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in some things than gentlemen now went. der to him that our great reformers had not got hold of Sampson against the Philistines, to support them in their views, and it could only be accounted for in this way: that they either did not exist then, or did not exist in Pennsylvania. Here were all the arguments in relation to the Passmore case, and the remedies proposed to correct the evils growing out of such transactions. Now it so happened that this Jesse Higgins was one of the greatest rascals that ever resided in the state of Delaware. According to the argument of gentlemen, then, reform must be put down, because the grand father of reform was a rascal. You need only go to that part of the state of Delaware in which this individual resided, to hear his character. During the last war, he (Mr. P.) happened to be stationed near where this great reformer had resided, and had learned something of his character, and he was then convinced that men were more capable of making a great sensation

abroad, than they were at home.

One word more, and he was done. The gentleman from Mifflin had said that a judge does a great deal more the first year after his appointment, than he ever did afterwards.

Mr. BANKS explained. What he said, was, that a judge did more the first year, or the first three or five years, than he did in the same space of time afterwards.

Mr. PORTER resumed. Well, all that he could say was, that his experience did not bring him to the same conclusion with the gentleman. He had known judges, he believed, to decide more cases the first year after their appointment; but there was a great many more of them to be reversed by the higher court; and this exemplified the old adage, "the more haste, the worse speed." He was aware it was the case with some judges, when they were first appointed, to go to work full tilt; and he had seen more injustice done by these speedy decisions of causes, than he had ever seen by the delay of justice. He admitted that some men were slothful by nature, and if you did not give them enough to do, they would become lazy. Well, then, they ought to be made more industrious, by giving them more to do; because, it was with mind as it was with water-the stagnant pool soon became putrescent. The mind which has not sufficient exercise, will become sluggish. Employment was what made great judges; and he believed no judge would be a great judge, who had not much to do. This was what made the English judges so celebrated. But lawyers were like other men; they would not do more work than they could help. But these were merely evils in the details, which can be remedied without altering the constitution.

This whole evil could be remedied by the rotatory principle. Let the judges go from one district to another, and his word for it, the evil would be corrected. We never heard a word of complaint, while the circuit court system was in operation. There were evils, he admitted, growing out of the judges residing and presiding in one district all the time; because he comes to have acquaintances and friends; and if he happens to decide a case rightfully in favor of one of these, it was looked upon with suspicion. Instead of having a provision, then, that a presi

dent judge should reside in a district, he would have one that he should not reside in the district in which he presided.

But he objected to having these evils of detail brought up as evidence against a system which, in the main, works well.

He believed he had now said all he intended to say on this subject; and he did not think he should again trouble the Convention in relation to it. He felt satisfied in his own mind, and so feeling he could not help expressing himself on the subject, that there were fewer evils sustained by the good behaviour tenure, than could be, if judges were appointed for short terms, and would have, as a matter of course, to court executive favor in order to secure a re-appointment. Judges ought to stand as independent as possible between the accused and the accusers. But, if in cases of a prosecution, got up by those in power against some humble individual, his word for it, a judge appointed for a tenure of years, would be found on that side which would bring most influence to his aid on the day of his re-appointment.

He wished the judges removed, then, from all such influences; and he hoped never to see a power over a judge which could say to him: "If you decide in this way, you shall continue in office; but if you do not, you shall be removed."

Mr. BANKS said there were a couple of matters which he had neg. lected to notice when he addressed the Convention, which he hoped he might have the opportunity now of laying before the Convention.

The first was, that our district courts, which had judges of the highest character to preside over them, were appointed for seven and ten years. These courts we had under the existing constitution, by means of acts of the legislature. The judges were appointed for seven and ten years, and the offices were filled with men of distinguished ability.

Another matter, which he wished to notice, was, that all the constitutions which were framed and adopted in the United States, since the year 1830, had this feature of a limited tenure in them. As, for instance, the state of Mississippi; the constitution of which was adopted or revised in 1832. The judges of the high court of error and appeals were appointed for six years; and the circuit court judges were elected for four years by the people; and the judges of the other inferior courts were elected by the people for two years.

