1880.]

MASSACRE OF CAVAGNARI.

123

policy, embracing another. He rested his case on letters of Lord Lawrence, written to himself when he was Secretary for India. These letters gave Lord Lawrence's policy. He had agreed with it then, he agreed with it still, for Lord Lawrence had said it was "one thing to leave the Afghans to fight their own battles, and quite another to stand by in the same attitude while others are interfering." And Sir Stafford had, even then, recorded his opinion that if Shere Ali tampered with the Persians about Herat, we might give aid to his rival. Others were now interfering, by the Russian Mission, in Afghanistan. Circumstances had altered, and his mind had changed with them.

Again, Lord Lawrence thought we should await a Russian move on our own frontier. Yes; but in 1866 Russia had been far more remote from Afghanistan than she was in 1878. When a Russian Mission went to Cabul, avowedly because Russia and England were unfriendly, and Cabul was a vulnerable point, then, "the circumstances on which Lord Lawrence based his policy of not advancing were completely revolutionised." Thus there was, in his own conduct, "no inconsistency whatever." We defeated the Ameer, he died, we appointed Yakoob as Ameer, we got a new frontier, we were to be masters of Afghan foreign policy, we were to support the Ameer against foreign foes, and we were to have a British resident at Cabul. All this policy, Sir Stafford said, "was forced on us" (August 14, 1879). In three weeks the resident, Sir Louis Cavagnari, with the gallant Hamilton,

had been massacred. Cabul was recaptured, the murderers were punished, but General Roberts was forced into the Sherpur cantonments, and Christmas came before he was relieved. In all this affair the unhappy Ameer deserved our regrets, the Russians, our disinterested congratulations; and as for the Government, it is easy to blame them, or commiserate with them, but hard to say what they should have done. It does seem as if, in these three troubles the Bulgarian atrocities, the war with the Ameer, and the Zulu war-the Government was ill served abroad, and had its hand forced into directions not approved of by its judgment.

They were not more fortunate in that grave of men and of reputations, South Africa. In 1877 we had annexed the Transvaal, which "was drifting into anarchy, was bankrupt, and was about to be destroyed by native tribes." According to Sir T. Shepstone, "most thinking men" were in favour of the annexation, but Sir Theophilus did not say that most Boers were. The annexation appears at least to have prevented Cetywayo from washing his spears, or trying to wash them, in the blood of Boers. It was in other blood that he performed this part. of Zulu coronation ritual.2 We annexed the Transvaal, its 40,000 white people, and its million of black people -unregarded dusky million-whom we took "for ever," and deserted in a few years. Cetywayo declared that he viewed the annexation with pleasure, though he re

1 Cetywayo and his White Neighbours. H. Rider Haggard, p. 117. 2 Op. cit., 119, 120.

1880.]

THE TRANSVAAL.

125

gretted the neglect of that ceremony with the spears. Then came a difficulty about the Boer and Zulu marches. We took the side of the Boers. Sir Bartle Frere came on the scene, and bade Cetywayo disband his army. He refused. We invaded Zululand, and every one knows what followed.

They stood

As to all these disasters, when Lord Hartington asked who is to be held responsible, Sir Stafford replied, “Her Majesty's Government" (March 31, 1879). We do not cast the responsibility upon our agents." between Sir Bartle Frere and the sentence of Parliament. The Government itself censured Sir Bartle Frere, but did not withdraw its confidence. He denied that Sir Bartle had throughout, in his negotiations, been deliberately working for a Zulu war. He gave a history of all that led to the Zulu war, and really this history seems a very strong condemnation of Sir Bartle's conduct, especially of his extraordinary ultimatum to the Zulus. The history is of most interest as expressing Sir Stafford's theory of the Transvaal annexation, as a measure taken in the cause of peace, and "to stop any future wars with the Zulus, and other native tribes." If the Government censured and dismissed Sir Bartle, what then? What was their next step to be? Where was a Liberal policy, except Mr Courtney's policy, "Abandon confederation, and withdraw from the Transvaal"? That, Sir Stafford thought, would, or might, involve our withdrawing from South Africa as an Imperial Power. The wish of the Government now was to break up the Zulu military system, while leaving them

the power of protecting themselves against native tribes. But, one fancies, the Amaboona (the Boers) were the only "tribe" from whom they needed protection.

In all this miserable business it is easy to criticise. Perhaps a really powerful nation would have simply enlisted the Zulus as its gladiators, and held South Africa with them. As it chances, we rescued the Boers from their assegais, only to "perish by the people we have made," only to ruin the finest natural soldiers in the world, and to give the world a typical proof of our inability to discharge imperial tasks. The Zulus were hardly overthrown before the Boers, now safe on that side, began to show their teeth. But the Boers were left to be dealt with by Mr Gladstone's Government.

CHAPTER XV.

SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE AS A PARLIAMENTARY LEADER.

ACCESSION ΤΟ LEADERSHIP -STATE OF POLITICS-HISTORY OF OBSTRUCTION-SIR STAFFORD AND THE CLÔTURE—MR BRADLAUGH'S AFFAIR THE FOURTH PARTY-GENERAL CRITICISM OF SIR STAFFORD AS A LEADER.

THE two previous chapters, reviewing Sir Stafford's conduct as Chancellor of the Exchequer and in foreign affairs, do not deal with his other work as leader of his party in the House of Commons, both before and after the Liberal victory of 1880. To that topic we now address ourselves.

Sir Stafford Northcote entered upon his duties as leader of the House of Commons on the 8th February 1877, when the Parliament of 1874 met for its fourth session. On the 6th July 1885, he took his seat in the House of Lords as Earl of Iddesleigh and Viscount St Cyres. For eight sessions and a half he led the Conservative party continuously in the Lower House.

When Sir Stafford Northcote, at the end of the session of 1876, quietly succeeded Mr Disraeli, who had been

VOL. II.

I