no redress, although it should lead to the utter ruin of his affairs. If the Attorneygeneral is a man of good intentions, he certainly will do no wanton injury, and no evil. may immediately result, unless it be the consequence of error in judgment; which, however, being a man, there is some ground to apprehend that he may occasionally fall into. But, unfortunately, we cannot depend on the office being so filled; and should some Noy* re-appear amongst us, with such a power as this, what injustice may he not perpetrate! "None can be safe against authorised malice; and notwithstanding the care of our ancestors, rapine, murder, and the worst of crimes may be advanced by the formality of verdicts, if grand juries be overawed, or not suffered to inquire into the truth, to the satisfaction of their consciences." No doubt this was written rather to point out the abuse of which grand juries, acting under the influence of illegal restraints, may be made the instruments. Lord Somers seems not to have had it in his contemplation that they could, in any case, be altogether dispensed with; but the effect may be the same, as far as it can extend, whether it proceeds from such restraints as render the appeal to them a mere form, or from their not being appealed to at all, the accused is deprived of the

"He was the most keen of all the ministerial gang in every illegal measure that the times produced;-in all oppressive prosecutions, the peculiar business of his office. Equal to a place of this sort, he filled it with the highest degree of infamy."

Macaulay.

benefit of that security from unjust accusation and its consequences, which it was the intention of the law to afford.

Nor is it unreasonable to conclude, that from the undue formation of grand juries, combined with the disuse of them in case of libel, has resulted the indefinite character of this offence, which has already been noticed. In describing the important duties which appertain to grand juries, Lord Somers states, that "they are not only to inquire whether the fact, that is laid, was done by the party accused, but into the circumstances thereof too,-whether it were done traitorously, feloniously, or maliciously, &c. according to the manner charged; which circumstances (says he) are not barely matter of form, but do constitute the very essence of the crime; and, lastly, into the credit of the witnesses, and that of the party accused; and unless they find both the fact proved upon him, and strong presumption of such aggravating circumstances attending it, as the law requires in the specification of such crime, and likewise are satisfied in the credibility of the witnesses, they ought not to expose the subject to an open trial in the face of the country."

If the grand juries, constituted as they are, enter thus fully into the examination of the few cases of libel which come before them, it is well; but the natural tendency of power to encroach, may, in the general absence of all such control, have given rise to the course of proceeding which the trials now exhibit.

All previous ordeal being evaded, the accused is abruptly brought into court; and to produce the publication containing the imputed libel, together with evidence of his connection, and of the fact of publishing, is held to be a sufficient proof of the charge. The falsehood, or the malicious or seditious intention is assumed,* although in every other case, the absence of proof is deemed a reasonable ground of inference in favour of the accused. Nay, if evidence is offered to prove the facts which occasioned the imputed libel, the judges refuse to receive it!

So

*The KING v. JOHN HUNT.-A Juror-1 wish to ask whether malice constitutes a part of the law of libel.

Chief Justice Abbott-An unlawful motive is an ingredient in that, as well as every other crime. If an act done is unlawful, or calculated to produce an unlawful effect, where the party committing it, is conscious of what he is doing, an unlawful motive is assumed.-February 21, 1821.

Juries are not composed of lawyers; and I am still at a loss to know how this jury ascertained that the act in question was unlawful. His Lordship told them so no doubt; but this was not evidence; and they were "a true verdict to give according to the evidence."

The KING v. SIR F. BURDETT.-Mr. Denman offered evidence to prove the statements respecting the Manchester meeting.

Mr. Justice Best said, that which related to the proceedings at Manchester was irrelevant. He would allow no evidence of what had passed there.

Mr. Denman-If evidence of the facts negative malice, in stating, that the troops cut down men, it must be important; he therefore offered evidence to prove them true.

Mr. Justice Best asked, if it were possible that such a charge. as this could be met by evidence of such a description? Mr. Denman observed, that if the charge was "that troops were stated to have cut down men," evidence of the truth, disproved malice in the statement.

Mr. Justice Best was of opinion that this was not evidence! "Such as in the King's name prosecute suspected delinquents," says Lord Somers, "ought according unto the law, to produce

F

that although the accusation itself will have an influence, as well as the opinion of the judge, which (crown lawyers not being such novices, as to arraign what they have any reason to suspect the court will not deem libellous) we may take it for granted, will be that the subject of the charge is a libel, the question of guilty or not guilty, may in effect be decided by the degree of political feeling in the minds of the jury; to what party they belong, or how far their zeal has carried them; and one man may be convicted by one jury of the very same charge, of which a second is acquitted by another.‡

How the legitimate objects of the administration of justice are thus to be promoted, has never been very clearly set forth; and the unlearned multitude do not find it

easy to discover. Indeed ordinary under

standings more readily perceive the mischiefs, which, in the hands of bad men, such a system may produce; and the strange inconsistencies to which it is liable in any. Suppose, for example, that by some oversight (for we

no witness whom they do not think to be true; no evidence which they do not believe good; nor conceal any thing that may justify the accused."—The law is surely not less binding on a judge than on a prosecutor.

One case of this nature occurs to me. The very same paragraph was published in 1811, by Mr. Drakard, in "The Stamford News," and by Mr. Hunt, in "The Examiner ;" both were brought to trial; the former at Lincoln was found guiltythe latter in London was acquitted!

"Certainty," says Lord Bacon "is so essential to law, that a law without it, cannot be just." And here the truth of the maxim is illustrated; if Mr. Drakard was guilty, so also was Mr. Hunt; and if Mr. Hunt was not guilty, there could be no justice in the punishment inflicted on Mr. Drakard.

need not suppose design) men should be appointed to fill succeeding vacancies on the judicial bench, who should afterwards pursue a career similar to that of Empsom and Dudley. If a public writer should animadvert on their conduct, he may be prosecuted for doing so and punished; although that conduct should hereafter become a subject of accusation, and ultimately lead the guilty judges to the severest penalty of the law. Indeed such men would be disposed to punish the offending writer with greater severity for the very reason which would be the best claim to reward; for as on the one hand by awakening the public attention to the subject, a due example may be made of those who commit "injustice in the form of law," so on the other, their successors, like the successors of Empsom and Dudley, may have their ears "made to tingle ;" and thus be inspired with reverence for their trust, and with fidelity to the people whom they are sworn to serve!

It may, however, be contended that though objectionable in principle, in point of fact no abuse has been committed. During the existence of the system, it will perhaps be prudent not to go more at large into this question; but I may venture to inquire after the good which has been done. If the object be simply to deter the people from exercising the right of animadverting on men in power, or on their proceedings, there is no doubt that to a great extent it may be accomplished. That this is in any case a good, is still, however, to be demonstrated; and undoubtedly