Bond.

BILLS AND NOTES-Continued.

1. Contract of drawer of bill of exchange.—By the act of drawing and issuing a bill of exchange, the drawer contracts that it will be accepted and paid according to its terms, and that if it is not he will pay it. Cummings v. Kent, 92.

2. How liability of drawer fixed.-The liability of the drawer of a bill of exchange is fixed by the due presentation, demand, and notice of dishonor. Id. 92.

3. Contemporaneous parol agreement inadmissible.—Evidence of a parol agreement, prior to or contemporaneous with the drawing and delivery of a bill of e change, that the drawer is not to be liable as such, is inadmissible. Id. 92.

4. Same.-Cummings was indebted to Kent. Chamberlain was indebted to Cummings in the same amount and more. Cummings drew bills of exchange upon Chamberlain in favor of Kent for the amount of his indebtedness to the latter, which were accepted but not paid. There were due presentation, demand, and notice of dishonor. In an action by Kent upon the bills, Cummings answered that Kent agreed to take the acceptances in payment of his claim against Cummings, and that the latter drew the bills only for the purpose of assigning to Kent his claim against Chamberlain. Upon the trial, Cummings offered to prove that prior to, and at the time of drawing the bills, there was a parol agreement that he was not to be liable thereon as drawer. Held, the evi. dence was properly excluded. Id. 92.

5. Acceptance of bill of exchange by agent.-The drawee of a bill of exchange, drawn by the " Kanawha & Ohio Coal Co.," was described in the bill as "John A. Robinson, Agt.," and it was accepted by him as "John A. Robinson, Agent K. & O. C. Co." Held, that the acceptance so made was the personal obligation of John A. Robinson, and that in a suit upon the acceptance by an indorsee against him, parol evidence was not admissible, in the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake, to show that the defendant so accepted the bill intending to bind the drawer as his principal, and that this fact was known to the plaintiff at the time it became the owner and holder of it. Robinson v. Kanawha Valley Bank,, 441.

BOND.

See GUARDIAN AND WARD; EXECUTOR, 3, 4, 6, 7.

1. Construed with reference to statutes in force when given.—The terms of an undertaking for an injunction, construed by the statutes in force at the time of giving the same, govern as to the liability of the sureties signing it. Krug v. Bishop, 221.

2. Dismissal of action, whether breach of injunction bond.—An injunction undertaking was given in accordance with section 5576 of the Revised Statutes, and was conditioned: "that the plaintiff shall pay to the defendants the damages which they or either may sustain by reason of the injunction in this action, if it be finally decided that the injunction ought not to have been granted." On motion of part of the defendants, and because co-defendants had not been served with summons, the court dismissed the action without prejudice to another action, and the

BOND-Continued.

Canvassing Board-Constitutional Law.

injunction was dissolved, and the costs were paid by plaintiff. There-
upon suit was brought, on the undertaking, for damages claimed by
reason of the injunction. Held, 1. Such dismissal of the action without
prejudice, and such dissolution of the injunction, do not constitute a
breach of the condition of the undertaking. 2. The sureties thereon
can not be required to pay damages for such injunction until it is “de-
cided that the injunction ought not to have been granted." Id. 221.
3. In action by solicitor of municipal corporation to enjoin misappropriation
of money. Where, under the provisions of section 1777 of the Revised
Statutes, a solicitor of a municipal corporation brings suit to enjoin the
misappropriation of money by the council, he is not required to give an
undertaking, and an injunction so allowed by a court of competent
jurisdiction, or a judge thereof, operates without such undertaking being
given; and the members of council, or any of them, violating the in-
junction after notice thereof has been served upon them, are liable to
be punished for the same as for a contempt of the authority of the court.
Forsythe v. Winans, 277.

4. Sureties on guardian's bond concluded by settlement in probate court.—
In an action upon a guardian's bond for the recovery of the amount
found due the wards upon a final settlement of the guardian's accounts
in the probate court, the sureties are concluded by the settlement, and
will not be heard, in the absence of fraud and collusion, to question its
correctness or to demand a rehearing of the accounts. Braiden v. Mer-
cer, 339.

CANVASSING BOARD. See ELECTIONS.

CASES APPROVED, FOLLOWED, DISTINGUISHED, ETC.—
Brown v. Hitchcock (36 Ohio St. 667).
Kellogg v. Ely (15 Ohio St. 60).
Agler, 486.

