in 1566, in the Netherlands, act wrong in stopping the messenger from the Spanish ambassador Alava at Paris, to Margaret, governant of the Low Countries, and in searching his despatches, by which they at length obtained incontrovertible evidence of King Philip II.'s sinister and revengeful plans? This amounts, however, to nothing more than that circumstances exercise always their influence upon the application of ethical principles. I never heard any one blame Columbus for making use of an eclipse, in the year 1502, to deceive the natives of Jamaica, in order to induce them by fear to continue to supply him and his crew with food, when that great man was shamelessly abandoned by the Spaniards in his colonies, who ought to have honored him most, wrecked in the saddest condition of health and with a mutinous crew.1 These instances, then, prove in no manner an absence of the moral element in politics. If such acts were not justifiable on other grounds than merely because they were political measures, they would not be justifiable at all. There was actually a time when, in Italy for instance towards the end of the middle ages, ethics was almost totally discarded from international intercourse, which in consequence became nothing more than the merest calculation of expediency. Such contemptible means as vanishing ink were resorted to in diplomatic affairs. As to municipal politics, some men have boldly avowed that "all means are fair in politics," not in times of revolutionary disorder, but of profound peace and social prosperity; not in the ardor of debate, but in print; not at that age of Italian expediency when the holy host would which he was violently assailed, was a secret which he faithfully took with him to the grave. Dr. Williamson avowed the fact to James Read, of Philadelphia, who communicated it to Dr. Hosack, of New York. See his biographical memoir of H. Williamson, in vol. i. of Hosack's Essays on Various Subjects of Medical Science, New York, 1824. The great simplicity, boldness, and yet sagacity of the scheme add much to its interest. See Washington Irving's Life of Columbus. I have not mentioned in this place Macchiavelli, probably as some readers might expect; I take a very different view of this great man, which I have given in the article on him in 'the Encyclopædia Americana. be used to convey poison to the lips of the communicant, but of late, in our times, in our country. Yet in a similar way have men asserted, and in printed works too, therefore well weighing what they said, that all means, the foulest not excepted, are fair for the promotion of religion.' If we may give up ethics in one thing, we may do so in all; the principle is the same; and Charles V. when he refused the offer made by the baker of Barbarossa to poison his master, though he was an outlawed pirate, or Fox when he informed the great enemy of England that offers had been made to the British government to assassinate him, acted but as a poor politician. Not so, I trust.3 It is one of the chief objects of this work to show how the principles of ethics are applicable to politics. If there is at present in some countries so great a confusion of ethicopolitical ideas that the observer would well nigh lose his hope, let us not forget that nations may rise from a state of political torpor or immorality and assume a station worthier of the nature of man. Who would deny that England of to-day stands, as to politics and public political opinion, far above the times of Charles II. and the political corruption under James II.? Who would deny that France has politically improved, if we compare her as she is, with the times 'of the Regent and of Louis XV.? Who can deny that the probity of the papal church government has vastly improved since the times of the Reformation, if we compare it to what it was under the popes of the fifteenth century? "Let the women who complain of the vices or ill humor of their husbands be instructed secretly to withdraw a sum of money, that by making an offering thereof to God they may expiate the crimes of their sinful helpmates and secure a pardon for them." Secreta Monita Societatis Jesu, ix. 16. 2 Charles said, "I conquer my enemies with arms, not with fraud and treachery." Sandoval, Historia de la Vida y Hechos del Imperador Carlos V., ii. 243. Vera, Epitome de la Vida y Hechos del Emperador Carlos V., 71. 3* Boyer (Political State, 1719, vol. ii. 344) mentions that Paul Miller, a private trooper, offered to Secretary Craggs to assassinate the Pretender. Craggs informed the Lords Justices, who ordered his dismissal and procedure against him with the utmost severity. See Mahon's England, i. 523. What minister of state would now dare to take a pension from a foreign monarch, or what judge a present or bribe? Yet nothing was more common, perhaps, all over Europe, in the seventeenth century. Much, however, seems yet in an unsettled state. Very doubtful, and, at times, decidedly immoral, principles are publicly, sometimes unwittingly, proclaimed. Our task is to proceed in this branch as mankind proceeded with regard to ethics in general. Let us gather what is acknowledged as stable, let us ascertain why it is so, and on these principles rest our further conclusions. CHAPTER VI. Does Religion or Common Sense dispense with Ethics in Politics?-Hume's View of Common Sense.-What is Common Sense?-It does not dispense either with a proper Knowledge of Politics and Ethics, or with constant Exertion and much Industry. XLII. POLITICAL Ethics has not appeared to many persons in as important a light as it otherwise would, had not false reliance been placed upon religion and common sense; both of which are as important in politics as in any other sphere of human action; but they do not dispense with morals in politics any more than anywhere else. As to the distinct sphere of religion, and the effects of confounding it, from whatever cause or motive, with politics or matters of right, and especially of taking the Bible, a code of religion. and morals, for a political code, I must refer the reader to the sequel of the work. It is a subject which requires the calmest investigation. Respecting common sense as the sole guide in politics, the following is the view I take. XLIII. Hume, in his Essays, vol. ii. p. 246, says, "Though an appeal to general opinion may justly, in the speculative sciences of metaphysics, natural philosophy, and astronomy, be esteemed unfair and inconclusive; yet in all questions with regard to morals, as well as criticism, there is really no other standard by which any controversy can ever be decided. And nothing is a clearer proof that a theory of this kind is erroneous than to find that it leads to paradoxes, which are repugnant to the common sentiments of mankind and to general practice and opinion." No one will deny that this is true in a great degree, yet it requires very much to be limited, or we should have in matters of taste as well as ethics the most unsettled standard. First, as to the words "mankind" and "general practice," they are vague. All mankind cannot be meant, for the diversity of opinion as to details is very great, both at different ages and at the same time. The African slave-trade, now declared by all Christian nations a piratical crime-Portugal, the first power who introduced it, abolished it last by a decree of December 10, 1836, and Texas sprang into existence almost with a declaration of its iniquity on her lips, which had but just pronounced her independence—was once a "general practice," and Roscoe, the pride of Liverpool, was hooted by that very community on his return from Parliament in 1807, for having voted for the abolition of that traffic (page 290, vol. ii. of Life of William Roscoe, Boston, 1833). Is then meant by mankind our peculiar race or tribe, or our nation, or our community, or whatever other representative of mankind be taken? If so, we shall find that in many cases what is a paradox with one nation is very far from being so with another. Respecting paradoxes themselves, we have only to remark that every great truth, when first promulgated, sounded paradoxical to the multitude. When the Eastern philosopher first called upon his followers to do good even unto enemies and to be like the sandal-tree which sheds perfume upon the axe that fells it, no doubt it appeared very odd, as we have the proof that Christ's precept to love our enemies was but a paradox according to the "general practice" and opinion of "mankind." There was a time when the idea that the people are after all the great and true fountain. of power, or that they should have the right to criticise the acts of government, was nothing more than an odd paradox. It was decidedly repugnant to the general feeling of mankind in antiquity and the middle ages that the man "disgraced by labor" should in any way stand equal to those who did not labor. To gainsay it would have appeared as a mere paradox. When the French rules of taste prevailed, it was a sheer paradox to prize a glowing lyric or pathetic ballad of the middle ages more highly than cold and stately declamation expressed in formal alexandrines-nay, to value Shakspeare higher than Racine or Voltaire. There was a time when it was an abso |