and Amos Dean, Union, 1826, he engaged in founding the Albany Law School, and continued as one of its lecturers for a period of nearly twenty years, preparing in the meantime six volumes of reports of criminal cases and assisting in the editing of the fifth edition of the Revised Statutes of the State. He was one of the earliest advocates of law reform. While visiting Europe in 1853 when such reforms were under consideration in England, he addressed the Law Reform Club at its annual meeting on the invitation of Lord Brougham, explaining the results of his experience on the bench, as to the changes that had been made in this State, more particularly as to the administration of law and equity in the same court. From 1855 up to the time of his death, Judge Parker was actively engaged in the practice of his profession and recognized as one of the leaders of the bar of the State, being engaged in many of the most important cases in the State and federal courts. Of Amos Dean, 1826, we have spoken in connection with the founding of the Albany Law School in collaboration with two other eminent graduates of Union. This school in 1873 became a part of Union University, and it is very largely to the impetus given under the management of Amos Dean that it early attained a high reputation as a school of law. William F. Allen, of 1826, was for sixteen years a justice of the Supreme Court, for two terms comptroller of the State and for eight years a judge of the Court of Appeals. It was well said of him "he filled a large space in the annals of the State." The qualities which characterized him were said by those who knew him most intimately to have been "a firm, intelligent and comprehensive grasp of the most difficult questions in the law, and the wisdom which he brought to bear upon the solution of legal controversies," as well as the "facility with which he could comprehend and formulate the principles applicable to the most difficult and complicated cases, and above all, his independence of judicial judgment and fearlessness with which he adhered to and enforced his conviction of the right," and it was not an undeserved tribute that through an extended life he was an honor to his race, to his profession of the law and to his judicial office." Rufus W. Peckham, for many years justice of the Supreme Court in the Third Judicial Department and at the time of his deccase in 1873 a member of the Court of Appeals, was of 1827. No more fitting tribute can be paid his memory than that of the memorial handed down at the opening of the court at its first meeting after the disaster by which he came to his death. Chief Judge Church, on behalf of himself and his associates, said, "Judge Peckham has for many years been identified with the judiciary of the State. His judicial career began as a judge of the Supreme Court, to which he was elected in the district where he had spent the whole of his professional life, and the qualities which distinguished him as a judge in that position led to his nomination and election as an associate judge of this court on its organization. His firmness, his learning and his fearlessness and independence in maintaining his convictions, guided always by a strong sense of justice, which was a distinguishing feature of his character, won the confidence and respect of the bar and bench, and of all with whom he was associated." Ward Hunt, of 1828, attained to the high dignity and responsibility of associate justice of the United States Supreme Court after having served as associate and chief judge of the Court of Appeals and commissioner of appeals. George F. Comstock, of 1834, came to the bar in 1837 and entered upon the practice of his profession at Syracuse. In 1847 he became reporter of the Court of Appeals for a term of three years, and in 1856 a judge of the Court of Appeals to fill vacancy; was chief judge of the court 1860 to 1862. "His opinions are all marked with the stamp of eminent ability, but his reputation as a judge rests chiefly upon his opinions in a few cases which involve the determination of great questions and the evolution and application of principles of permanent value. These opinions he elaborated with the greatest care and exhibited great logical power, the most discriminating analysis and profound learning." He practised his profession with marked success after his retirement from the bench, and up to his death in 1892. For many years John K. Porter, distinguished as an advocate, and bearing a high reputation as a judge of the court of last resort, was of 1837. a member of the leading law firm in the city of Albany, he conducted a very large business as counsel in the higher courts and achieved a reputation in the argument of causes second to that of no lawyer in the State. For a term of years, beginning with 1865, he was a member of the Court of Appeals, and upon his retirement became the head of one of the leading firms in the city of New York. He was best known to the public by reason of his participation in the action of Tilton against Beecher, in which he won many professional laurels, and to the country at large from having been counsel upon the trial of the assassin Guiteau for the murder of President Garfield. A hard student, the unremitting labors of this trial, extending over weeks and months, undermined his constitution, and ruined health necessitated his retirement from the bar. He was brilliant, persuasive and logical as a lawyer, and his opinions are