trustee ex maleficio, of which trust a court of equity will take jurisdiction. While the legal title and possession remain in the grantee, it is difficult, if not impossible, to reach the equity of the case in an action at law. The refusal to reconvey is a palpable fraud, not only upon the grantor, but indirectly upon other creditors than defendant. He obtains by solicitation from the debtor property worth three times his own debt, upon an express promise to reconvey when his own liability is discharged, and then, after selling part of the property, deliberately violates his promise. This is a manifest fraud. The transaction leaves the legal title in the wrongdoer, but the equitable is clearly in the grantor. That equitable title passes by the sheriff's sale to this plaintiff. He stands in Shaw's shoes. A trust A trust is where the legal estate is in one, and the equitable estate in another. If the intention of McMinn, as averred, is to convert the property to his own use, when nothing remains in him but the naked legal title, without a spark of beneficial interest, it is a fraud upon Shaw; and a chancellor must direct a reconveyance to him in whom is the complete equitable interest. "In all cases of fraud, and where transactions have been carried on mala fide, there is a resulting trust by operation of law; but, unless there be something in the transaction more than is implied from the violation of a parol agreement, equity will not decree the purchaser to be a trustee." McCulloch v. Cowher, 5 Watts & S. 427. As is said by Agnew, J., in Seichrist's Appeal, 66 Pa. St. 237: "We are of opinion this case falls within the proviso to the fourth section of the act of 1856, that where any conveyance shall be made of any lands or tenements, by which a trust or confidence shall arise by implication or construction of law,-such trust or confidence shall be of like force and effect as if the act had not been passed. Among the trusts thus resulting from the operation of

law are those arising from the fraud of him who has the title. Although no one can be compelled to part with his own title by force of a mere verbal bargain, yet, when he procures a title from another, which he could not have obtained except by a confidence reposed in him, the case is different. There, if he abuse the confidence reposed in him, he is converted into a trustee ex maleficio. The statute which was intended to prevent frauds turns against him, as the perpetrator of a fraud. It is not, therefore, the fact that the bargain by which he obtained the title is verbal, that governs the case, but the fact that he procured the title to be made to him in confidence, the breach of which is fraudulent and in bad faith." These principles cover the whole ground set out in the averments of this bill.

As to the act of 1881, which declares that a defeasance to an absolute deed must be in writing and be recorded, the provisions of the act have no application here. The parol agreement does not turn the absolute deed into a mortgage. It was absolute on its face, and intended so to be, that McMinn might with facility sell and convey the land for the payment of Shaw's debt. When that end was reached, McMinn's title ended, and Shaw was entitled to a reconveyance of what was not appropriated under the agreement. It was not a deed which was to become absolute upon a condition subsequent,-the failure of Shaw to pay McMinn's debt. It constituted, itself, a payment of that debt. The sales by McMinn were to determine whether the property was sufficient, or whether it exceeded in value the debts. We pass no opinion on the truth of the averments. They must be sustained by evidence which is clear and precise. All we say is that plaintiff is entitled to a hearing. The demurrer is overruled, the bill reinstated, and defendant ordered to answer over.

BRAUN V. BRAUN.

(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Dec. 30,

1899.)

DIVORCE-CRUELTY-PLEADING JOINDER OF

CAUSES.

1. A jury is justified in finding a husband guilty of cruel and inhuman treatment, where there is evidence that he constantly treated the wife with vile indecency, dreadful profanity, coarse and brutal vulgarity, accused her of adulterous intercourse with other men, compelled her to take dangerous drugs, and urged her to consent to a criminal operation to produce an abortion.

2. It is permissible to set up two grounds of divorce in a libel, especially where the decree is the same for both grounds, i. e. either a mensa or a vinculo.

3. The statutory prohibition against remarriage of the guilty party with the paramour, where a divorce is granted on the ground of adultery, is no reason why cruelty and adultery may not be set up in the same libel as grounds for divorce, since the prohibition takes place by force of the statute, and does not require the help of the de

cree.

Appeal from court of common pleas, Butler 'county.

Petition of Sadie E. Braun, by her next friend, Amos Steelsmith, for divorce, against William F. Braun. Decree for petitioner, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

L. McQuistion, W. A. Forquer, F. H. Murphy, J. D. Watson, and W. S. McElroy, for appellant. James M. Galbreath, H. L. Christie, and Thompson & Son, for appellee.

