old matter; but I do think that the quantum in another sense is material to be considered; that is, what proportion the quantum taken bears to the whole of the plaintiffs' works. In the case of Bramwell v. Halcomb, the passages complained of were the most material parts of the plaintiffs' work. But the lord chancellor considered, that the quantum was material to look into, to see whether so much was taken as would induce the court to interfere. In that case, it was impossible to suppose that two writers, whatever the subject might be, would use sentence after sentence the same language to express the same thoughts. The smallness of the excerption therefore must be the reason, why the injunction was not sustained before my lord chancellor, and I must take it, that where the quantity is minute, and proportionally so minute as in this case, and the intention manifestly was not to injure the plaintiffs, but to disseminate in an useful manner the knowledge of the law, I should be inflicting an injury rather than preventing one, by granting the injunction. I cannot think that it would occur to Mr. Smith, seeing the way in which he has managed the work, that he was not at liberty to take the cases as he did, and it is material that the plaintiffs did not interfere to quarrel with the publication of the cases taken from them in the first volume. I do not accede to the view that each case is a subject of copyright. It is not formed by assigning a copyright in one case and then in another. The difference may be arithmetical, but for purposes of practice and business, I do not think there is much difference between the first volume and the second. Three cases out of eight volumes is as great in quantity as twenty-four cases out of fortyfour volumes. It is not sworn that any injury has been produced, and no human being can believe that any ever will be; and the proper construction is, that if Mr. Smith could, without any animadversion, publish three cases, he might the twenty-four; and the invariable practice of the court is, that where there has been any lying by, a party comes too late; therefore, both upon the substance and conduct of the case, the plaintiffs are not entitled to an injunction; but I shall say nothing about the costs, and leave the parties to such action as they may think proper to institute, with liberty to apply.

The case subsequently came on before the lord chancellor, by way of appeal from the vice-chancellor's judgment, and Jacob and Russell were heard in support of the motion, and Wigram, Wilcox and Warner, for the defendant, and, on the 23d of June, the following opinion was pronounced by the

LORD CHANCELLOR. I have carefully looked through the pleadings and affidavits in this case, and am satisfied that the vice-chancellor has arrived at a right conclusion in refusing the injunction. The circumstances of this case, and the conduct of the parties, are and have been such, as render it unnecessary that I should go into the law affecting questions of this nature. The principles by which courts of equity are governed do not require them to exercise their jurisdiction, in determining what may be the legal rights of parties, but merely to protect those rights when ascertained by legal tribunals, or at most to clear the way of impediments, while litigation with that object is proceeding; and which, unless removed, would cause irreparable mischief and injury. The question is, does a probability of irreparable mischief exist in this case? I apprehend clearly not, as there is no evidence to that effect. Looking at the conduct of the plaintiffs, this case appears to fall precisely within the principle upon which lord Eldon decided Rundell v. Murray, (1 Jac. 316). His words are, "There has often been great difficulty about granting injunctions, where the plaintiff has previously, by acquiescing, permitted many others to publish the work; where ten have been allowed to publish, the court will not restrain the eleventh. A court of equity frequently refuses an injunction where it acknowledges a right, when the conduct of the party complaining has led to the state of things that occasions the application; and, therefore, without saying with whom the right is, I think it is a case in which strict law only ought to govern." Now it is well known to all of us, that Mr. Chitty, jun., in his treatise on bills of exchange, and several other authors, have been permitted by the plaintiffs to select, and in fact to print verbatim, cases from the reports now sought to be protected. And after such tacit or express permission, it is not for this court to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction by injunction, to prevent

Mr. Smith from selling the valuable work he in like manner has compiled from a similar source. Besides, there are other acts of the plaintiffs, approaching very closely towards direct acquiescence and sanction given by them to the publication of the second volume at least of the defendant's work. [His lordship went into these facts fully.] And therefore, upon the whole, I think this case ought to be decided by reference to the strict legal rights only. Let the plaintiffs try the question first at law whether piracy has been committed; and should they succeed, they may then return to this court. I must, therefore, refuse this motion, with costs. From what I perceive passed in the court below, it is necessary I should advert to the case of Bramwell v. Halcomb. Now, in the first place, I never decided that case at all; and his honor, the vice-chancellor, was wrong in supposing that I did so, upon the question of the quantum of injury inflicted by the work complained of. The motion fell to the ground under an arrangement between the parties. I never intended to make use of any expression to the effect, that the quantity selected could in any way conclude the question as to an injunction being granted. On the contrary, it appears to me that the mere quantum would afford but a very delusive test. It is not merely the quantity, but quality and value; for a clever author might, in a very small compass, comprise all that is really valuable or virtually important in the work of another.

LEGISLATION.

MISSISSIPPI.

The legislature of this state, at the regular biennial session thereof, held at Jackson, in January and February, 1838, passed one hundred and forty-three acts, almost all of which are of a private or local character.

Religious societies. When any body of people shall organize themselves as a religious sect, and establish a place of worship, the officers thereof, or such trustees as may be elected or appointed, are authorized to receive by gift, grant, or purchase, any lands, tenements, or other property, for the use and benefit of such society, or their successors, to be used and enjoyed by them, so long as they or their successors shall continue to worship, at such place so established. Feb. 2.

Pleadings. Pleas in abatement need not be verified by affidavit, when the abatable matter is apparent upon the face of the record; and the defendant in any suit may plead as many pleas in bar of the action, as he may think proper, although some of the pleas may be to the party or to the character of the party suing. Feb. 9.

Limited partnerships. By an act passed Feb. 15, the formation of limited partnerships is authorized, for the transaction of any mercantile, commercial, mechanical, or manufacturing business, or work of improvement, (but not for banking or making insurance), upon the terms, with the rights and powers, and subject to the conditions and liabilities prescribed in the act, the provisions of which are similar to those of the laws authorizing this kind of partnership, in other states.

Mechanics' lien. Every building of whatever kind is subjected to the payment of the price, contracted to be paid for the erection

thereof, or, where there is no special contract, of what the work and labor and materials are reasonably worth, in preference to any other lien originating subsequently to the commencement of the building, or the date of the contract therefor; provided the contract is reduced to writing and signed by the parties and recorded in the court of probates, or a suit is instituted thereon within six months after the date of the contract, or the commencement of the building; and provided also that the contractor performs the work according to his contract. Feb. 15.

Revised statutes. In our last notice of the legislation of Mississippi (see Am. Jur. vol. xviii. 212), we gave an account of the revision of the statutes of that state, which had been reported to the legislature of 1836, and directed to be printed, and which we supposed would be acted upon at the session of 1838. The volume before us, however, which contams the legislation of the last mentioned year, furnishes no further information on the subject.

TENNESSEE. The twenty-second general assembly of Tennessee, at its first session, commencing in October, 1837, and ending in January, 1838, passed three hundred and nine acts and thirteen joint resolutions.

Widows. The widow of a deceased intestate is entitled to receive so much of the crop, stock, provisions, and moneys on hand or due, or other assets, as may be necessary to support her and her family, until the expiration of one year from the decease of her husband, to be set out to her by three freeholders, and to be held and used by her as her absolute property, free from attachment on any precept or execution. Chap. 13.

Capital punishments. An "act relative to capital punishments provides for the commutation of the punishment of death, for the crime of murder in the first degree, to that of imprisonment for life in the penitentiary, in cases where there are extenuating or mitigating circumstances. The statute refers to persons under sentence of death at the time of its passage, as well as to cases afterwards occurring. In regard to the first, it is made the duty