clear, pointed and concise, indicating a vigorous intellect trained to the duties of the bar and the bench. His standing with his brethren at the bar is, perhaps, best illustrated by the fact that he was chosen as the first president of the New York State Bar Association upon its organization in 1876, and elected for a second term the following year. Those in attendance upon these Centennial exercises have listened to a commemorative address from George F. Danforth, of 1840. To those who have had that pleasure it is unnecessary to recall either his vigorous personality or ability as an orator. To the wider circle of graduates of the college he is known as a loyal son of Union, for whom a successful career at the bar was followed by a term of fourteen years of service in the Court of Appeals, from which he retired alike to the regret of the bar and bench only by reason of the constitutional limitation upon the term of his office. He was selected by a unanimous vote of his associates to preside over the deliberations of the commission appointed in 1890 to revise the judiciary article of the Constitution and did much toward shaping the report which was ultimately substantially adopted by the recent Constitutional Convention. Orsamus Cole, of the class of 1843, was for many years chief justice of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, and as such attained a high reputation as a jurist, Robert Earl, of 1845, retired from a seat upon the bench of the Court of Appeals at the close of 1894. after a continuous judicial service in that court of nearly twenty-five years, having served a longer period in that tribunal than any other judge sitting upon that bench since the organization of the court. Judge Earl was admitted to practice in 1848, and remained at the bar until 1869, serving during that period as county judge of his county. He first took his seat upon the bench of the Court of Appeals in 1870. He later became a member of the Commission of Appeals, and, upon the dissolution of that body, was again elected a member of the court. He acted as chief judge in 1870 and 1892. His opinions appear in the New York reports, beginning with volume 41 and ending with volume 144, and number over 1400. If published by themselves, it is said they would make about eighteen volumes of the Court of Appeals reports. He has thus impressed himself in a most striking manner upon the developement of the law in this State for the past quarter of a century, since their quality fully equals the quantity. The unusual courtesy was extended him upon his retirement from the court of the expression of the views of the judges in an official minute, and their appreciation and that of the bar cannot better be expressed than by an extract from that proceeding. They say: Especially we shall miss him at the consultation table, where the capacity to see swiftly, grasp accurately and hold firmly the rapid succession of facts and doctrines involved in the cases as they pass in review, finds its most useful field of effort. He held his place there, a sentinel never asleep, a patrol always on the alert, a guard not to be eluded; and yet none of us, even when stopped or challenged, ever had reason to regret the manner of the vigilance. For, however earnest the warn Hamilton Harris, of 1841, is, perhaps, among all the names mentioned, more especially a representative of the bar as apart from the bench. Nearly all the sons of Union who have been distinguished as lawyers have likewise achieved success as judges. But aside from the office of State Senator, Mr. Harris has aspired to no official position. For very many years he has been closely identified with the history of the bar of the State, and his industry, ability and learning have been availed of by hundreds of suitors in trial courts and courts of last resort, and no lawyer in the State has a more substantial clientage nor is better worthy of its confidence. The easy and deliberate manner of Mr. Harris in the trial courts recalls the anecdotes related of Sir James Scarlett, who was said, during the progressing, or relentless the criticism, there was always of a trial, to regard the proceedings with apparent indifference, but, as in fact, giving the closest attention to the salient features, with regard to which his adversary found him a most thoroughly equipped and dangerous adversary. Nothing of fact or law escapes his notice, and in concise and convincing terms, with no attempt at oratory, every point is presented in the clearest and most convincing terms to court and jury. No one has greater pride in his profession nor takes greater interest in affairs appertaining to the advancement of the educational interests of the State. Mr. Harris is not a stranger to the delights of literature, and finds relief from most painstaking and successful labor at the bar among the shelves of a carefully selected library. kindness and courtesy behind it, and a zeal which fully subordinated pride of opinion to the sound and stable reputation of the court." John T. Hoffman, of 1846, is best known in other fields than the law. He was, nevertheless, a man of standing at the bar, and, as recorder of the city of New York, obtained a high reputation for a fearless and independent discharge of his judicial duties. Eighteen hundred and forty-six graduated Silas W. Sanderson, for some time chief justice of the Supreme Court of California, and who for many years occupied a commanding position at