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ART. IV. An Efay on Naval Tactics, Syftematical and Hiftorical. With Explanatory Plates. In Four Parts. In Four Parts. By John Clerk, Efq. of Eldin, Fellow of the Society of Scotifh Antiquaries, and of the Royal Society of Edinburgh. Second Edition. Edinburgh, Conftable & Co. London, Longman & Rees. 4to. 1804.

A FEW copies of the first part of this valuable Effay, were printed and diftributed among the author's friends, in the beginning of the year 1782. It was reprinted and published in 1790; the fecond, third, and fourth parts were added in 1797: and the work is now republifhed entire, with a preface, explaining the origin of our author's difcoveries in Naval Tactics. As it would be impoffible for the reader, from any detached quotation, and unaflifted by the plates, to comprehend the whole detail of a fyftem which is explained with mathematical precifion, in a series of demonftrations, we will endeavour to give an accurate analysis of the principles upon which it is founded, and of the chief illuftrations by which it is developed and explained. In an introduction written in October 1781, he begins with obferving, that during the greater part of the American war, and during the whole of the two preceding wars, British failors, in the rencounter of fingle fhips, or of fmall fquadrons, never failed to exhibit the moft diftinguished feamanship, intrepidity and perfeverance, attended with the most uninterrupte fuccefs: yet wherever large fleets, of ten, twenty, or thirty fhips were affembled and formed in a line of battle, nothing memorable had ever been achieved, and not a fingle fhip had been loft or won. The defeat of Conflans and other fortunate occurrences during the fame war, form no exception to this general obfervation; as, on most of thefe occafions, the English poffeffed a decifive fuperiority in numbers; and in the defeat of Conflans, the French, though nearly of equal force, betrayed the utmost irresolution, and fairly ran away, without even attempting to fuftain an engagement. From the amazing exertions and uniform fuccefs of our feamen in leffer conflicts, it cannot be afcribed to any diminution, but to the improper direction of their characteristical intrepidity, that, during the whole of that war, our fleets were invariably baffled, nay were worsted, without having ever loft a fingle fhip, or almoft a man.' As little can it be attributed to the fuperior conftruction or failing of the enemy's veffels, when we find that they were fo frequently overtaken and captured in fingle engagements. Mr Clerk, therefore, concludes that the French must have adopted a new fyftem of tactics which we had not then difcovered; and that the method hitherto purfued on our part,

fince it was always unfuccefsful, must have been radically

wrong.

The author proceeds, in the first part of his work, to a feries of demonftrations on the mode of attack from windward, of which, for the reafons already afligned, it is impoffible to give any more than the general refult. A fingle veffel to windward in pursuit of another to leeward, will never bear down, endwife, in a direct line, on the broad fide of the other; because the is then expofed to be raked from end to end by the fire of the enemy, and to be difabled from purfuit. She will either bear down aftern of the other, and continue the purfuit in a parallel line, till fhe get alongfide; or, having fhot ahead, fhe will bear down athwart the other, to intercept her in her courfe. But a fleet to windward has invariably borne down in a perpendicular, or at leaft in a flanting line on another to leeward, each fhip in a line of battle abreast of the other, till they brought up, within a proper distance, for a close and general engagement from van to rear. A fleet to leeward, formed in a line of battle ahead of each other, and defirous to avoid a general engagement, had therefore full leifure to difable the other during its approach. And when the latter had affumed a fituation for close encounter, the former might bear away at intervals, while enveloped with fmoke; or, by making more fail, might fhoot ahead, and pour its whole fire into the oppofite van, as it paffed and wore in fucceffion, to form a new line to leeward, on the oppofite tack, where, if the enemy were not already difabled, the fame manoeuvre might be repeated with the fame fuccefs. Some idea may be formed of the effect of a raking fire, from the fuppofition of a column of infantry expofed to the fire of a battery through the whole line. But a fhip is infinitely more difabled by the damage fuftained in a few throuds or principal ftays, in a yard or topmaft, than by the loss of men; and the area which the hull and rigging together present to the fhot, appears from our author's calculations to be twenty times larger than the area formed by the decks alone where the men are expofed.

