In

erected a large building in Upper Swatara township, to which the children then in its care were transferred, and others were admitted. It employed teachers to instruct the children as they are taught in the public schools. The record does not inform us whether all the children in its care were admitted from Harrisburg, but it is probable that many of them were, because, as we have seen, the association was born of a desire to improve the condition of the children of that city. Do children from other districts who become inmates of this institution acquire thereby the right to free admission to the public schools of Upper Swatara township? The learned judge of the court below concluded that their physical presence in the district, considered in connection with the act of 8th May, 1854, requiring school directors to establish a "sufficient number of public schools for the education of every individual between the ages of five and twentyone years, in their respective districts," gave them such right. He concluded, however, that a reasonable interpretation of the act would limit it to persons of the prescribed age who were residents of the district. determining whether the relator has a residence in Upper Swatara township, which entitles him to common-school privileges there, regard must be had to the occasion and purpose of his presence there, and to the true intent and meaning of the act referred to. He is there as an inmate of an institution owned and managed by an association chartered for the purpose of supporting, caring for, and educating poor and needy children. Independently of his presence in this institution for the purpose of maintenance and education therein, there is nothing on which to base the claim that he is a resident in the district, for whom it is the duty of the directors to provide commonschool facilities. In respect to the acquisition of a residence in the district by his physical presence in it, he is on the footing of the children in Girard College, and of the children in the schools established by the state for the support and education of soldiers' orphans. These institutions, like the Children's Industrial Association of Harrisburg, were created for the maintenance and education of poor and needy children, who may be admitted to them from all parts of the state. But the presence of the children in these institutions does not, in our opinion, confer upon them any additional rights or privileges in the common schools. When the relator entered the charitable institution of which he is now an inmate, he was not entitled to admission to the public schools of Upper Swatara township. He was not a resident of the district, nor a member of any family in it. In view of the purposes for and the conditions under which he entered it, his presence there did not impose on the local authorities any duty in reference to his education. Neither he nor the institution of which

he is an inmate is in any manner identified with the district. The latter pays no taxes there for the support of the schools. It has undertaken to care for, support, and educate him from the fund raised in the manner already stated. While he is in its care and under its control, he cannot acquire commonschool privileges distinct from and independ ent of those which belonged to him in the place of his residence when he was taken from it. If the association is unable to perform its charter duties in reference to him, its inability to do so cannot, of itself, charge the district with his education and maintenance. It ought not to receive under its care more children than it is qualified to support and teach in conformity with the provisions of its charter, and presumably it has not done so. But this is a matter foreign to our present inquiry, as it does not appear on this record that it is unable to care for all it has in charge. In accordance with the views we have expressed, we conclude that the relator's presence in the district, under the circumstances shown, has not qualified him for admission to its public schools. In reaching this conclusion, we do not deny to any child in the commonwealth his or her rights under our common-school system. On the contrary, we recognize and maintain those rights, without abridgment or qualification. We realize that, to preserve that system, it must be administered in obedience to the laws on which it is founded, and by which it is governed. While it establishes schools in which all persons in the commonwealth between the ages of 5 and 21 years may be educated, they must receive the benefits it confers in the districts in which they respectively reside. The residents of one school district are not entitled to free admission to and education in the schools of an adjoining district. The taxes levied by a school district are for the education of the children of that district, and are not applicable to the education of the children of another district. There is no warrant in our common-school system for the contention that an institution like the Children's Industrial Association of Harrisburg may bring into any district it pleases the poor and needy children of other districts, for the purpose of maintenance and education in conformity with its charter, and thereby impose on the district to which it has brought them a duty it assumed in its acceptance of them, and for the performance of which it is bound by its charter. Such a construction would result, in some cases, in a denial to the children of the district of the. school facilities it was intended they should have therein. It would impose on some districts burdens they could not sustain under the power given them to levy taxes for school purposes. It would tend to defeat the equalization of the burdens and benefits contemplated by our common-school system, and would otherwise materially impair its effi

ciency. The order awarding a peremptory mandamus is reversed, and the petition therefor is dismissed.

COMMONWEALTH ex rel. FROME et al. v. BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF COMMONSCHOOL DIST. OF UPPER SWATARA TP.

