wise Monarch will almost never think it best to put to the test this theoretic power.

From these statements, it would seem that the power of the Crown as represented in the person of the Monarch is not great, though his influence may be much more than that of an ordinary citizen. The mere fact that the Cabinet is required to inform the Queen of its intended action, may serve greatly to modify that action. As the fact of the continuance of the forms of law which represent the Monarch as the source of power, has tended to the development of an unchecked Democracy, so it is not unlikely that the habit of exempting the doings of the Sovereign from political discussion, is now tending to destroy the political influence of the Crown. As the consciousness of the democratic character of the Constitution becomes more general, it is natural that every important political factor shall become the subject of political debate. To keep the Queen out of the field of debate, it is likely to be more and more necessary to minimize her political influence. It has been possible for an alert ear, at any time in recent years, to catch the sound of an implied censure of the Queen, in that she is believed to have been more loyal to the Government when Lord Beaconsfield or Lord Salisbury was at the head of the Cabinet, than she has been when Mr. Gladstone was Prime Minister. Probably no one is in a condition to say positively that the Queen has been more loyal to one Ministry than to another, yet the vague belief that it is so has tended to develop a spirit of unfriendly criticism. The area of debate is sure to extend with the consciousness of democracy. There is likely to be forced upon the Monarch more and more directly the alternative of being shorn of political influence, or of ⚫ being brought into political debate. Circumstances might easily arise in which the fact or the suspicion that the Monarch favoured a certain policy, would of itself be a

positive force against the policy. A secret society has not a fair chance in a successful democracy; it is almost sure to be suspected of being worse than it really is. If mysterious influences associated with the Monarch cannot be explained and defended in public debate, they are likely to be misrepresented and turned to a bad account.

At the tomb of Washington the guide is accustomed to say to the visiting pilgrims that during the Civil War the soldiers of both armies visited the grounds, and that it was their custom whenever they met at this spot to lay down their arms and shake hands as friends. Americans cannot be enemies at the tomb of Washington. To the American, Washington personates the deepest feelings of patriotism. In England, the Queen is the sentimental head of the nation, and conveniently personates the feeling of patriotism. I can easily believe that the sentiments that gather about the Monarch are a force of some consequence in the English Government. Mr. Bagehot has taken large account of these sentiments. He represents the chief function of the Crown to be that of deluding the masses of the people into the belief that they are really governed by a monarch, thus preventing them from injurious meddling with the real Government. I do not believe the English people ever were deluded upon this question to the extent that Mr. Bagehot assumes. I am sure they are not so deluded now. I can more easily believe that the few who have felt that their per- . sonal interests lay in the perpetuation of the high prerogatives of the Crown have been deluded into the notion that it was to their advantage to maintain all the forms of royal power, and that they have not perceived that they were thus contributing to the formation of the most absolutely democratic Constitution that has yet been attempted in any country. I can understand how an instructed Democracy may insist on perpetuating these

forms which no longer delude for the sake of perpetuating this free and unchecked democratic government.

From this description it is evident that the thing of chief constitutional importance about the Crown is the fact that it is made the centre of certain legal forms and certain formal executive acts which have tended to the development of an extreme and unchecked Democracy. These forms, while nominally in conflict with the Constitution, are in their practical working in entire accord with it. Circumstances might arise in which some of these forms might be vitalized into organs of positive power. Mr. Dicey has suggested a plan by which the Crown may be brought into positive touch with the democratic Constitution. He proposes that it shall be made the duty of the Queen, in the case of laws or parliamentary acts which are deemed to be of unusual importance, to commit such acts to a vote of the people before they shall go into effect. That is, the Queen shall have the power of a discretionary referendum. The Cabinet, when balked in the House of Commons, may dissolve Parliament and appeal to the people on the matter at issue. The case of Mr. Gladstone's appeal to the people on his first bill to secure an Irish Parliament is in point. This is like the referendum, in that the people, in voting for members of Parliament, are indirectly giving expression on the chief measure in debate at the time.

Again, we have discussed the possibility of the House of Lords fulfilling the function of securing an appeal to the people on important measures which have passed the Commons; as in the case of Mr. Gladstone's second Home Rule Bill. This also is indirect. The obnoxious measure can only be defeated by choosing a majority of the opposite political party. But Mr. Dicey proposes that the Monarch shall have power to secure a direct referendum. In that case the people will vote for or against the law

itself. It might readily happen that the people would at the same time defeat a measure which a party has passed and elect a majority of the same party to the House of Commons. In such a case it would be the duty of the party to modify its policy so as to be in accord with the mandate of the sovereign people. It is possible to conceive of this proposed scheme as a sort of revitalization of the now defunct power of royal veto. The Monarch instead of exercising the power in person passes it on to the real sovereign, the people. Certainly, there can be no objection to this proposed revival of royal power on account of its lack of harmony with the democratic Constitution.

CHAPTER VI

THE MINISTRY

S has already been shown, the Cabinet holds important relations to the House of Commons, the House of Lords, and to the Crown. Indeed, the Cabinet is the very core of the Constitution. It gathers to itself the control of both legislative and executive business.

The following were the members of the Cabinet in 1896: 1. Marquis of Salisbury, Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 2. Lord Halsbury, Lord High Chancellor. 3. Duke of Devonshire, Lord President of Council. 4. Viscount Cadogan, Lord Privy Seal. 5. Sir Michael E. Hicks-Beach, Chancellor of the Exchequer. 6. Sir Matthew White Ridley, Bt., Secretary of State for the Home Department. 7. Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of State, Colonial Department. 8. Marquis of Lansdowne, Secretary of State, War Department. 9. Lord George Francis Hamilton, Secretary of State, Indian Department. 10. Mr. George Joachim Goschen, First Lord of the Admiralty. 11. Mr. Arthur James Balfour, First Lord of the Treasury and Leader of the Government in the House of Commons. 12. Lord Ashbourne, Lord Chancellor of Ireland. 13. Earl Cadogan, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. 14. Mr. Charles Thompson Ritchie, President of the Board of Trade.

15. Mr. Walter Hume Long, President of the Board of Agriculture. 16. Lord James, Q. C., Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. 17. Mr. Henry Chaplin, President