If, then, fays our author in concluding this part of his demonftrations, after a proper examination of the late fea engagements, or rencounters, it fhall be found, that our enemy, the French, have never once fhown a willingness to risk the making of the attack, but invariably have made choice of, and earneftly courted a leeward pofition: If, invariably, when extended in line of battle, in that pofition they have difabled the British fleets in coming down to the attack: If, invariably, upon feeing the British fleet difabled, they have made fail, and demolished the van in paffing: If, invariably, upon feeling the effect of the British fire, they have withdrawn at pleafure, either a part, or the whole of their fleet, and have formed a new line

of

of battle to leeward: If the French, repeatedly, have done this upon every occafion: And, on the other hand, if it fhall be found that the British, from an irrefiftible defire of making the attack, as conftantly and uniformly bave courted the windward pofition: If, uniformly and repeatedly, they have had their fhips fo difabled and feparated, by making the attack, that they have not once been able to bring them to clofe with, to follow up, or even to detain one ship of the enemy for a moment ;-Shall we not have reafon to believe, that the French have adopted, and put in execution, fome fyftem which the British either have not difcovered, or have not yet profited by the difcovery (of)?' p. 39.

That fuch was the new fyftem adopted by the French, to preferve their own fhips, while they difabled ours, and fuch the mode of attack to which the English uniformly adhered, is illuftrated by the details of a variety of naval engagements, from Admiral Byng's in the Mediterranean, 1756, to Admiral Greaves's rencounter off the Chesapeak, 5th September 1781. In Byng's unfortunate engagement, the British having weathered the French fleet, edged down in a flanting or oblique line to bring the latter to close action from van to rear. The headmoft fhips fuffered a raking fire, and received three broadfides, before they could reach their stations to return a fhot. The fixth fhip in the line was difabled by the lofs of a topmaft; and from the interruption which the occafioned to the line, the van was feparated from the centre and rear. The van of the French fleet bore away at intervals, amidst the mistaken fhouts of our feamen, as foon as it felt the effects of our fire. The centre and rear, by making more fail, poured their whole fire with impunity into our five headmost fhips, as each veffel ranged along our van: and as they bore away in fucceffion, they formed a new line three miles to leeward; while our van which had fuftained the whole action, was too much difabled for the fleet to renew fuch a difadvantageous attack. In Pocock's engagement in the Eaft Indies, two years afterwards, a fimilar mode of attack, and the fame fyftem of defence were employed upon each fide, and with the fame fuccefs. So early had the French adopted a defenfive plan, which preserved their own fleet, while it difabled ours, and which, in Byng's engagement, prevented the relief of Fort St Philip.

Admiral Byron's engagement off Granada, on the 6th of July 1779, is defcribed as fimilar to Byng's, in almost every respect. Our fleet bore down from windward, in the fame oblique line; but as the enemy kept bearing away, we were unable either to bring their rear into action, or to produce a clofe engagement in the van. Our headmoft fhips were either difabled in making the attack, as they received the whole fire of the enemy's line, as each fhip of the latter paffed and wore in fucceffion, in order to

forma

form to leeward upon the oppofite tack. The French adhered fo closely to this defenfive fyftem, that, to avoid all danger of a general engegement, they forbore even to intercept our difabled fhips which had neceffarily fallen to leeward; and their caution was rewarded with the capture of Granada.

Admiral Arbuthnot's engagement off the Chefapeak, exhibits a repetition of the fame manoeuvres, with this remarkable addition, that the French fleet, which had the weather gage, being apprehenfive of an engagemant in that fituation, run down and formed to leeward of the British line. Accordingly, our headmoft fhips were fo much disabled in bearing down to engage, that when the enemy wore as ufual, and formed again to leeward, our fleet was unable to renew the attack. In Admiral Greaves's engagement off the Chefapeak, 5th September 1781, the fame manoeuvre was practifed with equal fuccefs. While the enemy's van bore away, their centre bore up in paffing, not only to protect their own van, but to pour their whole fire fucceffively into

ours.

