cal circles. It is there prefumed, that to make ample provifion for liberty and happiness, we have only to copy the code of England; whilft to that degree do circumftances vary, that in the exactness of the transcript we generally lose the spirit of the original, and the wideft difparity is to be found in the effects of regulations, which to the incurious obferver feem to correfpond moft critically. For instance, the law which limited the duration of Parliament. Until the year 1768, every member of the Houfe of Commons held his feat for the term of his own life or for that of the King; it then was enacted that every eighth year a new Parliament fhould be elected. There was no appearance of partiality upon the face of this measure; yet it was felt in fome parts of the country as a fcourge; in others it was a wholefome regulation, in others again indifferent; juft as county elections happened to be affected by it. Where the people generally were Proteftants, (I fpeak of that time when the Catholics were univerfally difqualified from the franchife of electing) the reprefentatives were placed under a falutary controul. Where the number of Proteftants, and confequently of electors was fmall, the nomination, pretty much as before, remained in the hands of fome powerful family; but in many places the two leading denominations were nearly balanced; there all the interefts of life, and all the princi. ples of action were driven out of the course of their ordinary direction. It is not neceffary to enter here into details on a grievance which has been remedied. One defcription of citizens were on every eighth year, the difpenfers of a favour which was earneftly fought after by the most confiderable perfons of each diftrict; another party were incompetent to confer that obligation; to which fide would power, to which would confi deration deration naturally incline? This octeniallaw was general in its provifions. There appeared no exception on the face of it. As Magna Charta was only intended for the Barons, and their free followers, fo was this privilege defigned to embrace a comparatively small proportion: it brought to perfection that monftrous conftitution as Mr. Burke appofitely denominates it, of a plebeian oligarchy, under which for above thirty years we exifted: it was the occafion, perhaps the cause of moft fubfequent diforders; by enhancing the fuperiority of a party, it promoted materially the popular divifion and difcontents. There can be no doubt, that if one fet of citizens enjoy advantages over another, in proportion as they are lefs familiarly displayed, the preference will be lefs invidious.* Again in the inftance of the Place-bill, nothing can be conceived more fair, than to oblige a reprefentative, who has fubmitted to the influence of the Crown, to return to his conftituents for their approbation; but of your 300 reprefentatives, 194 fit by private nomination, and family influence fecures many more from the effects of popular cenfure. The fole effect of this famous law, was to add an additional claufe, to the bargain for a borough. So whilft the independence, recognized in 1782, is exercifed by an Houfe of Com mons, *The argument applies equally to the more important difcuffion now before the public. And not upon fuch mean motive as private pique; but upon this reafon of found policy, tha every diftinction which is inevitable, fhould be foftened as much as poffible. One fubmits the better to inconvenience, by not being reminded of it. One is really lefs incommoded by the fuperiority of either a rival or a neighbour, when it is fparingly exercifed. [ 53 ] mons, flightly communicating with the country, it muft obviously be more the game of-the re-. presentatives, than of the reprefented. Let me not be claffed among the advocates of a very falfe fentiment, that a popular delegation is neceffary for the purposes of good Government. The British Parliament, although popular in a much greater degree than ours, would be an eminent exception. In the late conftitution of the Dutch ftates, there was not any thing popular, befide that widely diffufed profperity which arofe from it; but an ariftocratic body, governing by popular forms, should make up in public fpirit for the unfavourable circumstances of its origin. It fhould cultivate the representative character; at leaft in fentiment communicate with the people; direct or adopt the publick wishes; and discharging its duties, with a delicate fenfibility to reputation, prove itself worthy to have been elected. The British Parlia ment forms an efficient control upon the executive magiftrate; it even answers the purpose for which it is defigned, better than a more popular and tumultuous delegation. In that affembly are collected, the principal perfons of the landed, monied, and *The Irish Houfe of Commons confifts of 300 members, who are thus appointed: 32 Counties return 4 Open Cities The University 64 8 16 Cities and Boroughs, in which fome particu- 32 97 Boroughs fo clofe as to be transferable pro perty. 194 300 There is a greater mafs of Irish property in the English Peerage, than in the attending members of the Houfe of Lords of Ireland, and commercial interefts; with a moderate intermixture of active, afpiring men, who fupport the weight, and animate the investigation of public bufinefs. The profperity of the greater number of individuals, who fit in Parliament, is fo intimately combined with the welfare of the ftate, that they cannot more effectually promote the publick good, than by inclining the minifter to adopt their own views. The patronage of the Crown, which in a poor flate is omnipotent, rere lofes totally its effect; it is not fufficient to compenfate to individuals, their private lofs in a public injury they cannot of course, be blindfolded to the neglect or mifmanagement of minifters. Whilft you fee in daily practice, the trifling accidents by which great property in land, in ftock, or in commercial capital is materially affected, you will find abundant reafon for relying on the active providence of a fociety, in which thefe influences eminently predominate. Who fo fit to fuperintend the state, as men who must ruin themselves if they betray their country? Contrafted to this organ of Government, in our parliamentary conftitution, is an ariftocracy of perfons in office, with fixed emoluments, whofe inte refts do not fluctuate with the good or evil of the nation, who have no danger to apprehend, befide a total overthrow of government, and from that catastrophe the ftrength of the empire protects them. We have the name, not the utility, of the British fyftem. We have not the fame refources to carry it on with effect; the fabric is not fupported in Ireland by those pillars which infure its folidity in the fifter country. The bulk of our landed intereft is non-refident; our monied and commercial interefts are at beft but thinly feattered, and are rendered yet more inefficient by religious incapacities. There is not a merchant in in Parliament; fcarcely a man who feels the fluctuations of the money market, and comparatively few of the confiderable land-owners: the reprefentation of fome capital towns, and of the counties, abforbs whatever remains to us, from habitual absence, of a proprietary body. The feats for boroughs are generally filled by gentlemen, who enter Parliament in purfuit of promotion, and who have few sympathies with the public. Thus the fecurity for a judicious infpection of public affairs in the one country is honor, in the other a community of feelings between the governors and governed. The honor of our countrymen runs as high as that of any other perfons; but it is a capricious fentiment, and the fafety of millions deferves a lefs vulnerable protection. True, as I have already noticed, fortune is often worshipped in the British Senate, but she is not the fole deity of the Temple. Fame too has her votaries, even among the moft energetic, and leaft affluent part of that auguft body. The wide range of its difcuffions, and the elevated rank to which it has arifen, give this impulfe to ambition; whilft there is but one incentive here to mix in public affairs, the defire of preferment; and upon those who come under this attraction, the patro nage of the crown can frequently' act with great facility. The fault confifts in the excefs. Men of mere enterprise in the English Houfe are few, and adopt the fentiments of the greater number. They predominate in Ireland, and give to the whole a collective character of expectation. I suppose there is no gentleman in Parliament individually exceptionable. But every man of fenfe, even those of whom I fpeak, will admit, that one hundred perfons may each be an eligible member, to mix in any council of ftate, and ftill a council composed exclufively, or even principally of thofe hundred men, may be liable to ftrong objections. |