the bar of that State, and William H. King, a lawyer of high standing and reputation in his adopted city of Chicago, where, for a considerable period of time, he was president of the association of the bar of that city. And here we have arrived at the close of the first half century, and, with a single exception, leave the record from 1847 to be made up at a later day; not but that a number of the sons of Union have distinguished themselves at the bar and served faithfully and well upon the bench, but for the reason that we now come to deal more fully with our contemporaries, many of whom have established their reputation, some of whom have it yet to make, and further suggestion might seem invidious. The exception noted is that of Samuel Hand, of 1851, who passed away nearly a decade since at the comparatively early age of fifty-three. From 1859, when Mr. Hand located at Albany, his reputation as a lawyer was at once established throughout the State. As a member of the famous firm of Cagger, Porter & Hand, he developed his capacity for work, his methods of thorough preparation, and his ability to grasp and expound intricate questions of law. Up to the time of his death, except the short interval during which he was a judge of the Court of Appeals in 1878, he was the leading counsel at the bar of that court, a position for which he was admirably fitted not only by his knowledge of the law but by reason of his ability to grasp complicated facts and to apply legal principles thereto. During these years he served a short period as State reporter, publishing six volumes of the New York reports. Chief Judge Ruger said of him with the approval of the members of the Court of Appeals: "His most enduring claim to distinction must, we think, rest mainly upon the reputation made by him as an advocate at the bar of this court, where, for nearly a quarter of a century, he occupied a commanding position and was more extensively employed in the argument of cases than any other individual practitioner. The confidence reposed by his clients in his ability was fully justified by the great power and varied resources which he brought to bear in the discharge of his professional engagements and the success which usually attended his labors. His forensic efforts were always distinguished by thoroughness of preparation, perfect and expert knowledge of the case in hand, a clear and comprehensive appreciation of the legal questions involved, and of the reason and philosophy of the rules bearing upon them, a logical and felicitous method of arrangement and presentation which enabled him to exhibit in the strongest light the favorable features of his theme, and to anticipate and counteract those of his adversary." He was the second president of the New York State Bar Association, serving two terms in that capacity. The roll of lawyers and jurists who graduated from Union during the first half century of her existence numbers also Alfred Conkling, of 1810, United States minister to Mexico and district judge Northern District of New York; John W. Edmonds, of 1816, circuit judge of the First Circuit in 1845 and justice of the Supreme Court in 1847; Josiah Sutherland, of 1824, justice of the Supreme Court in 1857; Enoch H. Rosekrans, of 1826, justice of the Supreme Court in 1855, and William W. Campbell, of 1827, judge of the Superior Court and justice of the Supreme Court. Eighteen hundred and twenty-six graduated Alexander W. Bradford, commissioner to revise the laws, and surrogate of the county of New York; Hamilton W. Robinson, judge of the New York Common Pleas, and Gilbert M. Speir, judge of the Superior Court. Eighteen hundred and thirty-three gave to the Supreme Court bench Joseph Mullin and Daniel Pratt; 1835, James C. Smith, for a long time presiding justice in the General Term of the Supreme Court; 1836, Peter S. Danforth and William Fullerton of the Supreme Court bench; 1839, John N. Pettit, circuit judge in Indiana, and Hooper C. Van Vorst of the Common Pleas and Superior Court; 1841, Joseph Potter of the Supreme Court, and 1842, Joseph W. Jackson, justice of the same court. Union has, therefore, in addition to a brilliant array of lawyers whose name is legion, and whose services at the bar have been rendered with ability, fidelity and integrity second to none, seen of her graduates up to 1846 upon the bench, a chief justice of the Supreme Court under the Constitution previous to 1846, three chief judges of the Court of Appeals, eight associate judges of that court, four of the five commissioners of appeals, and the list is not complete without the enumeration of numerous judges and justices of Superior Courts, and three chief justices of the highest courts of other States. Thus has the college discharged its functions as an educator of the men who are described by the prince of Roman orators as "learned in the laws and that general usage which private persons observe in their intercourse in the community, who can give an answer on any point, can plead and take precautions for their client," and from among whom are selected the magistrates of the commonwealth, whose duties are set forth in the quaint language of Bishop Horne to be, "when he goeth up to the Judgment Seat to put on righteousness as a beautiful robe and to render his tribunal a fit emblem of that eternal throne of which justice and judgment are the habitation.” No one can be better aware than the writer of this paper that justice has not been done