A Supplement TO THE FIRST, SECOND, AND THIRD PARTS OF MR. CHITTY'S TREATISE ON THE GENERAL PRACTICE OF THE LAW, STATING THE RECENT STATUTES AND DECISIONS SINCE THE FIRST PUBLICATION OF THAT WORK TO THE 1ST OF JANUARY, 1835, AND WITH SEVERAL ADDITIONAL SUGGESTIONS AND NEW FORMS; INTENDED PRINCIPALLY FOR THE Use of the PURCHASERS of the first edition, BUT AS CONTAINING NEW MATTER AND FORMS, MAY ALSO BE FOUND USEFUL AS BY J. CHITTY, ESQ. BARRISTER, OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE. LONDON: S. SWEET, CHANCERY LANE; STEVENS AND SONS, BELL YARD; Law Booksellers and Publishers. ADVERTISEMENT. THE numerous changes in the law, as well by statute as decisions, since the first publication of "The General Practice of the Law," has rendered it essential, in order to continue its accuracy and utility, to publish a SUPPLEMENT, which, though principally intended for the use of the purchasers of the first edition, may, as containing much new and additional information and forms (not even to be found in the second edition, as for instance the observations on breaches of promise to marry, in page 13 to 15, and numerous others,) be also acceptable to those who possess copies thereof. I have therefore with considerable labour published this Supplement, the possession of which will afford the purchasers of the first edition even fuller and more recent information than those having the second; because many decisions and some enactments are herein noticed which did not exist when the second edition of the first and second parts was published. At the same time I cannot admit the justice of the remarks with which I have been assailed, that there was any injustice in publishing an improved edition immediately it was called for, because I consider that any more recent information thereby afforded could not in any view prejudice those who had read the first, and who pur chased to read and not to sell. I have considered it advisable to print the following pages in short detached sentences, referring to the pages in each of the editions of the first, second, and third parts of the principal work, so that Students may readily in reading incorporate the additions, and Practitioners, wishing to refer to a particular passage in the original work, may readily turn to the corresponding page in the Supplement, and there, even more readily than if the same were incorporated in the original context, ascertain whether there has been any recent enactment, or decision, or even suggestion, altering, or confirming the same subject. If this undertaking should be acceptable, I propose every year or two, when alterations may render it expedient, to publish a similar summary, by which means the earliest editions will continue as useful as the latest. J. C. Chambers, 6, Chancery Lane, SUPPLEMENT TO PART I. PREFACE. Page viii.-In illustration of the evils resulting from a prac titioner having knowledge of only one department of the law, the following statement of recent facts may be added in a note. "Recently a barrister practising only in the Courts of Law, very eminent for his legal attainments, sound opinions, and great practice, advised that there was no remedy whatever against a married woman, who, having a considerable separate estate, had joined with her husband in a promissory note for 2500l. a debt of her husband; because he was of opinion that the contract of a married woman is absolutely void, and referred to a decision to that effect, viz. Marshall v. Rutton, 8 Term Rep. 545, he not knowing, or forgetting, that, in equity, under such circumstances, payment might have been enforced out of the separate estate. (Bullpen v. Clarke, 17 Ves. jun. 366; Hulme v. Tenant, 1 Bro. P. C. 16; Stewart v. Lord Kirkwall, 3 Madd. Rep. 387; Bingham v. Jones, at Rolls, 1832, Chitty on Bills, 8th ed. 791; Field v. Sowle, 4 Russ. Rep. 112). And afterwards, a very eminent equity counsel, equally erroneously, advised, in the same case, that the remedy was only in equity, although it appeared upon the face of the case, as then stated, that, after the death of her husband, the wife had promised to pay, in consideration of forbearance, and upon which promise she might have been arrested and sued at law. (Lee v. Muggeridge, 5 Taunt. Rep. 36; and Littlefield v. Shee, 2 B. & Adolp. 811). If the common law counsel had properly advised proceedings in equity, or if the equity counsel had advised proceedings by arrest at law, upon the promise, after the death of the husband, the whole debt would have been paid. But, upon this latter opinion, a bill in Chancery was filed, and so much time elapsed before decree, that a great part of the pro SUP. B VOL. I. PREFACE. |