(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Nov. 12, 1894.) Appeal from court of common pleas, Dauphin county.

Application by the commonwealth, on the relation of Ammon Frome, to compel the board of directors of the common-school district of Upper Swatara township to admit the relator into its common school. The writ was granted, and respondent appeals. Reversed.

J. I. Chamberlin and L. W. Hall, for appellant. T. H. Edwards, for appellee.

McCOLLUM, J. This case is ruled by Com. v. Board of Directors of Common-School Dist. (just decided) 30 Atl. 507. The order awarding a peremptory mandamus is reversed, and the petition therefor is dismissed, at the costs of the relator.

COMMONWEALTH ex rel. PARRIS v. DIRECTORS OF SCHOOL DIST. OF BOROUGH OF BROOKVILLE. (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Nov. 12, 1894.)

DISTRICT SCHOOLS RIGHT TO ADMISSION - INMATES OF MEMORIAL HOME-CHILDREN OF UNION SOLDIERS.

1. The inmates of the Pennsylvania Memorial Home, an institution chartered to provide a home and support for the children of deceased and disabled soldiers, supported by state appropriations, and provided by the state with funds sufficient for the education of its inmates, are not entitled to free admission to the schools of the district in which it is located.

2. Act April 18, 1893 (P. L. 23), giving children of Union soldiers, who shall be, temporarily or otherwise, in any school district, the same right to instruction in the schools of such district as the resident children, does not apply to soldiers' children who are inmates of an institution amply provided by the state with funds for their education.

3. The fact that the managers of an institution provided by the state with funds for the education of soldiers' children who become inmates have neglected or failed to provide adequate educational advantages does not entitle the inmates to free admission to the schools of the district in which it is located.

Appeal from court of common pleas, Jefferson county; E. Heath Clark, Judge.

Mandamus, on the relation of Warren Parris, by his next friend, A. F. Thompson, against A. F. Balmer and others, constituting the board of directors of the school district of the borough of Brookville, to compel defendants to allow relator to attend the public schools of said district From a decree granting the writ, defendants appeal. Reversed.

W. F. Stewart and W. P. Jenks, for appellants. Geo. A. Jenks and Charles Corbet, for appellee.

MCCOLLUM, J. In Com. ex rel. Fry v. Board of Directors of School Dist. of Upper Swatara Tp. (decided at this term) 30 Ati. 507, we held that the inmates of an institution chartered for the care, support, and education of poor and needy children, and maintained by state appropriations, voluntary contributions, etc., did not, by their presence in it for the purpose of education and maintenance, become entitled to free admission to the schools of the district in which it was located. In other words, we held that the nonresidents of the district did not acquire a residence therein, for common-school purposes, by becoming inmates of the institution, for care, support, and education. It is not necessary in this case to restate the grounds of that decision, or the reasons given for it. The facts in the two cases are not exactly alike, but it is believed that the principle on which the one referred to was determined is applicable to and governs this. The object of the Children's Industrial Association of Harrisburg was the care, support, and education of poor and needy children, and there was no residence or class limitation in its charter. The Pennsylvania Memorial Home was chartered for the purpose, inter alia, of providing comfortable homes and maintenance for the children of deceased and permanently disabled Union soldiers, but its charter was silent as to the education of them. The home was located in the borough of Brookville, and the state made large appropriations for buildings and other equipment required for the performance of its charter work. Since its location there the state has made an adequate appropriation for the education of its inmates. There is now, and was when the petition for the mandamus was filed, a good school established in the home, in which all its inmates who require school privileges are educated at the expense of the state. In thus providing for the education of the inmates of the home, the state recognizes and avoids the injustice that would be done to the district in which it is located if they were admitted to its public schools, and educated there at its expense, and in abridgment of the rights of its own children to education therein. The learned counsel for the relator apparently concede that the underlying principle of our common-school system is that the children of the commonwealth shall exercise and enjoy the rights it confers in the districts in which they respectively reside, and that the duty of each district is to provide for the education of the children belonging to it. But they contend-First, that the relator has a residence in the Brookville district, by virtue of his admission to and presence in the home; and, second, that he is entitled, under the act of 18th April, 1893 (P. L. 23), to free admission to the public schools of the district, because he is a child "of a soldier of the late War of the Rebellion." Their first contention is sufficiently answered by our decision in Fry's

