support the position, that in conformity with that CHAP. III. instrument, the power in question could reside 1789. only with the chief magistrate: no power, it was said, would be more completely executive in its nature than that of removal from office.

But if it was a case on which the constitution was silent, the clearest principles of political expediency required that neither branch of the legislature should participate in it.

The danger that a president could ever be found who would remove good men from office, was treated as imaginary. It was not by the splendor attached to the character of the present chief magistrate alone that this opinion was to be defended. It was founded on the structure of the office. The man in whose favour a majority of the people of this continent would unite, had probability at least in favour of his principles; in addition to which, the public odium that would inevitably attach to such conduct, would be an effectual security against it.

After an ardent discussion which consumed several days, the committee divided; and the amendment was negatived by a majority of thirty four to twenty. The opinion thus expressed by the house of representatives did not explicitly convey their sense of the constitution. Indeed the express grant of the power to the president, rather implied a right in the legislature to give or withhold it at their discretion. To obviate any misunderstanding of the principle on which the question had been decided, Mr. Benson moved in the house, when the report of the committee of

CHAP. III. the whole was taken up, to amend the second 1789. clause in the bill so as clearly to imply the power

On the policy of the

of removal to be solely in the president. He gave notice that if he should succeed in this, he would move to strike out the words which had been the subject of debate. If those words continued, he said the power of removal by the president might hereafter appear to be exercised by virtue of a legislative grant only, and consequently be subjected to legislative instability; when he was well satisfied in his own mind, that it was by fair construction, fixed in the constitution. The motion was seconded by Mr. Madison, and both amendments were adopted. As the bill passed into a law, it has ever been considered as a full expression of the sense of the legislature on this important part of the American constitution.

The bill to establish the treasury department, secretary of contained a clause making it the duty of the

the treasury

reporting

management

plans for the secretary "to digest and report plans for the imof the provement and management of the revenue, and for the support of public credit."

revenue.

Mr. Page moved to strike out these words, observing, that to permit the secretary to go further than to prepare estimates would be a dangerous innovation on the constitutional privilege of that house. It would create an undue influence within those walls, because members might be led by the deference commonly paid to men of abilities, who gave an opinion in a case they have thoroughly considered, to support the plan of the minister even against their own judgment. Nor would the mischief stop there. A precedent

would be established which might be extended CHAP. 111. until ministers of the government should be 1789. admitted on that floor, to explain and support the plans they had digested and reported, thereby laying a foundation for an aristocracy, or a detestable monarchy.

a revenue.

Mr. Tucker seconded the motion of Mr. Page, and observed, that the authority contained in the bill to prepare and report plans would create an interference of the executive with the legislative powers, and would abridge the particular privilege of that house to originate all bills for raising How could the business originate in that house, if it was reported to them by the minister of finance? All the information that could be required might be called for without adopting a clause that might undermine the authority of the house, and the security of the people. The constitution has pointed out the proper method of communication between the executive and legislative departments. It is made the duty of the president to give from time to time information to congress of the state of the union, and to recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient. If revenue plans are to be prepared and reported to congress, he is the proper person to perform this. service. He is responsible to the people for what he recommends, and will be more cautious than any other person to whom a less degree of responsibility was attached.

He hoped the house was not already weary of executing and sustaining the powers vested in D d

VOL. V.

CHAP. III. them by the constitution; and yet the adoption of 1789. this clause would argue that they thought themselves less adequate than an individual, to determine what burdens their constituents were able to bear. This was not answering the high expectations that had been formed of their exertions for the general good, or of their vigilance in guarding their own and the people's rights.

The arguments of Mr. Page and Mr. Tucker were enforced and enlarged by Mr. Livermore and Mr. Gerry. The latter gentleman said, “that he had no objection to obtaining information, but he could not help observing the great degree of importance gentlemen were giving to this and the other executive officers. If the doctrine of having prime and great ministers of state was once well established, he did not doubt but he should soon see them distinguished by a green or red ribbon, insignia of court favour and patronage."

It was contended that the plans of the secretary, being digested, would be received entire. Members would be informed that each part was necessary to the whole, and that nothing could be touched without injuring the system. Establish this doctrine, and congress would become a useless burden.

The amendment was opposed by Mr. Benson, Mr. Goodhue, Mr. Ames, Mr. Sedgewick, Mr. Boudinot, Mr. Lawrence, Mr. Madison, Mr. Stone, Mr. Shermen, and Mr. Baldwin. It was insisted that to prepare and report plans for the improvement of the revenue, and support of public credit, constituted the most important service

which could be rendered by the officer who should CHAP. III, be placed at the head of the department of finance. 1789. When the circumstances under which the members of that house were assembled, and the various objects for which they were convened, were considered, it was no imputation upon them to suppose that they might receive useful information from a person whose peculiar duty it was to direct his attention to systems of finance, and who would be in some measure selected on account of his fitness for that object. It was denied that the privileges of the house would be infringed by the measure. The plans of the secretary could not be termed bills, nor would they even be reported in that form. They would only constitute information which would be valuable, and which could not be received in a more eligible mode. "Certainly" said Mr. Goodhue, "we carry our dignity to the extreme, when we refuse to receive information from any but ourselves."

"If we consider the present situation of our finances," said Mr. Ames, "owing to a variety of causes, we shall no doubt perceive a great though unavoidable confusion throughout the whole scene. It presents to the imagination a deep, dark, and dreary chaos, impossible to be reduced to order, unless the mind of the architect be clear and capacious, and his power commensurate to the object. He must not be the flitting creature of the day; he must have time given him competent to the successful exercise of his authority. It is with the intention of letting a little sunshine into the business, that the present arrangement is pro