deserted in a body. This diminution of force was CHAP. V. not in itself, perhaps, an object of much concern. 1791. But there was reason to fear that the example, should those who set it be permitted to escape with impunity, would be extensively followed; and it was reported to be the intention of the deserters to plunder convoys of provisions which were advancing at some distance in the rear. To prevent mischiefs of so serious a nature, the general detached major Hamtranck with the first regiment in pursuit of the deserters, and directed him to secure the provisions under a strong guard.

The army, consisting of about fourteen hundred effective rank and file, continued its march, and, on the third of November, encamped on a commanding piece of ground, about fifteen miles south of the Miamis villages. The right wing under the command of general Butler formed the first line, and lay with a creek about twelve yards wide immediately in its front. The left wing commanded by lieutenant colonel Darke, formed the second; and between the two lines, was an interval of about seventy yards.* The right flank was supposed to be secured by the creek, by a steep bank, and by a small body of troops; the left was covered by a party of cavalry and by piquets. The militia crossed the creek, and advanced about a quarter of a mile in front, where they also encamped in two lines. On their approach

* In his official letter general St. Clair says that the ground would not admit a larger interval.

CHAP. V. a few Indians who had shown themselves on the 1791. opposite side of the creek, fled with precipitation.

At this place, the general determined to throw up a slight work for the security of the baggage, and after being rejoined by major Hamtranck, to march as unincumbered, and as expeditiously as possible, to the villages he purposed to destroy.

In both these designs he was anticipated. About half an hour before sun rise the next morning, just after the troops had been dismissed from the parade, an unexpected attack was made upon the militia, who fled in the utmost confusion, and rushing into camp through the first line of continental troops, which had been formed the instant the first gun was discharged, threw them too into disorder. Great and immediate exertions were made by the officers, who had generally seen service, to restore order. But their endeavours were not entirely successful. The Indians pressed close upon the heels of the flying militia, and en gaged general Butler with great intrepidity. The action instantly became extremely warm; and the fire of the assailants, passing round both flanks of the first line, was in a few minutes poured with equal fury on the rear division of the American army. Its greatest weight was directed against the centre of each wing, where the artillery was posted; and the artillerists were mowed down in great numbers. Firing from the ground, and from the shelter which the woods afforded, the assailants were scarcely seen but when springing from one cover to another, in which manner they advanced close up to the American lines, and to the very mouths of the field pieces. They fought with the daring

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courage of men whose trade is war, and who are CHAP. v. stimulated by all those passions which can impel the savage mind to vigorous exertions.

Under circumstances thus arduous, raw troops may be expected to exhibit that inequality which is found in human nature. While some of the American soldiers performed their duty with the utmost resolution, others seemed dismayed and terrified. Of this conduct the officers were, as usual, the victims. With a fearlessness which the occasion required, they exposed themselves to the most imminent dangers, and in their efforts to change the face of affairs, fell in great numbers. For several days, the commander in chief had been afflicted with a severe disease, under which he still laboured, and which must have greatly affected him; but, though unable to display that activity which would have been useful in this severe conflict, neither the feebleness of his body, nor the peril of his situation, could prevent his delivering hisorders with judgment and with self possession.*

The following extract from the official letter of the commander in chief is inserted as showing both his own situation and his opinion of the behaviour of his troops. "I have nothing sir to lay to the charge of the troops but their want of discipline, which, from the short time they had been in service, it was impossible they should have acquired; and which rendered it very difficult when they were thrown into confusion, to reduce them again to order; and is one reason why the loss has fallen so heavily upon the officers who did every thing in their power to effect it. Neither were my own exertions wanting; but worn down with illness, and suffering under a painful disease, unable either to mount, or dismount a horse without assistance, they were not so great as they otherwise would, or perhaps ought to have been.

1791.

CHAP. V. It was soon perceived that the American fire 1791. could produce, on a concealed enemy, no con

siderable effect; and that the only hope of victory which could be entertained, must be placed in the bayonet. At the head of the second regiment, which formed the left of the left wing, lieutenant colonel Darke made an impetuous charge upon the enemy, forced them from their ground with some loss, and drove them about four hundred yards. He was followed by that whole wing; but the want of a sufficient number of riflemen to press this advantage, deprived him of the benefit which ought to have been derived from this effort; and as soon as he gave over the pursuit, the Indians renewed their attack. In the mean time general Butler was mortally wounded, the left of the right wing was broken, the artillerists almost to a man killed, the guns seized, and the camp penetrated by the enemy. With his own regi. ment, and with the battalions commanded by majors Butler* and Clarke, Darke was ordered again to charge with the bayonet. These orders were executed with intrepidity and momentary success. The Indians were driven out of the camp, and the artillery recovered. But while they were pressed in one point by the bravest of the American troops, their fire was kept up from every other with fatal effect. Several times particular corps charged them, always with partial success, but no universal effort could be made,

Although his leg had been broken by a ball, major But ler, mounted on horse back, led his battalion to the charge.

and in every charge a great loss of officers was CHAP. V. sustained, the consequences of which were severely 1791. felt. Instead of keeping their ranks, and executing the orders which were given, a great proportion of the soldiers flocked together in crowds, and were shot down without resistance. To save the remnant of his army was all that remained to be done, and about half past nine in the morning, general St. Clair ordered lieutenant colonel Darke with the second regiment, to charge a body of Indians who had intercepted their retreat, and to gain the road. Major Clarke with his battalion was directed to cover the rear. These orders were executed, and a most disorderly flight commenced. The pursuit was kept up about four miles, when, fortunately for the surviving Americans, that avidity for plunder which is a ruling passion among savages, called back the victorious Indians to the camp, where the spoils of their vanquished foes were to be divided. The routed troops continued their flight to fort Jefferson, a distance of about thirty miles, throwing away their arms on the road. At this place they met major Hamtranck with the first regiment, and a council of war was called to deliberate on the course to be pursued. As this regiment was far from restoring the strength of the morning, it was determined not to attempt to retrieve the fortune of the day; and, leaving the wounded at fort Jefferson, the army continued its retreat to fort Washington.

In this disastrous battle, the loss on the part of the Americans was very great when compared