CHAPTER VI.

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THE PROTECTIVE POLICY.

A New Doctrine in Political Economy.-The Protective Policy and Freedom identical. Mr. Clay's Debût on the Protective Policy.-His first Speech in Congress on the Subject.-Protection of the Interests of Navigation.-Navigation Acts.-Condition of Manufactures after the War of 1812.-Tariff of 1816.-Its Inadequacy.-The Unsuccessful Attempt for a Tariff in 1820.-Mr. Clay's Efforts at that Time.-Disastrous Consequences of the Failure.-The Tariff of 1824.Mr. Clay's Exertions in its behalf.-Machine Power.-A Measure of the Wealth of Nations.-Balance of Trade.-Policy of European States.-Russian Policy. -Policy of Napoleon.-What the British think of American Policy.-American Free Trade Policy is British Policy.

THE second great branch of the American system (that of internal improvement having been already considered), is the PROTECTIVE

POLICY.

There is one great principle in the protective policy, as it respects the United States, yet to be developed. It has frequently been announced by sagacious observers, but, so far as the author knows, has never assumed the position of a doctrine in political economy. The opposite of this doctrine has frequently dropped, in the shape of confession, from the advocates of the protective system, in the following loose form: That, if all nations would adopt the system of free trade, it would be best for all parties.

It is shown, in other parts of this work, that the protection of labor in the United States, against the low prices to which it is doomed in Europe and other parts of the world, is identical with freedom. It is on this principle that the following proposition is based That universal free trade, if it could at once be adopted by all nations, would be destructive of American freedom.

The opposite of this proposition is often affirmed, by advocates of the protective system, as is believed, without a consideration of consequences; or, it might, perhaps, be more correct to say, it is admitted by them, as may safely be done, since a general agreement in such a commercial system, as universal free trade, is not to be expected-is in fact impracticable. They say to their oppo

nents: "Secure to us universal free trade, and we will go with you. But to have free ports in one nation, and not in another, is unjust." This last is commonly, and very properly, called onesided free trade. There is no difficulty in making out the argument against it, though it seems for ever to be held in debate.

But, though this pledge to go for free trade on the condition of universal consent, is a very safe one, yet, with the United States, such a system would be entirely destructive of the great objects of their government and institutions. If equality in all other particulars could be made a part of the condition, it might perhaps do. But such equality can not be found, and can not be effected. At the starting point of such a universal free system, so far as ports of entry are concerned, American labor would have to meet European and other foreign labor on the same level—that is, it would have to come down to it. The state of political society is such in Europe, that labor is depressed, and does not obtain its fair compensation. It is compelled to perform its task, on an average, at about one third of the price of American labor. Other things being equal (they never would be exactly equal, but near enough to give all the required force to the present argument), the employers of European labor, by the forbearance of their respective governments on the subject of taxation-which would be their policy for a season-would be able at once to come into the market at prices which would tend directly and effectually to reduce American labor to the same condition of bondage with European. It would tend at the same time, and not less effectually, to break down those establishments which employ a large portion of American labor.

It can not be said, as shown elsewhere, that this proves, that the prices of articles now protected, would be cheapened, and that protection enhances the prices of such articles. They would be cheapened no longer, and no further, than, as a temporary policy, to break down the American producers, and subdue American labor, which being accomplished, and a monopoly acquired—at least superior advantages-the foreign factors would then be able to command their own prices, and would immediately raise them higher than they ever are under a system of protection, as all experience shows. European governments, knowing that their subjects had free entry into American ports, would relax or augment the burdens of taxation, according to circumstances, maintaining them just at the point, at which they could be sure to derive the greatest income and that must always be the point where their own factors

could most effectually secure the American market. European taxes would rise just in proportion as European factors, trading with the United States, could safely raise prices, and that would always be precisely at the point where they could keep down American establishments of the same kind.

The effect of the system would be, that the governments and higher conditions of society in Europe, which always absorb more than half of the fair compensation of European labor, and necessarily depress it to a condition of hopeless bondage, would be able to throw the same oppressive influence over American labor, and reduce it to the same condition. They would be able to tax the people of the United States just as much as they tax their own subjects, in the same way, and by the same means, because there 'would be no obstacle. Their own labor is already down to the lowest sufferable point, entirely subject to their control, and under a system of universal free trade, could and would be employed by them, as an agency, to reduce American labor to the same level. It is probably true, that, since the establishment of American independence, the American people, in consequence of the imperfect system of the American protective policy, have, indirectly, by the consumption of British manufactures, borne a burden of taxation, for the support of the British government and British institutions, not less than half the amount imposed on British subjects-all to the detriment of American interests.