to the alumni of Union who have pleaded at the bar or have administered justice from the bench. Lack of time, opportunity and sources of information can alone excuse the shortcomings of which he pleads guilty. He throws himself upon the mercy of the court, craving so light a sentence by way of just criticism as may be compatible with the character of the offense. To have selected from the large number of names of those who have graced the bench, those who might have been deemed most worthy of further mention, would have been a work of difficulty which could have been performed, with justice to those interested, by no expenditure of time or labor. To have selected a few for fuller mention would have appeared invidious. To have given the record of all might have been tedious. It has therefore been deemed best to leave those names as well as those of the distinguished members of the bar who have made a reputation for themselves and been an honor to the college to other annals, in which may be more fully recorded their ability, industry and integrity. ALBANY, N. Y. J. NEWTON FIERO. COMMENTS OF ENGLISH LEGAL PERIODICALS ON THE WILDE CASE. I' N America, in addition to the feelings of disgust which have arisen from the short printed reviews of the evidence in the Wilde trial, there has been great interest in the judge and lawyers who participated in this cause celebré. On this account a short review of the opinions of the English legal periodicals will prove attractive to the members of the American bar. The Law Times, in its editorial columns, says: "It is a long time since we had a trial so full of lessons as that of Taylor and Wilde for sodomy. Its judicial aspect is interesting. Mr. Justice Charles appeared to attach some weight, however small, in favor of the prisoner, to the intellectual and literary character of Wilde. Mr. Justice Wills was overpowered by the offensive nature of the case the intellectual and literary character of Wilde rather added to the beastly odor which arose to nostrils unused to such moral stinks. Here we find - different idiosyncracies influencing slightly but perceptibly the judicial mind in dealing with the same subject-matter. It is unavoidable. "The forensic aspects of the case are, perhaps, more interesting. The devotion of Sir Edward Clarke to the cause of a client who, at his best, was a moral monstrosity, is startling. It has been called heroic. Possibly it was- had it been successful, the achievement would have been phenomenal. But it failed, and the worthlessness of the cause which received self-sacrifice of every kind becomes pain fully prominent. The bar is supposed by the public to be a blood-sucking profession. How often its members work for nothing the public know not. Few barristers are grasping builders of fortunes. Very many vehemently support causes in which they have once embarked with absolute self-abandonment. Conspicuous instances may bring this home to the popular mind. "The forensic conflicts became personal. The ex-solicitor-general was fighting an up-hill fight leading a hope, if not forlorn, yet desperate. The solicitor-general had to ensure that the previous partial miscarriage of justice in the absence of the law officers should not become perfect when he was leading. He had to face a fierce and watchful defence to get rid of that dangerous glamor of "art" which Wilde himself impudently attempted to throw over the filthiness of his crimes, and which his advocate courageously supported by eloquence of which the theme was wholly unworthy; trimmings it was of the most deceptive but tawdry description, and we certainly do not complain that Sir Frank Lockwood was one whit too vehement, nor do we regret that he exercised the dubious right of reply, which defenders of prisoners grudge to the law officers of the crown. "The little lofty lectures of Sir Edward Clarke all round would be pardonable vanities, even if they had no forensic design. What he did in the longest period during 100 years in which one solicitor-general has held office is of no more importance than the fact that Sir Alfred Wills likes a room to himself. That he never exercised the right of reply affords no reason why no other law officer should. Of course it is satisfactory that he approved of the fairness and ability of Mr. Gill and of the cross-examination of Sir Frank Lockwood, whilst disapproving of his rhetorical descriptions of some of the evidence. Sir Edward, not without foundation, believed that this projection of his personality well forward would be effective, and the foreman of the jury, who is reported to have jerked out 'guilty' amidst snivelling gulps of emotion, no doubt felt a pang of regret for the ex-solicitor-general. The bar has to face this sort of influence as a real danger. The personal character, personal experiences and opinions of advocates are beside every issue to be tried, and it will be a sad day for the bar of England when the prestige of privy councilors, noble lords, and ex-law officers in practice fail to find opponents capable of rising above it, and so far as possible counteracting its influence upon the 'superstitious reverence' which is believed, in some instances, to possess the minds of jurymen." Then follows an article on "The Legal Points in Wilde's Case," thus: general interest connected with this case which it would be unsatisfactory to pass by unnoticed. We alluded in a previous number to the rule laid down by Reg. v. Carden (1879, 5 