In the state of Michigan, the constitution of which state was agreed to in convention in 1835, the judges of the supreme court are appointed by the governor, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, for the period of seven years; while the county court judges are elected by the people for the term of four years.

In the state of Arkansas, the constitution of which state was agreed to in convention in the year 1836, the judges of the supreme court are elected by the legislature for the period of eight years; while the justices of the peace are elected by the people for the term of two years. And the justices of the peace so elected, are to choose a presiding judge, to preside at the county courts, also for the term of two years.

These facts I bring to the notice of the committee, in connection

with what I have said before. The judges of the district courts are, under the constitution and laws, appointed and commissioned for the period of seven and ten years; and the states which have held conventions since the year 1830,-to wit, the states of Mississippi, Michigan, and Arkansas, have all adopted this feature of the limited tenure for their judicial officers.

Mr. M'CAHEN rose, and inquired if the amendment was susceptible of a division? To which interrogatory the CHAIR replied in the negative.

Mr. READ could not, he said, see any reason why the amendment was not susceptible of being divided, so as to take the question first on the tenure of the judges of the supreme court; secondly, on the tenure of the president judges; and, thirdly, on the tenure of the associate judges. They were three distinct and separate questions; and, as such, so far as he could discover, they were susceptible of division.

Mr. MANN asked for the reading of the amendment; which having been read,

Mr. FULLER rose to inquire of the Chair, whether, if the proposition now before the committee should be negatived, it would be in the power of any gentlemen to offer an amendment to the constitution of 1790. The question, as he understood it, was between the amendment of the gentlemen from Beaver, (Mr. Dickey) and the constitution of 1790. If the amendment of the gentleman from Beaver was negatived, Mr. F. supposed that it would be in the power of any member to offer an amendment to the provision in the old constitution.

The CHAIR gave his opinion that, if the amendment now before the committee was negatived, the question would then recur on the adoption of the article of the old constitution.

Mr. FULLER. Which article, I suppose, will be open to amendment. Mr. STEVENS Submitted that that could hardly be the case. The committee would take the question on the report of the committee. If the amendment was rejected, it could not be brought up again until second reading.

Mr. FULLER said, that he felt himself bound to vote against the amend ment of the gentleman from Beaver, (Mr. Dickey) because he did not believe that it contemplated that kind of reform which was desired by the people of Pennsylvania. On the face of it, to be sure, it was reform; it was the limited tenure of the judicial office; but, practically, he did not believe it would answer that end. He should vote against the amendment, in the belief, that, before the question was finally disposed of, the Convention would be able to secure that limit which the people of the commonwealth desired to have.

Mr. Sergeant rose and addressed the committee as follows:

Mr. Chairman: If the proposition submitted by the gentleman from Beaver, (Mr. Dickey) shall be adopted, then when it comes up again in Convention, we shall have fairly before us the question between a tenure for a term of years and a tenure during good behaviour, and we shall all have an opportunity of voting directly on that question. In the meantime, the question is not between a tenure for a term of years and a tenure during good behaviour, but between a tenure of fifteen and ten years, a

applied to the judges of the supreme court, and a tenure of ten and seven years, as applied to the president judges of the court of common pleas, and in like manner of the associates. It is simply a question of more or less time, and it is the only question on which we can vote, in the manner in which the subject has now come before us. When I vote, as I intend to do, in favor of the proposition of the gentleman from Beaver, I shall vote for it because it contemplates the longest time; and although, in my judgment, the tenure should not be for any limited term of years, but during good behaviour; yet the proposition for the longest time, to accompanied with the condition of good behaviour, approaches nearer the tenure which I think the most perfect, and which I wish to have continued. Therefore, I shall vote in favor of it. But when the question between the tenure for a term of years and the tenure for good behaviour shall come before us, as it will do on second reading, I shall have the opportunity of voting in favour of that principle which I believe to be right.

