XII. 1822. CHAP. vent. Without following out farther the thread of the negotiations, which were now substantially decided, it is more material to show what were the secret views of the French diplomatists in this, for them, auspicious state of affairs. "The despatch of M. de Montmorency," said Chateaubriand to M. de Villèle, "will show you the conclusion of the affair of Spain, which has turned out entirely as you wished. This evening we are to have a conference, to determine on the mode of making known the sentiments of the Alliance to Europe. Russia is marvellously favourable; Austria is with us on this, though on other points inclined to the English policy; Prussia follows Austria. The wish of the powers is decidedly pronounced for a war with Spain. It is for you, my dear friend, to consider whether you ought not to seize the occasion, perhaps unique, to replace France in the rank of military powers; to restore the white cockade in a war, in short, almost without danger, to which the opinions of the Royalists and the army strongly incline. There is no question of the occupation of the Peninsula, but of a rapid movement which would restore power to the true Spaniards, and take away from you all disquietude for the future. The last despatches of M. Lagarde prove how easy that success would be. All continental Europe would be for us; and if England took umbrage, she would not even have time to throw herself on a colony. As to the Chambers, success covers everything. Doubtless commerce and the finances would suffer for a moment, M. de Vil- but nothing great can be done without some inconveniences. na, Oct. 31, To destroy a focus of Jacobinism, to re-establish a Bourgrès de Ve- bon on the throne by the arms of a Bourbon,—these are results which outweigh all considerations of a secondary nature." 1 1 Chateau briand to lèle, Vero 1822; Con rone, i. 144, 145. But while M. de Chateaubriand, M. de Montmorency, and the war party, were with reason congratulating themselves on the success of France at the Congress, very different views were entertained by Louis XVIII. XII. 1822. 23. de Villèle and M. de Villèle at Paris. They were sincerely pacific CHAP. in their ideas, and, not without reason, extremely apprehensive of the possible consequences of a war with Spain. It was not external, but internal, danger that Views of M. they dreaded. They were well aware that Spain, in its and Louis distracted state, would be wholly unable to withstand XVIII. the arms of France, if these arms were united; but who could answer for this unanimity prevailing in a war of opinion, when the French troops grouped round the white flag were to be met by the Spanish arrayed under the tricolor standards? The recent disasters of the Royalists in Spain had shown how little reliance was to be placed on their support in any serious conflict; and was there no reason to apprehend that, if the arms and the Liberal press of England were engaged on the side of the republicans in the Peninsula, a convulsion fatal to the reigning dynasty might ensue to the south of the Channel? These considerations weighed much both with the king and his Prime Minister; and although, on his return from the Congress, M. de Montmorency was made a duke, yet grave doubts were still entertained whether it was either prudent or safe to go into the measures agreed on by the Congress. They were confirmed in these opinions by the Duke of Wellington, who, on his way back from Verona, had a long and confidential interview with Louis XVIII. at Paris, in which he represented to him in the strongest manner the extreme danger which France would run in the event of a rupture, both from internal dissension and the loss of the alliance and moral support of England. The great personal influence of the Duke of Wellington, the services he had rendered to the royal cause, and the obvious weight of his argu- 1 Lam. vii. ments, produced such an effect, that they had well-nigh 107, 108; Cap. viii. overturned everything done at Verona, and detached 5,7 France from the alliance of the Continental sovereigns.1* * The duke's instructions on this occasion were as follows: "The Duke of Wellington may declare openly to his Majesty the King of France, that the CHAP. 1822. 24. The first effect it produced was to overturn M. de Montmorency, and place M. de Chateaubriand in his stead. So uneasy was the king at what the Duke of Secret cor- Wellington had represented, that he demanded a distinct explanation from M. de Montmorency of the causes of Villèle and complaint which he had against the Spanish government. respondence of M. de garde. The latter replied, "that the causes of difference between France and Spain were not of so precise a kind as to admit of an exact and special definition; that a new state of things had been formed by the relations of the two countries; that the opinions in the ascendant in Spain were such as to endanger his Majesty's dominions, and that France would rather incur all the risks of war than expose itself to the inconveniences of the other alternative." Meanwhile the journals in the interest of the respective ministers commenced a violent contest on the subject, the Journal des Debats maintaining the necessity of preserving peace, the Quotidienne the imperative duty of going to war. In this state of division, both in respect of public opinion and in his own Cabinet, the king, with the concurrence of M. de Villèle, adopted the questionable step of opening, through the Prime Minister, a secret correspondence with M. de Lagarde, the ambassador at Madrid, unknown to the Foreign Minister, in which he recommended a conciliatory course of policy, entirely at variance with what had been agreed upon at the Congress, and very nearly in accordance with the views of England on the subject. The idea of Louis XVIII., and which flattered his secret vanity, was, that 7, 10; Lam. Ferdinand VII. should follow his example, and give a constitution to his subjects,1 which might establish a representative monarchy in harmony with that existing to 1 Cap. viii. vii. 107, 108. Government of His Britannic Majesty has always been opposed to any foreign intervention in the internal affairs of Spain. The Spanish Government has given no cause of complaint to any power, and the defects of its constitution are a matter of internal politics, with which no foreign power has any title to interfere."