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XII.

carry Ferdinand back to Cadiz rather than suffer him to CHAP. be conducted to Verona. The situation of France is not such as to oblige us to ask for permission for a war of 1822. invasion, as Austria was at Laybach; for we are under no necessity of declaring war at all, nor of asking for succour to carry it on if we do; and we could not admit of it, if it should lead to the passage of foreign troops through our territory. The opinion of our plenipotentiaries upon the question of what the Congress should determine on in regard to Spain is, that France is the sole power which should act with its troops, and that it must be the sole judge of when it is necessary to do so. The French plenipotentiaries must never consent that the Congress should prescribe the conduct which France should pursue in regard to Spain. They should accept of no pecuniary succour nor aid from the passage of troops through our territory. They should be firm in considering the Spanish question in its general aspect, and endeavour to obtain from the Congress a contingent treaty, honourable and advantageous to France, either Chateanfor the case of a war between herself and Spain, or for grès de Vethe case of the powers recognising the independence of 104." South America." 1

1

briand, Con

rone, i. 102,

ning's in

to Duke of

On the other hand, the instructions of England to 19. her plenipotentiary were equally decided, and such as Mr Canapparently to render almost unavoidable a rupture be- structions tween the two powers. Lord Londonderry, before his Wellingdeath, had drawn up a note for our plenipotentiaries, Sept. 27, which repudiated, in the strongest manner, any inter- 1822. ference in the domestic concerns of Spain. Mr Canning had only been forty-eight hours in office when he was

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* "With respect to Spain, there seems nothing to add to, or vary, in the course of policy hitherto pursued. Solicitude for the royal family, observance of our engagements with Portugal, and a rigid abstinence from any interference in the internal affairs of that country, must be considered as forming the limits of his Majesty's policy."-Marquis LONDONDERRY'S Instructions, transferred to the Duke of Wellington, Sept. 14, 1822. Annual Register, 1822, p. 96. (Public Documents.)

ton.

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CHAP. called on to give his instructions to the Duke of Wellington, who was appointed successor to that lamented nobleman as the plenipotentiary of England; but he had no difficulty in at once drawing them up. His private inclination, not less than his public duty, led him to adhere to the line marked out by Lord Londonderry. His instructions to Wellington, accordingly, on this point were, "If there be a determined project to interfere, by force or by menace, in the present struggle in Spain, so conning's In- vinced are his Majesty's Ministers of the uselessness and to Welling- danger of any such interference, so objectionable does it ton, Sept: appear to them in principle, as well as utterly impractiAnn. Reg. cable in execution, that, when the necessity arises—or, I would rather say, when an opportunity presents itself—I am to instruct your Grace at once frankly and decidedly to declare, that to any such interference his Majesty will not be a party."1

1 Mr Can

structions

27, 1822;

1822, 97;

Public Do

cuments, and Ann. Hist. v.

683.

20.

Measures

the majority

gress on the subject.

When instructions so directly at variance were given to the English and French plenipotentiaries upon a great adopted by public question, on which an instant decision required to of the Con- be taken by the powers immediately concerned, it need not be said that the peace of Europe was seriously threatened. In effect, the divergence of opinion upon this point, as well as the ulterior one of recognising the independence of the revolted colonies in South America, was so great, that it probably would have been broken, and a calamitous war ensued, if the other powers had been less unanimous and decided than they were in supporting the French view of the necessity of an armed intervention. The Emperor Alexander, from the first, both officially through his plenipotentiaries, and privately in society, expressed his opinion in the strongest manner on this subject, and declared his readiness to support any measures which France might deem essential for its safety. Prussia adopted the same views: the obligations contracted in 1813 rendered no other course practicable

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to the Cabinet of Berlin. Austria was more doubtful: CHAP. Metternich had a mortal dread of the northern Colossus, and in secret urged M. de Villèle to adopt no measures which should give the Emperor of Russia a pretext for again moving his troops across Germany. But as he was fully impressed with the danger to Europe from the revolutionary principles acted upon in Spain, and he had himself coerced them in the most vigorous manner in Italy, he could not ostensibly deviate from the other Continental powers on a subject so vital to their common welfare. Accordingly, after several conferences, in the course of which the Duke of Wellington strongly insisted on the necessity of limiting their interference with Spain to resistance to its external aggressions or attempts at verbal, Oct. propagandism, but not attempting any armed interference 20, and Nov. with its domestic concerns, the matter came to this, that Ann. Hist. the Duke of Wellington refused to sign the procès ver- Chateaubaux of the conference, when the opinions of the other Congrès de powers were expressed in favour of an intervention, in 104, 120. certain events, in the Peninsula.1

1 Procès

17, 1822;

v. 683, 685;

briand,

Verone, i.