It is not true, therefore, that the people of the United States can safely go upon a platform of universal free trade, if all other nations would consent to adopt it. It might be true, if all other things were equal, if all other nations were equally free, and if none of them had superior advantages in the producing arts, already acquired, that would enable them, under such à system, to crush American establishments in a state of comparative infancy. But the inequality in these comprehensive particulars, and in all their diversified ramifications, is decided and great. Nor is there any immediate prospect, that it will be diminished. Labor is the producer of wealth, wealth is power, and the state of society in Europe is designed to secure the wealth, and consequently the power, to a few.

Labor in Europe constitutes the power of its governments, by being kept under their control, and being forced to minister to their purposes. It is one of their cares to keep labor under, by robbing it of its reward. On a platform of free trade with the United States,

they would be able to use this power effectively against American labor. It would be absolutely necessary for them to do so, for the maintenance of their position. Under a system of free trade, either European labor, in such hands, and so employed, must enslave American labor, or the latter must emancipate the former. Such emancipation would be impossible, because American labor could not compete with European labor on European ground-certainly not in any degree sufficient to relieve its condition. It could not compete on its own ground. American labor, therefore, would be obliged to yield, to succumb-would be reduced and enslaved.

If, then, it should be asked, why do not the European governments all go for free trade? it may be answered, first, it is contended by some, that they are going for it; and if so, this, doubtless, is the reason, and it is the thing, in such a case, most of all to be feared by the people of the United States, as they must be aimed at as victims of such a seductive example. But, secondly, it does not appear that the governments of Europe are tending that way, and so far as England has relaxed her system of imposts, it is shown in another part of this work, that it is done on the principle of protection. Thirdly, the commercial systems of Europe, so far as they are framed by the governments, are old, and can not be easily modified. All changes in them must be very gradual and very slow, for their own safety. Fourthly, they were not framed in view of the United States, but chiefly in view of each other, or of all the world; and though their commercial connexions with the United States have been constantly on the increase, they are not even yet sufficient to invoke a change in their policy. They are not likely to consent to a system of free trade, even if the United States should be unwise enough to ask for that which would be their ruin. There is probably no nation in the world, that would be injured so soon and so much, by a system of universal free trade, as the United States-simply because there is no nation where labor commands so fair a compensation. It is labor first and chiefly that realizes the benefit of the protective policy; and labor would be the first victim of free trade. Not that all other interests are not concerned in it; but labor has the greatest interest.

It would, therefore, be fatal to the interests, and death to the freedom, of the United States, to enter into a compact for a universal system of free trade, notwithstanding it has been supposed by some of the advocates of the protective policy, that it might be safely done. This, it is admitted, is a theory which has little chance

of being reduced to practical operation, for the reason that universal consent can never be obtained. Nevertheless, it is a view of the subject which adds great force to the argument for protection, and casts much light on the protective system, as applicable to the United States. It is going behind the usual purposes of the protective policy, which are those of interest, and showing how it stands related to that most precious and most sacred of all American rights -FREEDOM. It undoubtedly has a vital connexion with this boon. It is impossible to look at the spectacle of European power and authority over labor, and not have some sense of this relation. Will that power-that authority-willingly relinquish its advantages— abandon its position? It has an iron grasp on the labor of a continent, receiving more than a moiety of its reward, any fraction of which it can afford to part with for a season, in a conflict with American labor, with the view of ultimately realizing an equal portion of the latter's reward, and reducing it to the same condition with the victim of its own constant oppression. It is only by extending the shield of protection over American labor, that it is saved from this doom. It is for this reason that the United States should indignantly reject, if they should receive, the offer of universal free trade.

But the main object now in view, is to exhibit Mr. Clay's doctrines on the protective system. His debût as a statesman, in this cause, was made in 1808, at the age of twenty-five, in the legislature of Kentucky, when he moved a resolution in that body, that the members, as an example to the people, and as an expression of patriotic duty in giving countenance and support to domestic manufactures, should clothe themselves, from head to foot, in articles of domestic fabric and production.

The first speech made by Mr. Clay in Congress on the protective policy, was in the senate, April 6, 1810, while in all the freshness of his youth as a statesman. The following is an extract :

"The opposition to manufacturing institutions recalls to my recollection the case of a gentleman, of whom I have heard. He had been in the habit of supplying his table from a neighboring cook and confectioner's shop, and proposed to his wife a reform, in this particular. She revolted at the idea. The sight of a scullion was dreadful, and her delicate nerves could not bear the clattering of kitchen furniture. The gentleman persisted in his design his table was thenceforth cheaper and better supplied, and his neighbor, the confectioner, lost one of his best customers. In like manner, Dame Commerce will oppose domestic manufactures.