Followed, Mason v. Alexander, 319.
Distinguished, City of Columbus v.

Shillito v. Thacker (43 Ohio St. 63). Approved and followed, Wagner v.
Ziegler, 59.

CASES CITED. See TABLE OF CITED CASES, xiii.

CITIES AND VILLAGES. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

CITY SOLICITOR. See INJUNCTION.

CLERK OF COMMON PLEAS. See CONTEMPT OF LEGISLATIve Body.
COLLATERAL IMPEACHMENT. See JUDGMENT.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—

1. Article 13, section 1.—The act of the general assembly passed April 3,
1885 (82 Ohio L. 101-111), conferring certain corporate powers on cities
of the first grade of the first class, is one of a general, and not of a
special, nature; and, therefore, not in conflict with article 13, section 1,
of the constitution, prohibiting the passage of special acts conferring
such powers. State er rel. Attorney-General v. Hawkins, 98.

2. Article 4, section 1.-The power conferred on the governor of the state

Constitutional Law.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Continued.

by section 1872 of the Revised Statutes, as amended by said act, to re-
move any members of the board of police commissioners, is administra-
tive, and not judicial, in its nature; and, therefore, not in conflict with
article 4, section 1, of the constitution, conferring judicial power on the
courts of the state. Id. 98.

3. Article 13, section 1-Classification.-The act of April 3, 1885 (82 Ohio
L. 101), providing for a police force in "cities of the first grade of the
first class," applies to all cities of that grade and class in the state, and
is a law of a general nature, having a uniform operation throughout the
state, and is constitutional. State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Hudson,
137.

4. Section 19, bill of rights.-There is no provision in the statutes whereby
the owner of material taken by a supervisor for the repair of a public
highway, under section 4715 of the Revised Statutes, can have his com-
pensation assessed by a jury, as required by section 19 of the bill of
rights, and it is therefore invalid; and the owner, resisting a supervisor
entering upon his lands under the provisions of said section, is not
guilty of resisting an officer under the provisions of section 6908 of the
Revised Statutes. Hendershot v. The State, 208.

5. Article 13, section 1.-The act of March 26, 1886, supplementary to sec-
tion 1707 of the Revised Statutes (83 Ohio L. 43), is invalid, for the
reason that the act is special and not general, inasmuch as the powers
there conferred on cities having at the last federal census a population-
of 16,512, and no more, simply designates the city of Akron, and does
not create a class, as Akron was the only city at that census having that
population; and as the act con fers corporate powers, it is in violation
of section 1, article 13, of the constitution. The State ex rel. Attorney-
General v. Anderson, 247.

6. Article 2, section 17-Impeachment of legislative journal.—Where the
journal of each house of the general assembly shows that a law receives
the concurrence of the number of members required by the constitution
for its adoption, and that it was publicly signed in the presence of each
house by its presiding officer, as required by section 17, article 2, of the
constitution, its authenticity can not be impeached by parol evidence
that one or more of the members in either house, recorded as concurring
in its adoption, had, prior thereto, been seated upon the determination
of a contested election, by less than a constitutional quorum, although
the concurrence of such a member, or members, was necessary to the
number of votes required by the constitution for the passage of the law.
The State ex rel. Herron v. Smith, 348.

7. De facto members of legislative body.--The members so seated are, at
least, de facto members of the house to which they belonged, and the va-
lidity of the title by which they occupy their seats can not be inquired
into by the courts for the purpose of affecting the validity of laws en-
acted by the legislature in which they hold seats. Id. 348.

VOL. 44-45

Constitutional Law.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Continued.

8. Article 1, section 1-Article 8, section 6-Article 1, section 20.-The act of the general assembly, passed May 17, 1886, entitled "an act to establish an efficient board of public affairs in cities of the first grade of the first class" (83 Ohio L. 173), is within the legislative power conferred on the general assembly by section 1, article 1, and the requirement of section 6, article 8, of the constitution; and does not by its provisions, vesting the appointment of the board in the governor of the state, impair any of the undelegated powers, which, by section 20, article 1, are declared to "remain with the people." Whether laws so enacted for the government of cities and villages are wise or unwise, is left, by the constitution, to the wisdom of the legislature, and the courts have no power to hold them invalid, although they may differ with the legislature as to the policy of such laws. Id. 348.