proposed by

the Conti

powers and

The mode of deliberating on this subject was very 21. peculiar, but well calculated to cut short the usual eva- Questions sions and subterfuges of diplomatic intercourse. France, France, and through its minister, proposed three questions to the answers of Congress, which were as follows: "1. In case France nental should find herself under the necessity of recalling her England. ambassador from Madrid, and interrupting all diplomatic relations with Spain, are the great powers disposed to adopt similar steps, and to break off their intercourse with that country also? 2. If war should break out between France and Spain, in what way, and by what acts, would the great powers give France their moral support, in such a manner as to inspire a salutary terror into the revolutionists of all countries? 3. What, in fine, are the intentions of the great powers in regard to the extent of the material succour

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CHAP. which they are disposed to give to France, in case, on her requisition, such assistance might appear necessary?" To these questions "the three Continental powers answered, on the 30th October, that they would follow the example of France in respect to their diplomatic relations; that they would take the same attitude which France took; and that they would give all the succour of which it might stand in need. A treaty was to fix the period and mode of that co-operation." The Duke of Wellington answered, on the part of Great Britain, "that having no information as to the causes of this misunderstanding, and not being in a situation to form a judgment on the hypothetical case put, it was impossible for him to answer any of the questions." It was afterwards agreed that, instead of a joint note being prepared by the four Continental powers, and signed by their respective plenipotentiaries, each should to address a separate note to the Cabinet of Madrid of the same general import, but containing in detail the views by which they were severally actuated; which was accordof France; ingly done while the Duke of Wellington addressed a v. 684,686. note to the Congress, stating the reasons why his Government abstained from any such intervention.1 *

ton's Memo

randum, Nov. 12,

1822, and

Questions

Ann. Hist.

The notes of the four Continental powers were all of the same import; that of Prussia was the most explicit, and was in these terms: "The Prussian Government sees with grief the Spanish Government enter upon a career which menaces the tranquillity of Europe; it recollects the title to the admiration of the world which the Spanish nation has given during so many ages, and the heroic perseverance with which it has triumphed over the ambitious and oppressive efforts of the usurper of the throne of France. The moral state of Spain is such at present, that the foreign powers must necessarily find themselves disturbed by it. Doctrines subversive of all social order are there openly preached and protected; daily insults against all the sovereigns of Europe fill its journals with impunity. The clubs of Spain have their emissaries in all quarters, to associate with their dark designs conspirators in every country against the public order and the legitimate authority. The inevitable effect of these disorders is seen in the interruption of the relations between France and Spain. The irritation to which it gives rise is such as to inspire the most serious alarm as to the preservation of peace between the two countries. That consideration itself would suffice to determine the united sovereigns to break silence on a state of things which from day to day threatens to compromise the tranquillity of Europe. It is not for foreign powers to determine what institutions answer best for the character, manners, and real necessities of the Spanish nation; but it belongs to them undoubt

CHAP.

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22.

what had

The business of the Congress at Verona was now concluded, and it had turned out entirely to the advantage of France; for not only had she gained the consent of all the Continental states to the policy which she Views of deemed it expedient to adopt, but, what was of equal occurred in importance, she had been allowed to remain the judge of this Conthat policy the other powers had agreed to follow in her wake, not take the lead. For the first time for a very long period, England found herself isolated on the Continent, and doomed to be the impotent spectator of operations which she neither approved of nor could pre

edly to judge of the effects which experience has taught them such changes produce upon themselves, and to fix their determination and future position in regard to Spain on these considerations."-CHATEAUBRIAND, Congrès de Verone, i. 130, 131.

On the other hand, the Duke of Wellington, in his note to the Continental sovereigns, said, "The origin, circumstances, and consequences of the Spanish Revolution, the existing state of affairs in Spain, and the conduct of those who have been at the head of the Spanish Government, may have endangered the safety of other countries, and may have excited the uneasiness of the Governments whose Ministers I am now addressing, and those Governments may think it necessary to address the Spanish Government upon the topics referred to in their despatches. But I would request those Ministers to consider whether the measures now proposed are calculated to allay the irritation against France, and to prevent a possible rupture, and whether they might not with advantage be delayed to a later period. They are certainly calculated to irritate the Government of Spain; to afford ground for a belief that advantage has been taken of the irritation which subsists between that Government and France to call down upon Spain the power of the Alliance, and thus to embarrass still more the difficult position of the French Government. His Majesty's Government is of opinion, that to animadvert upon the internal transactions of an independent state, unless such transactions affect the essential interests of his Majesty's subjects, is inconsistent with those principles on which his Majesty has invariably acted on all questions concerning the internal concerns of other countries; that such animadversions, if made, must involve his Majesty in serious responsibility if they should produce any effect, and must irritate if they should not ; and if addressed, as proposed, to the Spanish Government, are likely to be injurious to the best interests of Spain, and to produce the worst consequences upon the probable discussion between that country and France. The King's Government must therefore decline to advise his Majesty to hold a common language with his allies upon this occasion; and it is so necessary for his Majesty not to be supposed to participate in a measure of this description, and calculated to produce such consequences, that his Government must equally refrain from advising his Majesty to direct that any communication should be made to the Spanish Government on the subject of its relations with France."-Duke of WELLINGTON'S Note to the Allied Powers, 20th November 1822; Annual Register, 1822, p. 101. (Public Documents.)

gress.

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