and the treatment of his whimsicalities as a thing 'past and fled,' will hardly appear either very pointless, or impossibly outré, to any one who has read Swift's Death of Partridge: nor is every expression of a writer like Horace to be set down as spoken in sober earnest unless he himself apprizes us that he jests. But however this may be judged of, the reader will please to bear in mind, that the weight of the conjecture, if any, is on the side of simplification of a real though unimportant perplexity.

In the answer which the author supposes to be rendered to the question-' Quid TU? Nullane,' &c., the reading et, as distinguished from Aldus Manutius's 'haud,' has the unquestionable sanction of the MSS.; and yet the sentiment is enfeebled by it, whether we suppose the reply to proceed from Horace directly, or from the character which we have imagined him to assume for the moment. This may perhaps be relieved by understanding et to be taken in sole connexion with fortasse, and including both in parenthesis; when the sense would run-'yes, others (and tis a chance if) of less magnitude.' But query without this refinement, may not minora mean more paltry, more petty-of a lower grade? And it must be admitted that some of the faults brought forward in the preceding verses are somewhat childish. This would certainly be an undignified confession, if understood, in the usual way, as the direct reply of him who is about to lecture so gravely upon morals, (although perhaps not more undignified than some

of the previous strictures commonly attributed to Horace propria persona): but taken as a suggestion of what must be the answer of the backbiter if he speaks truly, it harmonizes well with our previous theory.

And be it observed that Kirchner does in fact regard the sentence, not as uttered by the party interrogated, but as ironically suggested by the questioner. This is important even although he does so evidently in order to cover the difficulty of the nonadversative et, which we have just now endeavoured to remove by a more simple process: for while the objections which Orellius makes to the extent to which he pushes his supposition are undoubtedly valid, still the name of such an acute critic as Kirchner must mitigate one of the counts, at all events, of the indictment for innovation which is probably by this time beginning to swell to a monster compass against us.

6

MENIUS ABSENTEM NOVIUM CUM CARPERET, 'HEUS TU,' QUIDAM AIT, IGNORAS TE? AN UT IGNOTUM DARE NOBIS VERBA PUTAS?' 'EGOMET MÎ IGNOSCO,' MENIUS INQUIT. SER. I. III. 21–3.

A VERY pointless reply of Mænius, as generally understood, and irrelevant withal. But if it be true that gentle dulness ever loves a joke,' perhaps it will here gently permit itself to be converted into one. Let us now suppose the following dialogue:

เ

Ques. Ignoras te?' Ans. 'Ig-nosco mî.' Ques. An ut ignotum nobis,' &c.? Ans. (may be supposed) • Ignotum est mî.' Mænius admits the soft impeachment of being a practical stranger to the adage · Γνώθι σεαυτόν, in terms which imply a jestingly complacent ignoring of his own faults. Though ignotus in the latter sense could not be applied to a person, (and therefore, instead of 'Ignotus sum mî,' an impersonal form is here employed, as in Ter. Adel. III. 4. 28.-" Ignotum est, creditum est," &c.), yet the common participial form is used by Hirtius, (a respectable classical writer, and the same who eventually became one of the two last of the Roman Republican Consuls, properly so called), in Bell. Gall. 31

"tamen sæpe a se (Julio Cæsare) fugatis, pulsis, perterritisque et vitam concessam, et ignota peccata," &c. Some puns are so exceedingly bad that they amuse as much as the best; though from a different And thus the jest here would inevitably recoil upon Mænius himself, and all such characters as he represents.

cause.

NAM VITIIS NEMO SINE NASCITUR: OPTIMUS ILLE EST
QUI MINIMIS Urgetur.

SER. I. III. 68-9.

THE singularly meagre sentiment which general consent attributes, by an unaccountable oversight, to the latter member of the above sentence, is held over for

examination in Section IV., which shall be reserved exclusively for the discussion of a certain class of propositions to which this seems to belong. Lest however the reader may too hastily imagine that there cannot be anything very particular in the case, it is desirable that he should here just consider for a moment what it is that the usual version of the passage exactly means-" He is best who is cumbered by least faults"-that is- Every man is in proportion better than if he were worse.' Is this a sentiment worthy of a Roman poet-philosopher? At the lowest estimate, is it in keeping with the plain practical good sense of Horace? It is probable, on the contrary, that there is no reader who, when his attention has been once called to the place, would not desire to see the sense otherwise vindicated, and particularly if this can be effected without any strain of text or context. But whether such hope can be realized must for the present remain a depending issue.

PAULUM DELIQUIT AMICUS,

(QUOD NISI CONCEDAS HABEARE INSUAVIS, ACERBUS,) (QUOD NISI CONCEDAS HABEARE INSUAVIS), ACERBUS ODISTI ET FUGIS, UT RUSONEM DEBITOR ÆRIS:

}

SER. I. III. 84-6.

WHILE it must be granted that some of the commentators have much assisted an unembarrassed construction by suggesting the parenthetic relation of

the clause which is accordingly so printed here, yet a like measure of approbation is not due to their invariable exposition of its meaning, which is thus paraphrased by Orellius, speaking with the general voice-" Quod nisi condones et ignoscas, merito te omnes nominabunt intractabilem et morosum."The phrase to forgive a fault' is susceptible (independently of any particular language) of either a literal or a figurative acceptation. In the former sense, the relation of a person to (or in favour of) whom the mental action passes must, to complete the sense, be likewise expressed; and for this the Latin language has duly provided in such phrases as 'concedere alicui peccata,' Cic. &c.: in the latter the fault itself is (for compendium) personified, and its representative word must therefore appear in the case-form of the person-word, as in the expression 'concedere peccatis,' Cic. &c. This rule is not the dictum of an individual, but the sum of the principles derivable from the whole examples given in such cases; and is manifestly founded in most natural associations. With it, however, the preceding paraphrase of our parenthesis is wholly inconsistent. No example whatsoever occurs of the omission of the oblique case-form of the person-word where the 'fault' implied is the literal object of the action: still less, if possible, of its not assuming the person-case, (as settled by the rule in that instance provided), if its relation to the verb be figurative. Therefore, quod concedere,' in the sense of to pardon which, must, in