GREEN, J. This was a proceeding for divorce a vinculo by a wife against her husband, in which the libel alleged cruel and barbarous treatment, and also adultery. A jury trial was had, and resulted in a general verdict in favor of the libelant. So far as the questions of fact are concerned, the verdict of the jury establishes the truth of both the charges. An examination of the testimony develops a great mass of evidence,-far more than sufficient to justify the verdict on both charges. It seems almost incredible that any man fit to associate with his fellow men could possibly be guilty of the vile indecency, the obscenity, the dreadful profanity, the coarse and brutal vulgarity, with which this respondent constantly treated his wife. Added to this, his charges against the virtue of his wife, denying the paternity of his children, accusing her of adulterous intercourse with other men, compelling her to take dangerous drugs, and urging her to consent to a criminal operation, all to produce an abortion, and spreading his accusations broadcast throughout the community, without any apparent cause, except an insane and unfounded jealousy, make out a case of such cruel and barbarous treatment as is seldom heard in courts of justice. The language he constantly used to his wife is too filthy and vile to quote, but its citation is un

necessary, in view of the verdict, which settles all controversy respecting it. There is really but one matter presented by the assignments of error that is worthy of the least consideration. The appellant claims that it was incompetent to set up two causes of divorce (cruelty and adultery) in the same libel, and therefore the libel should have been dismissed, or the jury directed to find for the defendant. No decision of this court is cited to support this contention. In fact, the question does not appear to have ever been before us. In 2 Bish. Mar. & Div. § 327, it is said: "If several matrimonial wrongs (as, for example, adultery and cruelty) are each made cause for the same kind of divorce, whether from bed and board or from the bonds of matrimony, the applicant for divorce may join all in one libel, and take his decree for the one or more particular offenses which he proves. This is the universal practice in England and in our states." In Young v. Young, 4 Mass. 430, it was said: "The libel in this case charged upon the respondent extreme cruelty, and also adultery, and prayed a divorce a vinculo, or such other decree relative to the premises as to the court should seem just and lawful." The bill was sustained. In McDonald v. McDonald, 1 Mich. N. P. 191, it was held that a bill alleging two grounds for divorce (adultery and habitual drunkenness) is not for that reason multifarious. In Stokes v. Stokes, 1 Mo. 228, it was ruled that different causes of divorce may be joined in the same bill. In Morris v. Morris, 20 Ala. 168, it was said: "But, even if two distinct grounds for divorce are contained in the same bill, it is not demurrable on that account." In Quarles v. Quarles, 19 Ala. 363, it was held that a bill for divorce. a vinculo matrimonii, which alleges cruelty, abandonment, and adultery on the part of the defendant, is not multifarious. To the same effect are Fritz v. Fritz, 23 Ind. 388, and Griffith v. Griffith, 89 N. C. 113. In Story, Eq. Pl. 257, it is said: "The title to the relief prayed is the same whether one or the other of the several alleged grounds be proved. It is well settled that the plaintiff may aver facts of a different nature which will equally support his application." The case of Johnson v. Johnson, 6 Johns. Ch. 163, cited for appellant, in which it is held that these charges may not be united in the same bill, is ruled upon the special provisions of the New York statute, which is different from ours in the points indicated. Thus, the chancellor said: "I feel well persuaded, from a perusal of the statute which gives jurisdiction on this subject, that the prosecutions for adultery and for cruel usage were contemplated as totally distinct and separate prosecutions." Thus, upon authority, it seems that the point is not well taken. Upon principle, we do not see any sufficient reason for holding that the libelant in a divorce case may not join two or

more distinct causes for divorce in the same bill, especially where the decree is the same in both; that is, both either a mensa or a vinculo. In this case the decree for either cause would be a vinculo.

It is contended that the proper decree in a case of adultery ought to contain a prohibition against subsequent marriage with the paramour. But there is nothing in our act which requires that the decree shall contain such prohibition. The act simply provides that in such a case there shall be no such

marriage, but that prohibition takes place by force of the statute, and does not require the help of a decree, although it is very proper to insert it therein. In this case it happens that the court below made the general decree which gave the parties liberty to marry again. It was competent for the libelant to complain of this, and ask the court to correct it; but the respondent has no cause of complaint, and is not entitled to be heard on that subject. Decree affirmed, and appeal dismissed, at the cost of the appellant.

Appeal of CHASE. (Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. Nov. 7, 1899.) Appeal from superior court, Hartford county; John M. Thayer, Judge. George L. Chase applied to the board of relief of the town and city of Hartford to be relieved from an assessment. The relief applied for was denied, and he appealed to the superior court, where a judgment was rendered confirming the action of the assessors and board of relief, and he appeals. Affirmed. Charles E. Perkins, for appellant. Edward D. Robbins and William J. McConville, for appellee.