Case. It is claimed that the act on which their second contention is based is class legislation, and therefore unconstitutional. The question thus raised need not be decided or considered now, because, in our view of the act, it is not applicable to the case presented by the petition and answer. It provides that the child of a Union soldier, who shall be temporarily or otherwise in any school district of the commonwealth, shall have the same right to instruction in the proper school of such district as the resident children have, although he may have come into the district for the purpose of attending such school, and the residence of his parents, guardian, or other person entitled to the custody of him may be in another district. It was obviously intended to secure common-school privileges to the children of soldiers who were obliged to seek employment and homes in families outside of the district of their parents' residence, but we discover no manifestation of a purpose in it to include the children of any class for whose education in the charitable institution of which they are inmates the state has made adequate provision.

The learned court below thought that School Dist. v. Pollard, 55 N. H. 503, afforded some support to the relator's contention in this case, but we do not think so. In that case it was decided that the minor children of paupers supported at a county poor farm had the right to attend the public school in the district in which such county farm was located, on the ground that they were inhabitants of the district, within the meaning of the statute regulating admission to the public schools. The county farm was taxed for school purposes in that district, and it is manifest from the opinions of the judges that, if the state or county had specially provided for the education of the children upon it, their application for free admission to the public school would have been denied. Besides, the decision in Pollard's Case was made with reference to the educational system of New Hampshire, and to what extent that conforms to the common-school system of Pennsylvania does not appear from the report of it. It is not, therefore, an authority for the proposition that nonresiuent children, for whose education the state has otherwise provided, are entitled to free admission to the public schools of a district by reason of their presence in a charitable institution located within it. It is suggested, however, that the children may acquire the right to such admission by the misconduct or neglect of the managers of such institution. We do not think so. With the same propriety and reason it might be said the misconduct or neglect of the school directors of one district entitles the children residing in it to free admission to the schools of an adjoining district. We think, upon due consideration of the facts of this case, and the legislation pertinent to it, that it is governed

by the principle on which Fry's Case was decided. The order awarding a peremptory mandamus is reversed, and the petition therefor is dismissed, at the costs of the relator.

HARRIS v. REINHARD et ux. (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Nov. 12, 1894.) JUDGMENT BY CONFESSION-AGAINST MARRIED WOMAN-ORDER OPENING JUDGMENT.

Where, under a power contained in a bond signed by a married woman and her husattorney, an order opening the judgment to alband, judgment against her is confessed by an low her to interpose, as a defense to the bond, that she signed it as surety for her husband's debt, will not be reversed on appeal.

Appeal from court of common pleas, Allegheny county.

Action by L. H. Harris against Charles R. Reinhard and Sarah A. Reinhard, his wife. Judgment was confessed against Sarah A. Reinhard by an attorney, and from an order opening the judgment plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Sarah A. Reinhard, with her husband, signed the bond in question, the same being dated May 25, 1889, for the penal sum of $9,168.58, conditioned for the payment of the sum of $4,598.29. This bond was given to Dr. L. H. Harris, the plaintiff in an execution for like amount, which at that time was levied upon the Reinhard Drug Store in Verona, Allegheny county, which store was the main support of the defendants and their family, and which store had been purchased by Charles Reinhard from the L. H. Harris Drug Company, who had given his note, with confession of judgment, to secure the payment thereof. On this the execution above mentioned had been issued. After said execution had been issued, and levy made, the defendants gave the bond in question to plaintiff. The wife, when the bond had become due, judgment entered thereon, and an execution issued, filed a petition in the court setting forth, inter alia, that she had signed the bond as surety for the debt of her husband and praying the court to open judgment as to her, and stay proceedings; that the plaintiff was seeking to sell her stock in her store and such personal property as she might have,-upon which petition a rule was issued, and subsequently made absolute. From From this action of the court the plaintiff has appealed.

James H. Porte, for appellant. Arch. H. Rowand, Jr., for appellee.

PER CURIAM. We think the learned court below was entirely correct in opening the judgment as to Sarah A. Reinhard, and letting her into a defense. When the facts are fully developed on the trial, the merits of the controversy can be intelligently consid ered. Order affirmed.