Mr. Chairman, no opportunity has yet been presented of taking the sense of this Convention directly on the question of tenure during good behaviour I mean, of testing how many members of this body are in favor of that principle. The opportunity, nevertheless, will hereafter arise, as I have already intimated, and I am myself satisfied to have an opportunity of voting on the question at a future time; voting, in the meantime, in the manner I have stated. As it is probable, however, that I shall not have another opportunity of submitting the reasons why I entertain the views at which I have just hinted-I mean, that the tenure of good behaviour is the best possible judicial tenure-but that if it must be limited to a term of years, accompanied with the condition of good behaviour, the longer term is best calculated to attain the desired purpose, I will, with the permission of the committee, avail myself of the present occasion to offer my views. I am aware, Mr. Chairman, how much this committee has been fatigued, by its long attention to the discussion of this question; and that I am probably about to do a thing not very acceptable to them, in offering, at this time of day, any remarks on the subject. And, sir, probably it is not necessary that I should offer any remarks: necessary I mean, with reference to the discussion on either side, for I have no hope that I shall be able to add to the arguments which have been already presented to the Convention in favor of the tenure of good behaviour, nor to remove any of the doubts or objections of those gentlemen who are arrayed against us on the other side. But, sir, if the members of the Convention feel themselves fatigued by the discussion they have heard on this question, let me ask them whether the severity of the exercise which their minds have undergone, has not been ascribable as much to the importance as to the length of the debate? If this had been an ordinary question, of little moment, during the discussion of which the members of this body could have been quiet in their places, pursuing the other avocations which claim their attention, independently of the business of the Convention-if they had been able to read, write, or otherwise occupy or amuse themselves, without giving constant attention to the arguments which were going on at the time, there would have been, comparatively, little labor in this discussion. But I do this Convention the justice to believe I do sincerely believe-that, throughout the whole of this discussion, they have felt the importance of the question on which they

were called to decide, and that it has not only rested on their minds here, but that it has accompanied them wherever they have gone, and has engrossed their deepest and most anxious consideration. If such is the case, I would again say to them that, whatever the length of this discussion may have been, and it has not yet been as long as the discussion on several other articles of the constitution, nor even as long as we had anticipated it might be-whatever fatigue the members of this Convention may feel, must be attributed to the fact, that they know and feel this to be a question of vast interest and magnitude.

1 do verily believe, Mr. Chairman, that upon the right settlement of these questions in relation to the judiciary, the maintenance and support of republican government entirely depend. Yes, sir, I go the whole length of this. Sir, there are successive questions, which must be separately stated, and, in some degree, separately considered. The first is, Do you, in a republican government, require a judiciary as a part of the government? If not, you can dispense with it altogether. If you are to have a judiciary, then the next question is, What is the nature of the functions which that judiciary has to perform? And, having ascertained these two points, then comes the inquiry, which is now occupying our attention-In what way can we best secure the right performance of those functions? I have not, as yet, heard any one deny that, in a republican government, as well as in all others, a judiciary is indispensable. You cannot do without a tribunal to expound and administer your laws. Without such a'tribunal, your government is good for nothing. Keep your legislature your executive! retain them, but cut off your judiciary, and what is your government? What is it with reference to the thousands (hereafter to become millions,) who constitute the body of your citizens? How are their purposes of peace, protection and security to be attained, if you have not an administration of justice? Sir, it is the end of all government. Yes, and, by and by, I may probably take occasion to show to you, that every argument used, here or elsewhere, that has gone to prove that the judiciary is to be placed in subordination to any power in the republic, is contrary to reason-because the administration of justice is the first end of all government. And if you can. ascertain in what manner justice can be administered, you have then ascertained in what manner the whole end of government can be answered. If you can obtain a perfect administration of justice by means of a monarchy, then, so far as that goes, a monarchy would be a superior form of government; and if you can obtain it by means of a republican government, as no doubt you can, then a republican government achieves its title, in this respect, to an equality with a monarchial government in the particular I have mentioned, and its superiority over such a government in a vast many other respects. But if you can have a republican government, as in my conseience I believe you can, and now have, in which this great end of all government is accomplished, you have then a government of the most perfect kind, and one in which you attain, in the most perfect way, the end of all government. Sir, do I exagerate in this? Let me put you a case. Conceive, for a moment, if you can so conceive! the condition of a government without an administration of justice! It is a despotism, whatever may be its form. Suppose the case of our own government without the administration of justice! Your people can overthrow it; undoubtedly they can, and they would do so, and they would.

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