CHAPTER IV.

Man, a Being having his own End and Purpose, or an Ens autoteles.-Natural Law. Its only Axiom.-Its Object.-Difference of Natural Law and Ethics. -Science of Politics.-Disastrous Consequences of confounding Natural Law and Politics proper.-Good Faith necessary wherever Man acts.—Political Ethics.-Its relation to the other Sciences which treat of Man.

XXVIII. WE have seen that every man, as man, has his own ethic worth and value; he is in this respect not only his own object, but in consequence of his reason and free will he can and ought to make himself the conscious object of his own activity; in other words, he shall consciously work out his own perfection; that is, the development of his own humanity. For this reason man has been called by the old philosophers ens autoteles (ens, being, autoteles from ɑvróg, self, and ros, end), a being that is consciously its own end and object, to distinguish him from other animals. This, as is evident, is again indispensably connected with man's individuality. Ethics having established these points, it is the object of another science, natural law, or, as others have called it of late, e.g. Mr. Rotteck of Freiburg, rational law, to show the rights which man has according to his inherent, inalienable ethical nature.

XXIX. Every science, even mathematics, has to start from some axioms, that is, from truths which must be either supposed to have been proved by other sciences, or are selfevident in their nature. The very meaning of proof involves its starting from and relying on previously acknowledged truths. For every syllogism we want first two terms, to make our conclusion; the axiom therefore is a truth the convincing and binding power of which we cannot help acknowledging without the logical process of deriving the conclusion from the term and middle term.

It appears to me that the only axiom necessary to establish the science of natural law is this: "I exist as a human being, therefore I have a right to exist as a human being.”1 This once acknowledged, the rights of men in their various. relations as individuals, husbands or wives, fathers or mothers, as citizens individually and collectively in the state to other independent states and to the collective citizens within the state, may consistently and justly be established. Though some ancient and modern writers have maintained that no right exists antecedent to the magistracy, deriving the right of this from some extra-political, and in some cases even from some extra-human, source, it is nevertheless true that, if we do not deny our own existence and the existence of truth, the reality and truth of natural law can be scientifically and irresistibly established with as much certainty as that of other sciences. Spinoza (Epist. 74), who, it will be admitted on all hands, might be charged with anything rather than too great a readiness to admit unwarranted truths, justly remarks, "Quomodo autem id sciam si roges, respondebo, eodem modo ac tu scis tres angulos trianguli æquales esse duobus rectis, et hoc sufficere negabit nemo cui sanum est cerebrum nec spiritus immundos somniat, qui nobis ideas falsas inspirant, veris similes."

Natural Law, then, inquires into the rights of man to be derived from his nature, both physical and moral, for the latter is closely connected with the former; it inquires into quid sit justum aut injustum, not into quid sit juris (what is law or lawful). The word nature is a term used in so many various significations that it has led to great confusion of ideas in several branches; and it is not an uncommon mistake to believe that natural law is that law which existed in the erroneously supposed state of nature, on which, as has been indicated already, I shall have to dwell in the next book. The law of nature, or natural law, on the contrary, is the law, the body of rights,

[It being, of course, understood what a human being is in all his relations, and what ought to take place when those relations are disturbed.]

It is,

which we deduce from the essential nature of man. therefore, equally erroneous to contradistinguish or oppose natural law to revealed law, for the latter can only be founded upon the former, since by the nature of man we understand that imprint and essential mode of existence which he received from the hands of his Creator. They cannot conflict.

Nor are natural law and moral law or ethics the same. The difference is material. Ethics treats, among other subjects, of the duties of man, and secondarily of his rights derivable from his duties; natural law, on the other hand, treats, as the fundamental and primary subject, of man's rights, and secondarily of his obligations flowing from the fact of each man's being possessed of the same rights. This distinction, though essential, has been and to this day is frequently overlooked. An equally good name with that of natural law might be abstract law or pure law, as we have pure mathematics.

