L. W. Hall and L. D. Gilbert, for appellant. J. C. Durbin and C. H. Bergner, for appellee.

ing that the piece of track proposed to be laid on Front street, between Adams and Trewick streets, is not an "extension or branch constructed on any street or highway upon which a track is laid, or authorized under any existing charter," and is a bona fide crossing at grade, diagonally or transversely, and proposed to be built for that purpose, under the express authority of the eighteenth section of the act of May 14, 1889 (P. L. 211). The plaintiff was obliged to build, and did build, its power plant at Ewington, under the ordinance granting permission to use the streets. In order to reach this plant, it was necessary that the plaintiff should build a crossing from the end of its line at the end of Adams street, where it connects with Front street. Adams street extended no further in that direction, and the connection could only be made by transversing on Front street the short distance of 220 feet from Adams street to Trewick street. The original proposition of the plaintiff was to make this connection by a diagonal line extending across the tracks of the defend

GREEN, J. The master in this case found that the proposed crossing of the plaintiff over the tracks of the defendant was practicable and safe, and without danger, if it was properly constructed and was kept in reasonably good order. The learned court below, after having made a visit to the place of the crossing, and after considering the testimony on both sides upon this subject, concurred with the master, and confirmed his finding. There was conflicting testimony, the witnesses for the plaintiff testifying there was no danger, and the witnesses for the defendant testifying to the contrary; but there was ample testimony to sustain the finding of the master, and we therefore treat the finding of this controverted fact as the verdict of a jury. Moreover, we are satisfied that upon the merits of the contention the finding was correct.

We also agree with the court below in find

ant's road on Front street, but the court below thought the same purpose would be subserved with much less inconvenience to the defendant by crossing the defendant's tracks in a curved line from the end of Adams street, and then running along Front street, parallel with the defendant's tracks, until the connection at Trewick street was reached. We see no objection to this. It is a crossing of defendant's tracks, somewhat elongated, it is true, owing to the physical condition of the grade surface, but none the less a crossing. We cannot discover that it works any harm to the defendant to construct the crossing in this way. It certainly It certainly is far less prejudicial to the defendant than would be a long, diagonal crossing track from the foot of Adams street to Trewick street. Both a diagonal and a transverse crossing are expressly allowed by the eighteenth section of the act of 1889, and there is nothing therein contained which prohibits such a reasonable elongation of the connecting track as is essential to reach the opposite point of the crossing. The decree made by the court below is most carefully drawn, with special reference to the protection of the cars of the defendant company from any possible collision. We do not see how it could be improved in this respect. If it is obeyed any collision is impossible, and if it is not obeyed the remedy available to the defendant is short and sharp. We are of opinion that the assignments of error are not sustained, and they are therefore dismissed. Decree affirmed and appeal dismissed, at the cost of the appellant.

COLEMAN et al. v. SHIELDS, Register of Wills.

Appeal of COLEMAN et al. (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Oct. 1, 1894.) COURT OF COMMON PLEAS-POWERS-CHANGING RECORDS OF WILLS.

1. Act June 17, 1839, makes it the duty of the judges of the courts of common pleas, as often as the register of wills of any county shall be superseded, and as much oftener as may be requisite, to ascertain if the records, books, indexes, and files of his office be kept and left as the law contemplates, and, if neglect is apparent, to direct the deficiency to be performed by the proper officers. Held, that the court of common pleas may order the register of wills to alter a record made by his predecessor, which does not pertain to his judicial acts and decisions, either with or without a petition therefor, or a suggestion of inaccuracy in the record, by interested persons.

2. But where a register of wills accurately records a certified copy of a foreign will claimed to have been admitted to probate in a foreign country, in accordance with Act March 15, 1832, requiring such register to record "all orig inal wills produced under the provisions" of such act, the court of common pleas cannot, 15 years afterwards. alter, or command the register to alter, such record.

Appeal from court of common pleas, Philadelphia county.

others against William G. Shields, register of wills for the county of Philadelphia, Rosalie Parant Coleman, and Bertram Dawson Coleman, for an order commanding said register of wills to correct the transcription of the will of Robert Coleman, deceased. From a judgment granting the petition, Rosalie Parant Coleman and the Pennsylvania Company for Insurances on Lives and Granting Annuities, trustees under such will, appeal. Reversed.

The order is as follows: "And now, June 17. 1893, the court having considered the said petition of Louise Ybañez Coleman et al., and the answer filed thereto by Wm. G. Shields, Esq., register of wills, and John W. Brock, Esq., appearing for Horace Brock, executor of Robert Coleman, deceased, and it appearing that divers errors exist in the transcription of the will of Robert Coleman, deceased, in the Will Book in the office of said register owing to the neglect or omission of one of his predecessors in office, it is ordered and decreed that said register of wills, Wm. G. Shields, Esq., do cause said errors to be corrected by altering said transcription so that the same will correspond with the copy of said will annexed to the commission which issued to make probate of the will at the instance of Horace Brock, the executor thereof, and which remains on file in the office of said register."