Q. B. Div.), which prevents a magistrate in a prosecution for criminal libel from receiving evidence in support of a plea of justification, and on which the magistrate acted in the preliminary proceedings in the Queensberry case, and pointed out both its unfairness and its anomalous character now that the legislature has repealed it in favor of newspaper proprietors. We revert to the subject now merely to express the hope that advantage will be taken of Sir John Leng's bill to amend and consolidate the law of libel which is at present before Parliament to repeal it altogether. Another point of importance raised by the Wilde case is as to the position of prisoners indicted at once for a statutory offence in regard to which they are, and a common-law offence in regard to which they are not, competent to testify. This question was first raised in Reg. v. Owen (1888, 58 L. T. Rep. 780). There the prisoner was tried on an indictment containing two counts, one for an indecent, and the other for a common assault. He gave evidence at the trial under section 20 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885, which makes a person charged with an indecent assault a compe*tent witness, but does not apply to a charge of common assault, denying that he had indecently assaulted the prosecutrix, but admitting that he had put his arm around her. He was acquitted on the statutory, but convicted on the common-law charge. There was evidence to support the conviction independent of the prisoner's statement. But the Court for Crown Cases Reserved held that his statement was an admission which could be used against him. This decision was impliedly followed by Mr. Justice Charles in the case of Wilde and Taylor. It clearly shows the necessity for the enactment of the Evidence in Criminal Cases Bill in order that these arbitrary distinctions between charges with reference to which prisoners are, and those with reference to which they are not, competent witnesses may be abolished. The present law is doubly unfair. If the prisoner's incidental evidence in regard to charges as to which he is not competent to testify is adverse to himself, it is available against him as an admission; if it is favorable, it merely ranks as an unsworn statement, to which little credit is attached. "Lastly, the question of the admissibility of the evidence of an accomplice, and the effect of the absence of corroboration has arisen, and the action of the judge in withdrawing the charge supported by such evidence only invited criticism. Mr. Darling, Q. C., in the Times, arraigns the judge as if he had acted beyond his power and contrary to practice in withdrawing the charge connected with Shelley. Roscoe, however, says in his Criminal Evidence (p. 123) that it has been repeatedly laid down that a conviction on the testimony of an accomplice uncorroborated is legal,' * but, while the law is thus fully established, the practice of judges is almost invariably to advise juries not to convict upon the evidence of an accomplice who is uncorroborated, and sometimes judges, where the testimony of the accomplice is the only evidence, take upon themselves to direct an acquittal of the prisoner.' 'The law,' he adds, 'remains in that anomalous state in which the bare existence of a principle is acknowledged, but which principle is constantly disapproved of and frequently violated.' "We think Mr. Justice Wills acted wisely in this instance, but it is desirable that the law and practice should be made uniform and consistent." The Law Times prints several letters sent to the editor, the first is on "The Function of Prosecuting counsel," as follows: "Linguam causis acuis (Horace Epist. i, 3, 1.23). SIR.-While admiring the generosity of the sentiment expressed by Sir E. Clarke, in his splendid oration in defense of Wilde at the Old Bailey, that the solicitor-general should act rather as a judge than as an advocate working for conviction, permit me to cite one or two historic instances which would decidedly induce the view that the reputation of the solicitor-general is, speaking historically, that of a lawyer with a decided talent for what Aristotle calls eristic speech. Thus, Solicitor-General Finch, on the trial of Sir Harry Vane, in June, 1661, indulged in such forensic amenities as openly declaring that 'the prisoner must be made a public sacrifice of.' In his peroration he exclaimed: 'What counsel does he think would dare speak for him (Sir H. Vane) in such a manifest case of treason, unless he could call down the heads of his fellow-traitors, Bradshaw or Coke, from the top of Westminster Hall.' In the last century it fell to the lot of a solicitorgeneral to deliver an invective, which for its scathing satire, as well as for its pregnant consequences, has acquired a permanent place in the pages of history. I refer, of course, to Wedderburn's invective against Franklin before the Privy Council, February, 1774. It is well known that the solicitor-general's sarcastic wit on this occasion produced such a profound resentment in its object that Franklin declared his resolution never again to wear the clothes he donned before the Privy Council till he signed the public Declaration of the Independence of America. It is unnecessary to add he kept his resolution, being one of the four American signatories to the Treaty of Paris, in January, 1783, by which his Britannic majesty declared the United States to be free, sovereign and independent. The incident |