XXX. Natural Law having ascertained and established that which is right from the nature of man, it is the subject of another science to ascertain the best means of securing it, both according to the result and conclusion of experience, and the demands of existing circumstances. I would call this branch politics proper. An instance or two will illustrate the subject. If natural law shows from the fact of every man's being a moral being, who has his own end and worth, and from the consequent impossibility of his becoming a nonmoral being under whatsoever circumstances, or of losing his individuality, that the state must offer protection to every one, or must cease to be a state so far as he is concerned who is denied to have a right to derive any advantage from it; or if it shows that all men are equal in this respect, that each one has his own ethic worth, and that this equality forms the only true foundation for justice; it would, on the other hand, be a question of politics proper to ascertain how the many ends of true justice are to be obtained. If natural law establishes the general right to property, namely, that it is founded in the unalterable and indispensable nature of man that exclu

sive possession of things belonging to the material world should be vested in individuals or individual societies; it is for politics proper to ascertain whether, under certain given. circumstances, this general right of property is best secured. by representative governments, by the trial by jury, by unlimited possession, or by revertible titles, as was the case in the Mosaic law; whether the general principle demands, under the given circumstances, that the accumulation of property as well as its division should be unlimited, or whether it is wise to prevent division below a certain standard, as is the case in Sweden and some other countries, or prevent accumulation beyond a certain limit, as Solon prescribed. The whole great question of constitutions, with respect to everything that is not strictly a principle of natural law, e.g. protection of personal liberty, of freedom from molestation as long as no wrong is done, of a degree of protection extended even to the evildoer and while we bring him to punishment, belongs to the present branch. Shall we have two chambers, or one, or three separate estates, or four? How long shall the membership of the upper house continue? for six years, as in the United States, for ten, or for life, as has been the case in France ? Who shall bestow it? Once bestowed, shall it be hereditary, as in England, or shall the house consist of some hereditary peers and others holding the place for life, as in Holland, Bavaria? Shall prelates belong to it? Does not the crown increase its influence if it has the right to make peers for life only, because the opportunity of conferring the peerage returns more frequently, and the whole body feels more dependent upon the crown? Does the increased independence of a hereditary peerage upon the crown promise on the whole more advantage to the people by uniting with them against encroachments of the crown, or disadvantage by continued opposition to cherished measures of the people? Is it advisable to have female monarchs, where monarchy is necessary? Are they or are they not in their nature, as belonging to the weaker sex which is universally excluded from public business, peculiarly jealous of their rights, suspicious of oppo

sition, and high-toned in holding on to their prerogatives; and, if so, are the advantages to be derived from an order of succession which includes females greater than the disadvantages? Which mode of voting promises the greatest advantage, that by ballot or by open votes? By which mode is, after all, greater independence and a less degree of intrigue obtained? Is an election of electors best, or a direct election? Shall judges be appointed for good behavior, or for a limited time? What shall form the basis of representation, property, number, education, or a combination of them? When shall a man be of age? Is it good that the executive be dependent upon the people for supplies? Ought the crown to have a distinct crown treasure? On which side are the greatest advantages, where the executive ministers are members of one of the houses, and if so, where they have a vote or not, or where they are excluded, as in the United States? How is the appointing power of the executive to be limited? How, altogether, is the great problem of giving sufficient and yet not too much power to the executive, to be solved? All these questions cannot be solved on absolute grounds; it is experience alone, soundly viewed and impartially applied to existing circumstances as well as the principles ascertained by natural law which can guide us respecting these subjects, many of which are, nevertheless, of vital interest.

The confusion of natural law and politics proper has produced evil, and not unfrequently disastrous consequences. On the one hand, men have seen that, without establishing firm and absolute principles, all would be confusion and insecurity. On the other hand, they have been so far misled by principles drawn from natural law, as to judge every political question "by theory alone, disavowing experience, expediency, and a due regard to the elements which were given wherewith to work. The impossibility of proceeding in this way never fails soon to be felt, and the very disowners of expediency or the necessity of making measures practical have committed the most tyrannical outrages, not unfrequently founded alone, and acknowledgedly so, on absolute expediency as preparatory