ernment would be involved in perplexities from CHAP. IV. which no means of extricating itself had been 1790. shewn. Nor would it be practicable to discrim. inate between the debts contracted for general and for local objects.

In the course of the debate, severe allusions were made to the conduct of particular states; and the opinions advanced in support of the measure, were ascribed to local interests.

In support of the assumption, the debts of the states were traced to their origin. America, it was said, had engaged in a war, the object of which was equally interesting to every part of the union. It was not the war of a particular state, but of the United States. It was not the liberty and independence of a part, but of the whole for which they had contended, and which they had acquired. The cause was a common cause. As brethren, the American people had consented to hazard property and life in its defence. All the sums expended in the attainment of this great object, whatever might be the authority under which they were raised or appropriated, conduced to the same end. Troops were raised and military stores purchased, before congress assumed the command of the army, or the control of the war. The ammunition which repulsed the enemy at Bunker's hill, was purchased by Massachussetts; and formed a part of the debt of that state.

Nothing could be more erroneous than the principle which had been assumed in argument, that the holders of securities issued by individual k k

VOL. V.

CHAP. IV. states were to be considered merely as state cred1790. itors;...as if the debt had been contracted on ac

count of the particular state. It was contracted on account of the union, in that common cause in which all were equally interested.

From the complex nature of the political system which had been adopted in America, the war was in a great measure carried on through the agency of the state authorities, and the debts were in truth the debts of the union, for which the states had made themselves responsible. Except the civil list, the whole state expenditure was in the prosecution of the war; and the state taxes had undeniably exceeded the provision for their civil list. The foundation of the several classes of the debt was reviewed in detail; and it was affirmed to be proved from the review, and from the books in the public offices, that in its origin a great part of it even in form, and the whole in fact, was equitably due from the continent. The states individually possessing all the resources of the nation, became responsible to certain descriptions of the public creditors. But they were the agents of the continent in contracting the debt, and its distribution among them for payment arose from the division of political power which existed under the old confederation. A new arrangement of the system had taken place, and a power over the resources of the nation was conferred on the general government. With the funds, the debt also ought to be assumed. This investigation of its origin demonstrated that the assumption was not the creation of a new debt, but the reacknowledgment of liability for an old one, the payment of

which had devolved on those members of the sys- CHAP. IV. tem, who at the time, were alone capable of paying 1790. it. And thence was inferred, not only the justice of the measure, but a complete refutation of the arguments drawn from the constitution. If, in point of fact, the debt was in its origin continental, and had been transferred to the states for greater facility of payment, there could be no constitutional objection to restoring to it its original and real character.

The great powers of war, of taxation, and of borrowing money, which were vested in congress to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States, comprised that in question. There could be no more doubt of their right to charge themselves with the payment of a debt contracted in the past war, than to borrow money for the prosecution of a future war. The danger to be feared from a competition between the general and state governments, with respect to those subjects over which they possessed a concurrent right of taxation, was much insisted on. It was said to be unfriendly to both to leave them under circumstances which rendered clashing and interference of interests and jurisdiction unavoidable. The impolicy of leaving the public creditors to receive payment from different sources was also strongly pressed. The excise it was urged, would be made more productive without being burdensome, if regulated by the general government on uniform principles, than it could possibly be, if in the hands of thirteen independent legislatures; and the jealousy and

CHAP. IV. hostility which would exist between the creditors 1790. of the union and of the states, was considered as a powerful argument in favour of giving them one common interest. This jealousy and hostility it was feared might be carried so far, as even to create an opposition to the laws of the union.

If the states should provide for their creditors, the same sum of money must be collected from the people as would be required if the debt should be assumed; and it would probably be collected in a manner more burdensome than if one uniform system should be established. If all should not make such provision, it would be unjust to leave the soldier of one state unpaid, while the services of the man who fought by his side were amply compensated; and after having assumed the funds, it would dishonour the general government to permit a creditor for services rendered, or property advanced for the continent, to remain unsatisfied, because his claim had been transferred to the state at a time when the state alone possessed the means of payment. By the injured and neglected ereditor, such an arrangement might justly be considered as an artifice in a high degree disreputable.

Instead of delaying, it was believed to be a measure which would facilitate the settlement of accounts between the states. Its advocates declared that they did not entertain, and never had entertained any wish to procrastinate a settlement. On the contrary, it was greatly desired by them. They had themselves brought forward propositions for that purpose: and they invited their adver

saries to assist in improving the plan which had CHAP. IV. been introduced.

The settlement between the states, it was said, either would or would not be made. Should it ever take place, it would remedy any inequalities which might grow out of the assumption. Should it never take place, the justice of the measure became the more apparent. That the burdens in support of a common war, which from various causes had devolved unequally on the states, ought to be apportioned among them, was a truth too clear to be controverted; and this, if the settlement should never be accomplished, could be effected only by the measure now proposed. Indeed, in any event, it would be the only certain as well as only eligible plan. For how were the debtor states to be compelled to pay the balances which should be found against them?

If the measure was recommended by considerations which rendered its ultimate adoption inevitable, the present was clearly preferable to any future time. It was desirable immediately to quiet the minds of the public creditors by assuring them that justice would be done; to simplify the forms of public debt; and it was also desirable to put an end to that speculation which had been so much reprobated, and which could only be terminated by giving the debt a real and permanent value.

That the assumption would impair the just influence of the states was controverted with great strength of argument. The diffusive representation in the state legislatures, the intimate connexion

1790.