The laft inftance of an unfuccefsful attack from windward, which our author has produced, is Lord Rodney's engagement off Martinico, on the 17th of April 1780. His Lordship's first defign was to attack the rear of the enemy with his whole force. The French Admiral, however, difcovering the meaning of the fignal, wore and formed on the oppofite tack; and the manœuvre, though it was still practicable, was exchanged for a general attack upon the whole line. Notwithstanding the perfonal gallantry of Lord Rodney, and the example of clofe action given by the Sandwich, the French fleet bore alternately away and efcaped; while the English, from the damage fuftained in the hulk and rigging, were unable to continue the purfuit that night.

Mr Clerk next proceeds to fhew, that wherever the French, in oppofition to their ufual practice, had kept to windward, as if a ware of the peculiar danger of their fituation, they were careful never to make the attack themfelves. Their anxiety to preserve a fecure distance, is illuftrated by Rodney's two engagements on the 15th and 19th of May 1780, to the windward of Martinico; by Sir Samuel Hood's engagement on the 17th of April 1781, off Martinico; and by Admiral Keppel's in 1778, off Ufhant; in each of which, a fmart cannonade was maintained, while the two adverfe fleets paffed each other upon oppofite tacks. In the laft of thefe engagements, the French fleet, as in the subsequent engagement with Arbuthnot, off the Chefapeak, run down and formed to leeward, after having paffed the fire of the British

line.

Such was our naval fituation in the beginning of the year 1782,

when

when the first part of this work appeared. During the whole war, our fleets had invariably been baffled, difabled, and worsted, in fact, in every general engagement, without the loss of a single ship on either fide, or almost of a man. Our admirals adhered invariably to the established mode of attack, and endeavoured to obtain a windward pofition before they began to engage. Each fhip steer ed directly upon her opponent in the adverfe line, and brought up in order to produce a general engagement from van to rear. In this fituation, our admirals could not avail themfelves of the fu perior fkill, perfeverance, and spirit of our feamen; nor, in bearing down, could our fhips retaliate upon the enemy with a fingle fhot. The French, relying upon our want of penetration to difcover, or of skill to counteract this new fyftem of defence, never failed to accomplish the object of their expedition, and to difable our fhips, while they preferved their own. Difpirited by the failure of our arms in the American war, we beheld ourselves uniformly baffled in our own element; and we began to apprehend a decay of spirit in our officers and feamen, when we reflected upon the victories obtained at Meffina and La Hogue, upon our obftinate battles with the Dutch in the preceding century, and on the glorious annals of Queen Elizabeth's reign.

Mr Clerk's merit would have been fufficiently confpicuous, had he merely discovered this concealed fyftem of French tactics, which, during three fucceffive wars, had efcaped the penetration, or at leaft had eluded the fkill of our naval commanders. But he has alfo taught us how to counteract this fyftem, and to bring the enemy, in every fituation, to a clofe engagement, in which the fuperiority of our feamen might be fuccefsfully exerted. Inftead of the former erroneous mode of attack, the fyftem which he has fubftituted, poffeffes this peculiar merit, that it cannot avail our enemies even when divulged. That innate fpirit and habitual fkill, which have rendered our feamen fuperior in every clofe encounter, muft firft be communicated to our enemies, before the two modes. of attack which he propofes, and which have been fuccessfully adopted, from windward and from leeward, can be employed against us even upon equal terms. We will proceed to explain concifely the principles of each mode of attack, without attempting to fol low the minute and accurate demonftrations which the author has given, of the various fituations to which they may extend.

The mode of attack propofed, whether from windward or fron leeward, is founded upon the fame principle which a fkilful general adopts in engagements by land; that is, to exert the chief force against the weakeft or moft vulnerable part of the oppofite line. The impoffibility of carrying the whole fleet by a general attack, has been fufficiently proved. Instead, therefore, of bearing di

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