CHAP. VIII. 1795. On no subject whatever, have considerations such as these been more influential, than in that which was now brought before the American people. Their operation was not confined to those whose passions urged them to take part in the war, nor to the open enemies of the executive. The friends of peace and of the administration had generally received impressions unfavourable to the fair exercise of judgment in the case, which it required time and reflection to efface. Even among them, strong prejudices had been imbibed in favour of France, which the open attempts on the sovereignty of the United States had only weakened, and the matters of controversy with Great Britain had been contemplated with all that partiality which men generally feel for their own interests. With respect to commerce also, strong opinions had been preconceived. The desire to gain admission into the British West India islands, especially, had excited great hostility to that colonial system which had been adopted by every country in Europe; and sufficient allowances were not made for the prejudices by which that system was supported. The treaty, therefore, when exposed to the public view, found one party prepared for a bold and intrepid attack, but the other, not ready in its defence. To the passions, the prejudices, and the feelings of the nation, an appeal might confidently be made by those whose only object was its condemnation; but reflection, information, and consequently time, were required by men whose first impressions were not in its favour, but who were indisposed to yield absolutely to those CHAP. VIII. impressions. That a treaty involving a great variety of complicated national interests, and adjusting dif ferences of long standing, which had excited strong reciprocal prejudices, would require a patient and laborious investigation, both of the instrument itself, and of the circumstances under which it was negotiated, before a just estimate could be made of its merits, would be conceded by those who are most conversant in diplomatic transactions. But an immense party in America, not in the habit of considering national compacts, without examining the circumstances under which that with Britain had been formed, or weighing the reasons which induced it; without understanding the instrument, and in many instances without reading it, rushed impetuously to its condemnation, and seemed to expect that public opinion would be surprised by the suddenness, or stormed by the fury of the assault; and that the executive would be compelled to yield to its violence. In the populous cities, meetings of the people were immediately summoned, in order to take into their consideration, and to express their opinions respecting an instrument, to comprehend the full extent of which, a statesman would need deep reflection in the quiet of his closet, aided by considerable inquiry. It may well be supposed that persons feeling some distrust of their capacity to form, intuitively, a correct judgment on a 1795. CHAP. VIII. Subject so complex, and disposed only to act 1795. knowingly, would be disinclined to attend such meetings; or, if present at them, would be unwilling to commit themselves by so hasty a decision. Many intelligent men, therefore, stood aloof, while the most intemperate assumed, as usual, the name of the people; pronounced a definitive and unqualified condemnation of every article in the treaty; and with the utmost confidence assigned reasons for their opinions, which in many instances, had only an imaginary existence; and in some, were obviously founded on the strong prejudices which were entertained with respect to foreign powers. It is difficult to review the various resolutions and addresses to which the occasion gave birth, without feeling some degree of astonishment, mingled with humiliation at perceiving such proofs of the deplorable fallibility of human reason.* The first meeting was held in Boston. The example of that city was soon followed by New *The author does not mean to express any opinion on the treaty itself, or on the validity of some of the objections which were made to it; but to apply these remarks to the general complexion of the resolutions and addresses which condemned indiscriminately every stipulation, and many of the expressions of the instrument. In addition to those strictures which related to the matter agreed upon, it was vehemently censured for not containing concessions in form as well as in substance, and the usual expressions of amity were spurned with indignant disgust. 627 York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Charleston; CHAP. VIII. and, as if their addresses were designed at least 1795. as much for their fellow citizens as for their president, while one copy was transmitted to him, another was committed to the press. The prece. dent set by these large cities was followed, with wonderful rapidity, throughout the union; and the spirit which originated this system of op position, sustained, in its progress, no diminution of violence. On the 18th of July, at Baltimore, on his way to Mount Vernon, the president received the resolutions passed by the meeting at Boston, which were enclosed to him in a letter from the select men of that town. The answers to this letter and to these resolutions † evince the firmness with which he had resolved to meet the effort that was obvi The address from the citizens of Philadelphia was expressed in terms unobjectionably respectful; but the conduct of the meeting was particularly improper. After finishing the business, about three hundred of them paraded before the doors of the British minister, British consul, and Mr. Bingham, a senator, who had voted in the majority, and at each place burnt a copy of the treaty. †The meeting at Boston was held on the 13th of July, and that at Charleston on the 22d; consequently, the former could not have occasioned the latter. In a confidential letter, the president said, "whether it was from the spark which kindled the fire in Boston that the flame has spread so extensively, or whether the torch, by a preconcerted plan, was lighted so as to be ready for the explosion in all parts, so soon as advice to ratify the treaty should be announced, remains to be developed." 4 L 2 CHAP. VIII. ously making, to control the exercise of his con1795. stitutional functions by giving a promptness and vigor to the expression of the sentiments of a party, which might impose it upon the world as the deliberate judgment of the public. Addresses to the chief magistrate, and resolutions of town and country meetings, were not the only means which were employed on this interesting occasion, to enlist the American people against the measures which had been advised by the senate. In an immense number of essays, the treaty was critically examined, and every argument which might operate on the judgment or prejudice of the public, was urged in the warm and glowing language of passion. To meet these efforts by counter efforts was deemed indispensably necessary by the friends of that instrument; and the gazettes of the day are replete with appeals to the passions, and to the reason of those who are the ultimate arbiters of every political question. That the treaty affected the interests of France not less than those of the United States, was, in this memorable controversy, as serted by the one party, with as much zeal as it was denied by the other. To the president, these agitations furnished matter for deep reflection, and for serious regret; but they appear not to have shaken the decision he had formed, or to have affected his conduct otherwise than to have induced a still greater degree of circumspection in the mode of transacting the delicate business before him. On its first appearance, therefore, he pro |