HAMERSLEY, J. This case presents the same questions decided in the preceding case of In re Dennis (Conn.) 44 Atl. 545. It must be controlled by the decision of that case. There is no error in the judgment of the superior court. The other judges concurred.

PARKER v. YERGER. (Court of Chancery of Delaware. Sept. Term, 1894.) Bill for specific performance by James Parker against Hiram Yerger. Decree for plaintiff. H. H. Ward, for complainant. Harry Emmons, for respondent.

WOLCOTT, Ch. Let the decree be entered as follows: And now, to wit, this 25th day of February, A. D. 1895, the above-stated cause having come on to be heard upon bill and answer, and the arguments of counsel having been made thereon, and it appearing to the court that the said James Parker, said complainant, is seised of, in, and to the said lands and premises in said bill of complaint described, in his demesne as of fee, and that he can convey a clear and unincumbered title thereto, it is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the said Hiram Yerger, said defendant, specifically perform the said agreement for the sale of the lands and premises in said bill of complaint set forth, and that said defendant pay unto the said complainant the remainder of said purchase money in said agreement for sale mentioned; and it is further ordered and decreed that, upon the payment of the whole of said purchase money by said defendant to said complainant, the said complainant shall make, execute, and deliver a proper conveyance of said lands and premises to the said defendant, and let the said defendant into the possession of said premises, according to said agreement of sale; and it is further ordered that the said complainant pay the costs of this proceeding, and said costs are hereby taxed at the sum of $31.66.

(Supreme

MURPHY et al. v. HILL et al. Court of New Hampshire. Merrimack. July 30, 1897.) Action by Laura E. Murphy and Franklin Eaton against Winthrop Y. Hill and Nancy M. Hill. Judgment for defendant Nancy M. Hill, and for plaintiffs against Winthrop Y. Hill. Burleigh & Adams, for plaintiffs. Charles C. Rogers, for defendants.

PER CURIAM. Notice having been given Eaton, after the announcement of the previous opinion in this case at the June term, 1896 (68 N. H. 544, 44 Atl. 703), he appeared at the

trial term, April, 1897, and assented to the facts previously reported, but offered no evidence. As no claim was made of fraud or mistake in the original entry of judgment in Eaton's favor in his suit against Clarence E. Hill, the question of law which it was suggested might be presented was not considered, and the views expressed in the opinion heretofore announced were affirmed. It now appearing as a fact that Nancy M. Hill did not join in the covenants sued upon, judgment was ordered for her, and for the plaintiff, against Winthrop Y. Hill only, for one dollar damages. Case discharged.

BOARD OF HOME MISSIONS OF PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH v. CONGREGATIONAL HOME MISSIONARY SOC. (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. Nov. 20, 1899.) Appeal from court of chancery. Action by the Congregational Home Missionary Society against the Board of Home Missions of the Presbyterian Church. From a decree for plaintiff (42 Atl. 1047), defendant appeals. Affirmed. James E. Howell, for appellant. Cortlandt Parker, Jr., for respondent.

PER CURIAM. The decree in this cause is affirmed, upon the grounds stated in the opinion of Vice Chancellor EMERY.

CONSOLIDATED TRACTION CO. v. EAST ORANGE TP. et al. (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. Nov. 20, 1899.) Error to supreme court. Certiorari by the state, on the relation of the Consolidated Traction Company, against the township of East Orange and another, to review a conviction of relator's employés for injuring shade trees. From an affirmance of the conviction by the supreme court (38 Atl. 803), relator brings error. Affirmed. Affirmed. Riker & Riker, for plaintiff in error. Philemon Woodruff, for defendant in error.

PER CURIAM. The judgment of the supreme court is affirmed, on the grounds stated in the opinion of Mr. Justice LIPPINCOTT.

GNICHTEL v. OLIVER et al. (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. Nov. 20, 1899.) Appeal from court of chancery. Bill by Frederick W. Gnichtel, receiver, against Elizabeth Oliver and Edward Jewell. From a decree of the court of chancery (41 Atl. 227), complainant appeals. Affirmed. George O. Vanderbilt, for appellant. James E. Hayes, for respondents.

PER CURIAM. The decree appealed from is affirmed, for the reasons given in the opinion of Vice Chancellor REED.

HICKMAN v. STATE. (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. Nov. 20, 1899.) Error to supreme court. Action by the state against John P. Hickman for negotiating as agent for the Mercantile Mutual Fire Insurance Company of Philadelphia a contract of insurance in New Brunswick, neither said Hickman nor said com