F. Carroll Brewster, for appellants. John W. Brock and John G. Johnson, for Bertram Dawson Coleman. Rowland Evans and R. L. Ashhurst, for appellees.

MCCOLLUM, J. This is an appeal from an order of the court of common pleas commanding the register of wills of Philadelphia county to alter a record made on the 19th of September, 1878, by one of his predecessors in office.

The first contention of the appellants is that the order was not authorized by the statute relied on by the appellees to sustain it. By this statute' it is made the duty of the judges of the courts of common pleas of the several counties of the commonwealth, as often as the register of wills of any county shall be superseded, and as much oftener as shall be requisite, to ascertain if the records, books, indexes, and files of his office be kept and left as the law contemplates, and, if neglect is apparent, to direct the deficiency to be performed by the proper officers. How is the duty thus imposed to be discharged, and what is the scope of it? There is nothing in the statute which suggests the necessity or propriety of the institution of proceedings by interested parties, and the formation of issues for the settlement of disputes be tween them. It is obviously a duty which may be performed by inspection. A petition for the performance of it is not required,

1 Act June 17. 1839; P. L. 67S; 2 Brightly,

includes many things. On the part of the pas-1 senger, his consent is implied to all the company's reasonable rules and regulations for entering, occupying and leaving their cars, and, if injury befell him by reason of his disregard of regulations which are necessary to the conduct of the business, the company are not liable in damages, even though the negligence of their servants concurred with his own negligence in causing the mischief." Sullivan v. Railroad Co., 30 Pa. St. 234. Nothing short of a paramount and justifying necessity will excuse a departure from these regulations, or render the company liable for an injury caused by it. Railroad Co. v. Zebe, 33 Pa. St. 318. There was no such necessity in this case. That the car was crowded with passengers, and in consequence thereof egress from it was retarded somewhat, and rendered less convenient than under ordinary conditions, furnished no justification of the plaintiff's disregard of a reasonable regulation of the company. It nowhere appears in the testimony that she made an effort to get off the car at the place provided for the accommodation and safety of passengers in leaving it, or that she was required to get off from it where she did. Neither the language of the conductor while she stood in the side door, nor the assistance he gave her in alighting, nor both combined, charged the company with responsibility for the consequences of her careless act. It was in violation of a rule for the protection of passengers. It was obviously dangerous, and she must be considered as having voluntarily assumed the risk involved in it. In such case something more is required to render the company liable than its employé's consent to the passenger's negligent act.. 4 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 766, and cases cited; Railroad Co. v. Langdon, 92 Pa. St. 21. The specifications of error are overruled. Judgment affirmed.

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LAIB et al. v. HARE et al., Judges. (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Oct. 1, 1894.) INTOXICATING LIQUORS TRANSFER OF LICENSES. The judges of the court of quarter sessions have no authority or discretion, under the various acts of assembly relating to liquor licenses, to allow or make transfers of such licenses from one place to another.

Petition by Laib & Co. for a rule on J. I. Clark Hare, Craig Biddle, and Michael Arnold, judges of the court of quarter sessions for the county of Philadelphia, to show cause why a writ of alternative mandamus should not issue to compel them to grant an application by petitioners for a transfer of their liquor license from the corner of Second and Vine streets to 432 Market street, in the city of Philadelphia. Rule denied and petition dismissed.

Clinton O. Mayer and Jos. L. Greenwald, for petitioners.

PER CURIAM. This petition for a rule on defendants to show cause why a writ of alternative mandamus should not issue against them as prayed for, etc., was presented, considered, and denied at our last session in the eastern district. It appears that the transfer of the license in question was refused by the defendants, in their official capacity, for the following among other reasons, viz.: That "the various acts of assembly relating to liquor licenses do not authorize the transfer of such license from one place to another, and that no discretion is vested in the court to allow or make such transfers." These reasons are both satisfactory and conclusive. The jurisdiction vested In the judges of the quarter sessions to grant liquor licenses, and in certain circumstances to authorize the licensee to transfer his license to his successor in the business, etc., is purely statutory. There appears to be nothing in the law, however, that authorizes them to sanction the transfer of licenses from one locality to another. It therefore follows that, in refusing to authorize the transfer of plaintiff's license as prayed for, the defendants acted strictly within the line of official duty, and there is nothing on which to sustain this proceeding. Rule denied and petition dismissed, with costs to be paid by the plaintiffs.

COMMONWEALTH ex re!. WILLIAMS v.
PROVIDENT LIFE ASS'N.
(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Oct. 1, 1894.)
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANIES-NONPAYMENT OF

ASSESSMENTS-REINSTATEMENT-ESTOPPEL.

Where, after default as to assessments in a mutual insurance company, notices of other assessments are sent such member, who there upon makes application for reinstatement, and pays all such assessments to a general agent, who receives the payments without condition, and subsequently such member is notified of an assessment for semiannual dues, which he promptly pays, the insurance company is estopped to deny that the member had been reinstated.