-Mr CANNING'S Memorandum to the DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Nov. 4, 1822; CAPEFIGUE, viii. 5, 6. XII. the north of the Pyrenees. It never occurred to him CHAP. that, without the support of the allied bayonets, that constitution never would have been accepted in his own dominions.* 1822. 25. it in the and resig M. de Mont morency, ceeded by teaubriand. As soon as M. de Montmorency was made acquainted with this secret intrigue, which virtually superseded him in Debate on his own department in the most important branch of state Cabinet, policy, he insisted on a meeting of the Cabinet being called. nation of The point submitted to them was, whether a decided note prepared by M. de Montmorency, in accordance with who is sucwhat had been agreed on at Verona, and to which his M. de Chapersonal honour as well as the faith of France stood pledged, should be forwarded to Madrid, to supersede the conciliatory and temporising one prepared by M. de Villèle? A majority of the council approved of M. de Montmorency's note; in particular, Peyronnet and Clermont-Tonnerre were energetic in its support. The Duke of Belluno (Victor) strongly advocated the same side. He represented the state of opinion in the army, which he as war-minister had peculiar means of * The note of M. de Villèle approved of by Louis XVIII. set forth-" Since the revolution which occurred in Spain in April 1820, France, regardless of the dangers with which she herself was threatened by that revolution, has used its best endeavours to draw closer the bonds which unite the two kings, and to maintain the connections which unite the two people. But the influences which had led to the changes in the Spanish monarchy have become more powerful than the changes themselves, as it was easy to foresee would be the case. A constitution which King Ferdinand had neither recognised nor accepted in resuming his crown, was imposed upon him by a military insurrection. The natural consequence of that has been, that every discontented Spaniard has conceived himself entitled to seek by the same method an order of things more in harmony with his opinions and principles, and the use of force has caused it to be regarded as a right. Thence the movement of the guard at Madrid, the appearance of armed corps in different parts of Spain. The provinces adjoining France have been the principal theatre of that civil Thence arose the necessity on the part of France to take measures for its own security. The events which have taken place since the establishment of the army of observation at the foot of the Pyrenees have sufficiently justified the foresight of his Majesty in forming it. The precautions of France have appeared just to its allies; and the Continental powers have adopted the resolution to unite themselves to her, if it should become necessary, to maintain her dignity and repose. France would have been contented with a resolution at once so friendly and honourable to her; but Austria, Prussia, and war. XII. 1822. CHAP. knowing; that the example of the Spanish revolution was extremely dangerous for the throne of France; that the impression it had already produced upon the soldiers might prove prejudicial to the tranquillity of the country; that it was absolutely necessary to act, to extirpate by force that mania for military revolutions; that the army was well affected, and would become, in a campaign, devoted to the Bourbons, but that it was extremely dangerous to leave it at rest on the frontier. "Nothing," he added, " is so easy of corruption as a body of troops in a state of inaction: when they advance, they become animated with one spirit, and are incapable of treachery." On the other hand, M. de Villèle, M. de Lauriston, and M. de Corbière argued in favour of the pacific note, as likely to conciliate matters, and avoid the serious risks of a war of opinion, which might involve all Europe in con1 Cap. viii. flagration.1 The matter was still in suspense, and the issue doubtful, when Louis cut the matter short by declaring that the note of M. de Villèle appeared to him to express with more prudence than that of M. de Montmorency the opinion of his Cabinet. The consequence 11,14; Lam. vii. 108. 109. Russia have deemed it necessary to add to that act of the Alliance a manifes tation of their own sentiments. Diplomatic notes have in consequence been addressed to the representatives of these powers at Madrid, who will follow the instructions of their respective courts. As for you, M. le Comte, you will say that the government of the king is intimately united with his allies in the firm determination to repel by every means the revolutionary principle; and that it participates equally strongly with them in the desire which they feel that the noble Spanish nation may find a remedy of itself for the evils which afflict it-evils which are of a kind to disquiet the governments of Europe, and impose upon them precautions always painful. You will assure them that the people of the Peninsula, restored to tranquillity, will always find in their neighbours sincere and loyal friends. The succour of all kinds which France can dispose of in favour of Spain will always be offered to insure its happiness and increase its prosperity; but you will declare at the same time, that France will relax in none of its protective measures so long as Spain shall be torn by factions. His Majesty's government will not hesitate to recall you from Madrid, and to seek for guarantees in more effective dispositions, if his essential interests continue to be compromised, and if he loses all hope of an amelioration, which he still hopes from the sentiments which have so long united the French and Spaniards in the love of their kings and of a wise liberty."-Le President du Conseil du Ministres au M. le Comte De la Garde, Ambassadeur à Madrid, Paris, 25th Dec. 1822; LACRETELLE, Histoire de la Restauration, iii. 477-479. Pièces Justificatifs. |