CHAP. V. with the number of men who were engaged. 1791. Thirty-eight commissioned officers were killed upon the field, and five hundred and ninety-three non-commissioned officers and privates were slain and missing. Twenty-one commissioned officers, several of whom afterwards died of their wounds, and two hundred and forty-two non-commissioned officers and privates were wounded. Among the dead was the brave and much lamented general Butler. This gallant officer had served through the war of the revolution, and had, on more than one occasion, distinguished himself in a remarkable manner. In the list of those who shared his fate, were the names of many other excellent officers who had participated in all the toils, the dangers, and the glory of that long conflict which terminated in the independence of their country. At the head of the list of wounded were lieutenant colonels Gibson and Darke, major Butler, and adjutant general Sargent, all of whom were veteran officers of great merit, who displayed their accustomed bravery on this unfortunate day. Deploring their fate in his letter, general St. Clair observed; "the loss the public has sustained by the fall of so many officers particularly of general Butler and major Ferguson, cannot be too much regretted; but it is a circumstance that will alleviate the misfortune in some measure, that all of them fell most gallantly doing their duty." From the weight of the fire, and the circumstance of his being attacked nearly at the same time both in front and rear, general St. Clair was CHAP. V. of opinion that he was overpowered by numbers. 1791. The intelligence afterwards collected would make the Indian force to consist of from one thousand to fifteen hundred warriors. Of their loss, no estimate could be made; the probability is, that it bore no proportion to that sustained by the American army. Nothing could be more unexpected than this severe disaster. Having confidently anticipated a successful campaign, and a consequent termination of the war, the public could not believe that the general who had been unfortunate, had not been culpable. It was said that his vicinity to the Miamis villages, and the parties of observation which he occasionally saw, ought to have suggested to him the probability of being attacked in the absence of one of his regiments; and that he ought to have used sufficient vigilance to prevent the enemy from approaching so near his camp, both in front and rear, before they were observed. His order of encampment too was censured, and it was said that his lines were not sufficiently distant from each other. The commander in chief requested with earnestness that a court martial should sit on his conduct; but this request could not be granted, because there were not in the American service, officers of a grade to form a court for his trial on military principles. Late in the session, a committee of the house of representatives was appointed to inquire into the cause of the failure of the expedition, whose report, in explicit terms, exculpated 1792. 1792. CHAP. V. the commander in chief.* This inquiry however was instituted rather for the purpose of investiga ting the conduct of civil than of military officers; and was not conducted by military men. More satisfactory testimony in favour of St. Clair is furnished by the circumstance, that he still retained the undiminished esteem and good opinion of the president. The Indian war now assumed a more serious aspect than it had hitherto worn. There was reason to fear that the hostile tribes would derive a great accession of strength from the impression which their success and the spoil they had acquired would make upon their neighbours; and the reputation of the government was deeply concerned in retrieving the fortune of its arms, and affording protection to its citizens. The president therefore lost no time in causing the estimates for a force which he deemed competent to the object to be prepared and laid before congress. In conformity with a report made on this subject by the secretary of war, a bill was brought into the house of representatives, directing three addi *After stating the causes to which in the opinion of the Committee the failure of the expedition was to be ascribed, the report proceeds to add, "your committee conceive it but justice to the commander in chief to say, that in their opinion the failure of the late expedition can in no respect be imputed to his conduct either at any time before or during the action: but that as his conduct in all the preparatory arrangements was marked with peculiar ability and zeal, so his conduct during the action furnished strong testimonies of his Coolness and intrepidity. tional regiments of infantry, and a squadron of CHAP. V. cavalry to be raised, to serve for three years if 1792, not sooner discharged. The whole military establishment, if completed, would amount to about five thousand men. The additional regiments however were to be disbanded as soon as peace should be concluded with the Indians; and the president was authorized to discharge, or to forbear to raise any part of them, "in case events should in his judgment, render his so doing consistent with the public safety." A opposition to the the army. This bill experienced great opposition. motion was made to strike out the section which increase of authorized this augmentation of force. By those who argued in favour of the motion, the justice of the war was arraigned, and the practicability of obtaining peace at a much less expense than would be incurred in its further prosecution was urged with vehemence. An extension of the present frontier was said not to be desirable, and if the citizens of the United States were recalled within their proper boundaries, hostilities would cease. At any rate, it was an idle profusion of blood and treasure to carry the war beyond the line of forts already established. It was only exposing their arms to disgrace, betraying their own weakness, and lessening the public confidence in the government, to send forth armies to be butchered in the forests, while the British were suffered to keep possession of posts within the territory of the United States. To this cause was ascribed any disposition which might exist on the part of the Indians to continue hostilities, CHAP. V. and to its removal ought the efforts of the govern. 1792. ment to be directed. But, admitting the war to have been just in its commencement, and its continuance to be required by the honour and interest of the nation, yet as an invasion of the Indian country ought not to be attempted, this augmentation of the military establishment could not be necessary. Regular troops could only be useful as garrisons for posts to which the militia might resort for protection or supplies. Experience had proved that the sudden desultory attacks of the frontier militia and rangers were productive of more valuable consequences, than the methodical operations of a regular force. But should it even be conceded that invasion and conquest were to be contemplated, the existing establishment, if completed, would be sufficiently great. The levies which the president had been authorized to raise would, in every respect, equal regular troops. In the last campaign they had been equally serviceable, and in the late battle they had been equally brave. But it was still insisted that even for the purposes of conquest, the frontier militia were superior to any regulars whatever. The expense of such an army as the bill contemplated was said to be an object worthy of serious attention; and members were requested to observe the progress of this business, and to say where it would stop. At first, only a single regiment had been raised, and the expense was about one hundred thousand dollars; a second was afterwards added, which swelled the expense |