Appeal from court of common pleas, Philadelphia county.

Mandamus to compel the Provident Life Association to reinstate Carter Williams as a member. Writ granted. Defendant appeals. Affirmed.

A. E. Stockwell, for appellant. H. B. Amerling and Wm. W. Wiltbank, for appellee.

MCCOLLUM, J. The appellant is a Maryland corporation having its principal office in Baltimore. It has a branch office in Philadelphia, in charge of Thomas C. Balderston, who is its general agent for Pennsylvania. It is engaged in the business of life insurance. On the 8th of January, 1883, it issued a policy of insurance on the life of the appellee in the sum of $1,000, payable to him 10 years from the date thereof, if he survived that period, and, if he did not, then

to his executors or administrators, 90 days after his death. By the terms of the policy it was to be null and void if the semiannual dues or assessments upon it were not paid at maturity, and there could be no modification of the provisions of the contract, or waiver of any forfeiture under it, "except by an agreement in writing, signed by the president or secretary of the association." The policy, the application therefor, and the by-laws of the association, taken together, constituted the contract between the insurer and the insured. The by-laws provide, inter alia, that "any member failing to pay his semiannual payments and pro rata assessments at the death of a member or members within thirty days after he is notified, or according to the terms stated in the notice, shall forfeit his membership;" and that "only as many members as shall pay their mortality assessments within thirty days after date of notice shall be counted in determining the assessment basis of the death claim. Others shall be forfeited in like manner as those who fail to pay their dues, with opportunity for reinstatement, or similar conditions." There is nothing in the policy, in the application therefor, or in the by-laws prescribing the conditions of reinstatement in the case of a forfeiture for nonpayment of semiannual dues, and there is no designa tion of them in the oral testimony. The assessment notices, signed by the secretary of the association, and delivered to the appellee, informed him that after forfeiture of his policy no payment could be received, or reinstatement made, except upon the condition that he was alive, and in good health. He might reasonably conclude from these notices that the only condition of restoration to membership in case of forfeiture of his policy was that mentioned in them. Four notices of mortality assessments were sent to him after he failed to make payment of the July assessment within the time prescribed in the by-laws we have quoted, and in them he was requested to remit the assessments to the company's office, or pay the same to its authorized collecting agent. He paid the mortality assessments on the 24th of December, 1890, in accordance with the company's request. He signed and delivered to its representative at its Philadelphia office the application for reinstatement which it prepared and sent to him, and he furnished the requisite proofs that he was "in good health, and in every respect in a good, Insurable condition." He received notice January 8, 1891, of an assessment of his semiannual dues, which, he promptly paid. All of these payments were accepted without condition. The company is chargeable with knowledge of the appellee's default when it made these assessments, requested him to pay them, and informed him of the condition on which he could be reinstated in case he failed to make the payments within 30 days from the date of the notice. Its

action, therefore, was clearly inconsistent with a declaration of forfeiture, or a purpose to relieve him of the duties, and deprive him of the privileges, pertaining to membership in it. Such action ought, in equity, to estop the company from repudiating what was done on the faith of it. It was a recognition of the appellee as a member, and well calculated to create the belief that payment of arrearages and proof of continued good health were all that were required for the preservation of his rights as such. He knew that the by-laws provided for the reinstatement of a member on compliance with conditions which did not appear in them or in the body of the policy. His sole knowledge of these conditions was derived from the assessment notices received from the company over the signature of its secretary, who was authorized by the contract to waive any forfeiture under it. In view of the facts recited, all of which appear in the undisputed testimony, or are established by the verdict of the jury, we think the appellee was entitled to reinstatement as a member of the defendant company. We discover no error in the instruction complained of, and overrule all the specifications. Judg ment affirmed.

HINDS et al. v. BATTIN et al. (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Oct. 1, 1894.) JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES - FAILURE TO RECORD ARTICLES-LIABILITY AS GENERAL PARTNERS.

Members of a limited stock company are not liable as general partners for goods ordered on approval, in the name of the company, but before the articles of association had been recorded, as required by statute, where such articles were recorded before approval.

Appeal from court of common pleas, Lackawanna county.

Assumpsit by Hinds, Ketchem & Co. against Henry A. Battin and others, partners under the name of the Scranton Match Company, Limited, for goods sold and delivered. There was a judgment for defendants, from which plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

Jessups & Hand, for appellants. E. N. Willard and Everett Warren, for appellecs.

MCCOLLUM, J. All the equities of the case are with the defendants, and in accord with the judgment appealed from. In the negotiations which resulted in the contract under which the goods were delivered the defendants were not acting for themselves or a general partnership, but for the Scranton Match Company, Limited, an association or ganized under the act of June 2, 1874, and through its supplements. The plaintiffs, their agent, knew the signature of the association, what had been done in the way of organizing it, what its capital was, and the measure of the liability of its members. The statutes under which it was formed and the articles on which it was founded were read