9. Selling liquor within two miles of fair.-The clause "whoever sells intoxicating liquors within two miles of the place where an agricultural fair is being held ... shall be fined,” etc., contained in section 6946 of the Revised Statutes, as amended May 2, 1885 (82 Ohio L. 222), includes sales made by one whose place of business is permanently located within such distance, is not in conflict with any provision of the constitution, and is a valid law. Heck v. The State, 536.

10. Taxing liquor traffic. It is competent to the general assembly of the state to impose a tax on the business of trafficking in intoxicating liquors as a means of providing against evils resulting therefrom. Adler v. Whitbeck, 539.

11. Article 15, section 9.-Neither the tax so imposed, nor a provision that the same shall attach as a lien on the property in which it is conducted, constitutes a license within the meaning of section 9 of article 15 of the constitution. Id. 539.

12. Bill of rights, section 16—Due course of law. The statute imposing the tax may provide for its collection by the treasurer of the county, as other taxes are collected; may impose penalties for its non-payment; and, for the refusal of a person engaged in the business, on demand of the assessor, to sign and verify the statement of the return. And, for an injury done him in his property, such provisions do not deprive the citizen of the due course of law, secured to him by section 16 of the bill of rights, nor are they inhibited by the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States. Id. 539.

13. Article 2, section 26—Uniformity of operation. The legislature may, in providing against evils resulting from the traffic in intoxicating li quors, levy a tax upon such forms of the traffic as in its wisdom may seem best, without infringing the constitutional requirement (sec. 26, art. 2), that all laws of a general nature shall be uniform in their operation throughout the state. Id. 539.

14. Dow liquor tax law valid.—The act of the general assembly passed May 14, 1886, providing against the evils resulting from the traffic in intoxicating liquors (83 Ohio L. 157) is not, in any of these respects, in con

Construction-Contempt of Legislative Body.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Continued.

flict with the constitution of the state nor of the United States and is a valid law. Id. 540.

15. Validity of lien provision of liquor tax law. Under the second section of the statute of May 14, 1886, known as the Dow law (83 Ohio L. 157), a valid lien is created upon the real property when the tenant holds under a lease, written or parol, made after the passage of the statute Anderson v. Brewster, 576.

16. Article 12, section 2.—The assessment imposed by the first section of the statute is not in conflict with the second section of the twelfth article of the constitution. Id. 576.

17. Schedule, section 18.-The statute, so far as it provides for an assessment or tax upon the business of trafficking in intoxicating liquors, is not, in effect, a license law, and not within the inhibition of the 18th section of the schedule to the constitution. Id. 576.

18. Extension of term of constitutional office.-Where the term of an office is fixed and limited by the constitutiou, there is no power in the general assembly to extend the term or tenure of such office heyond the time so limited. State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Brewster, 589. 19. Schedule, section 18.-Section 18 of the schedule to the constitution, which provides that "no license to traffic in intoxicating liquors shall hereafter be granted in this state; but the general assembly may, by law, provide against evils resulting therefrom," applies as well to the wholesale as to the retail traffic in intoxicating liquors. Senior v. Ratterman, 661.

20. Liability of wholesale liquor dealers to tax under Dow law. -Wholesale dealers in intoxicating liquors, who are not manufacturers, are within the terms of the act of the general assembly passed May 14, 1886, entitled "An act to provide against the evils resulting from the traffic in intoxicating liquors," and are liable to the tax therein imposed. Id. 661. 21. Article 12, section 2-Article 2, section 26.-Said act, as applied to wholesale dealers in such liquors, is not in conflict with section 2, of article 12, of the constitution, which provides that "laws shall be passed taxing by a uniform rule all moneys," etc., nor with section 26, of article 2, of the constitution, which provides that "all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the state. Id. 661. CONSTRUCTION. See RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.

CONTEMPT OF COURT. See INJUNCTION.

CONTEMPT OF LEGISLATIVE BODY

1. Power of committee to compel clerk of common pleas to produce pollbook. A standing committee on privileges and elections of either house of the general assembly, while engaged under the orders of such house in taking testimony and making investigations to be reported to it, in a contest for membership thereof, pending therein, with power to send for persons and papers, may, by a subpoena duces tecum, lawfully command a clerk of the court of common pleas, having custody thereof, to pro