal of discontent and irritation, among the American officers, and was likely to lead to very serious difficulties. With his usual prudence and good judgment, General Washington exerted his influence to quiet the wounded feelings of both parties. He was powerfully assisted in this attempt, by the Marquis de La Fayette, who was very much beloved by the Americans as well as the French, and gladly rendered his services to bring about a reconciliation. Washington wrote on the subject to the several general officers of his army, and took the first opportunity of recommencing his correspondence with Count D'Estaing. His letter took no notice of the angry dispute that had occurred, and good humor and cordial good-will were speedily restored.

With the battle of Monmouth, active operations closed in the middle states. On the approach of winter, the American army went into quarters in the neighborhood of the Highlands. Being better clothed and better fed than in the preceding winter, their situation was greatly ameliorated. At the close of 1778, except the possession of New-York by the British, the local situation of the hostile armies did not much

"It is

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differ from that of the commencement of the campaign of 1776. not a little pleasing," observed Washington in a letter to a friend, less wonderful to contemplate, that after two years' manœuvring, and undergoing the strangest vicissitudes, both armies are brought back to the very point they set out from, and the offending party in the beginning is now reduced to the use of the pickaxe and the spade for defence. The hand of Providence has been so conspicuous in all this, that he must be worse than an infidel that lacks faith, and more than wicked that has not gratitude to acknowledge his obligations."

In the last months of the year 1778, when the active operations of the campaign were over, Congress decided on a magnificent plan for the conquest of Canada. This plan was to be carried into effect by the joint operations of distinct detachments of Americans, acting in different points, and co-operating with a French fleet and army on the river St. Lawrence. The scheme was not communicated to Washington, till it had been adopted by Congress. He was then consulted, and requested to write to Dr. Franklin, then minister at Paris, to interest him in securing the proposed co-operation of France. Doubtful of the success of the operation, even with the assistance of the French, Washington was urgent to obtain its rejection. Congress persisted in the measure, and a committee of their body was chosen to confer with the general on this business, and on the state of the army. His objections were then found to be insurmountable, and the expedition was laid aside.

The alliance with France had seemed to many to secure our independence. It was supposed that Great Britain would despair of final success, and relinquish farther prosecution of the war. Washington was very busy in opposing the progress of this dangerous delusion. In his correspondence with members of Congress, and influential men throughout the state, he represented the fallacy of this opinion, and the impolicy of indulging it. He was anxious that early and vigorous measures should be taken for the next campaign. Yet it was not till the twenty-third of January, 1779, that Congress passed resolutions for re-enlisting the army; and not till the ninth of March, that the states were called upon to furnish their proportion of the general forces. This state of affairs greatly alarmed Washington, and his apprehensions at the time may be gathered from the following extract of a letter to one of his confidential friends.

"To me it appears no unjust simile, to compare the affairs of this great continent to the mechanism of a clock, each state representing some one or other of the small parts of it, which they are endeavoring to put in fine order, without considering how useless and unavailing their labor is, unless the great wheel, or spring, which is to set the whole in motion, is also well attended to and kept in good order. I allude to no particular state, nor do I mean to cast reflections upon any one of them, nor ought I, as it may be said, to do so upon their representatives; but as it is a fact too notorious to be concealed, that Congress is rent by party; that much business of a trifling nature and personal concernment withdraws their attention from matters of great national moment, at this critical period; when it is also known that idleness and dissipation take place of close attention and application; no man who wishes well to the liberties of his

country, and desires to see its rights established, can avoid crying outWhere are our men of abilities? Why do they not come forth to save their country? Let this voice, my dear sir, call upon you, Jefferson, and others. Do not, from a mistaken opinion that we are to sit down under our own vine and our own figtree, let our hitherto noble struggle end in ignominy. Believe me, when I tell you, there is danger of it. I have pretty good reasons for thinking that the administration, a little while ago, had resolved to give the matter up, and negotiate a peace with us upon almost any terms; but I shall be much mistaken, if they do not now, from the present state of our currency, dissensions, and other circumstances, push matters to the utmost extremity. Nothing, I am sure, will prevent it, but the interruption of Spain, and their disappointed hope from Prussia."

The depreciation of the paper currency had so reduced the pay of the American officers, as to render it inadequate to their support. This led to serious troubles and discontents. Early in May, the Jersey brigade was ordered to march by regiments to join the western army. In answer to this order, a letter was received from General Maxwell, stating that the officers of the first regiment had addressed a remonstrance to the legislature of the state, in which they professed a determination to resign their commissions, unless that body immediately attended to their pay and support. General Washington knew the sufferings to which the army had been exposed, and the virtue and firmness with which they had supported them. He knew the truth and justice of the complaints now made by the Jersey regiment; but saw and felt the evils that would result from the measures they had adopted. Relying on their patriotism and personal attachment to himself, he immediately wrote to General Maxwell a letter to be communicated to the officers.

In this address, he adopted the language of a friend as well as of an officer. He acknowledged the inconvenience and distress to which the army were exposed; and expressed the hope that they had done him the justice to believe, that he had been incessant in endeavors to procure them relief. The limited resources of the government were mentioned, and their embarrassment in procuring money. He then alluded to the progress of the cause, the probability of soon attaining the object of their struggles, and the meanness of a shameful desertion, and forgetfulness of what was due to their country. "Did I suppose it possible," he observed, "this could be the case, even in a single regiment of the army, I should be mortified and chagrined beyond expression. I should feel it as a wound given to my own honor, which I consider as embarked with that of the army at large. But this I believe to be impossible. Any corps that was about to set an example of the kind, would weigh well the consequences; and no officer of common discernment and sensibility would hazard them. If they should stand alone in it, independent of other consequences, what would be their feelings, on reflecting that they had held themselves out to the world in a point of light inferior to the rest of the army. Or if their example should be followed, and become general, how could they console themselves for having been the foremost in bringing ruin and disgrace upon their country. They would remember, that the army would share a