their capacity to work. Any Sergeant or Corporal, found screening any person on any pretence, and acting contrary to the above Orders, will not only be reduced, but also punished.

The Colonel having indulged them hitherto, is resolved not to forgive such evil practices for the future.

Parole Blakeney.

ORDERS

Winchester, October 28, 1756.

As Colonel Washington is to hold conference with the Catawba Indians, betwixt eleven and twelve o'clock. He desires all the Officers in town to attend at that time. And during the time of conference, he orders a Sergeant and Drummer to beat through the Town, ordering all Soldiers and Towns people to use the Indians civilly and kindly; to avoid giving them liquor, and to be cautious what they speak before them: as all of them understand english, and ought not to be affronted.

SPEECH TO CAPTAIN JOHNNE, CATAWBAS"

[Winchester, October 28, 1756.] Capt. Johnne: We Desire you to go to the Cherokees, and tell them the Road is now clear and Open; We expected them to War last Spring, and love them So well, that Our Governor Sent Some few men to build a fort among them; but we are mighty Sorry that they hearken so much to lies French tell, as to break their promise and not come to war, when they might have got a great deal of honour; and kill'd a great many of the

"The Catawbas were one of the eight Indian nations of North America discovered by the Europeans in the seventeenth century. Their region lay southward of the Tuscaroras, between the Yadkin and Catawba Rivers. They were brave, but not aggressive, in warfare, and although at one time they belonged to the powerful league of southern Indians who were determined to extirpate the whites, later on they allied themselves with the English and remained stanch friends to them ever after.Hamilton's Letters to Washington.

French, whose hearts are false, and rotten as an old Stump. If they Continue to Listen to What the French Say much longer they will have great cause to be sorry, as the French have no Match locks, pow'd and Lead but what they got from King George our father, before the War began and that will soon be out; when they will get no more, and all the French Indians will be starving with Cold, and must take to Bows and Arrows again for want of Ammunition.

Tell them we long to Shake hands with them;

Let them get their knives and tomhawkes Sharpe, we will go before them, and show them the way to honour, Scalps, prisoners, and money Enough, We are mighty sorry they stay at home idle, when they should go to War, and become great men, and a terror and dread to their Enemies. Tell them they shall have Victuals enough, and used very kindly.

REMARKS ON THE COUNCIL OF WAR 18

[November 5, 1756.]

Upon receiving orders from His Honor Governor Dinwiddie to hold a Council of War upon the necessity of continuing or discontinuing Fort Cumberland, I immediately directed Lt. Col. Stephen (it being impracticable to attend myself, while absent on a tour reviewing the southern frontiers) to summon the officers of that Fort and the neighboring Garrisons to take the affair into their serious consideration. Their sentiments in my opinion are fully and impartially delivered on the other side, both in respect of its condition, situation and importance, as respecting Virginia, and the provinces of

18 The proceedings of this council (at which Washington was not present) held October 30, at Fort Cumberland, and of which Lieut. Col. Adam Stephen was president, are in the Washington Papers. Ford prints them in volume 1, page 36. They are also printed in Hamilton's Letters to Washington; but Washington's remarks are quite understandable without the proceedings.

Pennsylvania and Maryland in general. The situation of Fort Cumberland is extremely unsuitable for defence, and in no ways fit for fortification; and a fort some-where in that neighbourhood rather more advanced to the westward, well-fortified and strongly garrisoned wou'd contribute much to the mutual safety and interest of these three Colonies.

Because it secures the only gap of the Alleghany at present made passable for wheel-carriages and which wou'd forward an Expedition to the Ohio. Now wou'd the three Colonies consent to furnish proportionable supplies for so beneficial and salutary a design; I shou'd think it highly expedient to maintain that pass by erecting a Fortress of strength towards the Little Meadows, in advance to the Enemy, which wou'd give us yet more advantages and Fort Cumberland wou'd still answer its present purposes without attempting its improvement while covered by the other. Or should Virginia herself take the weight of this Enterprize; or could it be accomplished by any means whatever, I shou'd be extremely fond of the expedient. But to view Fort Cumberland in its present defenceless posture, relative to Virginia in particular, and at this gloomy juncture of affairs; I can not entertain very favourable sentiments of supporting it, for these reasons, vizt. 1st. 'Tis evident the Maryland Assembly have given up, all their lands above the Tonollaways, by building Fort Frederick below, ordering in the Inhabitants above, and withdrawing their Troops from Fort Cumberland. From them we may expect small succours, and what hope we may have of Pennsylvanias aid towards this salutary purpose, I am yet to learn. They have large and extensive frontiers, and have hitherto acted on the Defensive.

2ly. Fort Cumberland lying in the province of Maryland and remote from our Settlements, can of course contribute little to their protection, without a numerous garrison is kept

therein to detach strong parties to reconnoiter at a distance, and waylay the enemy almost at their own homes; as there are various paths that lead to the inhabitants, without coming near Fort Cumberland.

3ly. Fort Cumberland being in Maryland, it prevents a great part of our Force from acting there; in consequence of an Act of Assembly, prohibiting those Troops to march out of the Colony. These forces, thus restricted are to be discharged the 1st December; by which means not only Fort Cumberland, but many other places will be rendered so weak (without immediate supplies; and how easily these are obtained, I appeal to sad experience!) that their conquest wou'd be easy, if attempted. Lastly. As to the works, they are already well described, as quite insufficient to resist a common swivel; and must require new improvement, if continued which wou'd be better be bestowed on a new and more suitable situation; and without the conjunction of the two provinces to carry on this proposal, it wou'd be next to impossible for Virginia (which has hitherto defrayed the charge and refuses any further supplies for that purpose) to maintain and support His Majesty's fort under their present feeble force. For by putting a Garrison there of strength requisite to defend it, and keep up the difficult communication with the inhabitants at so great a distance wou'd employ more than half our men, and of consequence unguard the rest of our frontiers.

As to the Address of the Council to me for reinforcement, they must have known that it was out of my power to grant it. The Garrison at that place was appointed in consequence of a former council of war; and a large proportion of our force alloted to act on the defensive there. Whilst the remainder were divided for the protection of other places; which wou'd be equally unadvisable to leave open and exposed.

Upon the whole, were it at any other time than this, knowing the weakness of our strength doubting the assistance of our neighbours, and dreading the consequence of leaving the place longer exposed, altho' great part of the Stores is already removed, I shou'd vote for demolishing it. But the affair being of great importance, I only offer my sentiments; and submit to his Honor the Governor and the approaching Assembly, for a determination of the case.

LOCATION OF THE FORTS

[November 9, 1756.]

A Plan of the Number of Forts, and strength necessary to each extending entirely across our Frontiers, from South to

North.

19 Spelled indifferently Dickinson's, Dickersons, or Dickenson's.