BOOK 9. BOOK III. He therefore that wants matter in a deliberative oration, let him bring in some person to praise or dispraise. And in demonstratives, he that has nothing to say in commendation or discommendation of the principal party, let him praise or dispraise somebody else, as his father or kinsman, or the very virtues or vices themselves. He that wants not proofs, let him not only prove strongly, but also insinuate his manners: but he that has no proof, let him nevertheless insinuate his manners. For a good man is as acceptable as an exact oration. Of proofs, those that lead to an absurdity, please better than those that are direct or ostensive; because from the comparison of contraries, namely, truth and falsity, the force of the syllogism does the better appear. Confutation is also a part of proof. And he that speaks first, puts it after his own proofs; unless the controversy contain many and different matters. And he that speaks last, puts it before. For it is necessary to make way for his own oration, by removing the objections of him that spake before. For the mind abhors both the man and his oration, that is damned beforehand. If a man desire his manners should appear well, lest speaking of himself, he become odious, or troublesome, or obnoxious to obtrectation; or speaking of another, he seem contumelious or scurrilous ; let. him introduce another person. Last of all, lest he cloy his hearer with enthymemes, let him vary them sometimes with sentences, but such as have the same force. As here is an enthymeme: If it be then the best time to make peace, when the best conditions of peace may be 16. had; then the time is now, while our fortune is BOOK III. And this is a sentence of equal force to it: Wise men make peace, while their fortune is entire. entire. CHAPTER XVII. OF INTERROGATIONS, ANSWERS, AND JESTS. THE times when it is fit to ask one's adversary a question, are chiefly four. The first is, when of two propositions that conclude an absurdity, he has already uttered one; and we would by interrogation draw him to confess the other. The second, when of two propositions that conclude an absurdity, one is manifest of itself, and the other likely to be fetched out by a question; then the interrogation will be seasonable; and the absurd conclusion is presently to be inferred with out adding that proposition which is manifest. The third, when a man would make appear that his adversary does contradict himself. The fourth, when a man would take from his adversary such shifts as these: In some sort, it is so; in some sort, it is not so. Out of these cases, it is not fit to interrogate. For he whose question succeeds not, is thought vanquished. To equivocal questions a man ought to answer fully, and not to be too brief. To interrogations, which we foresee tend to draw from us an answer contrary to our purpose, we must, together with our answer, presently give an answer to the objection which is implied in the question. And where the question exacteth an answer that BOOK III. concludeth against us, we must, together with our answer, presently distinguish. 17. Jests are dissolved by serious and grave discourse; and grave discourse is deluded by jests. The several kinds of jests are set down in the Art of Poetry. Whereof one kind is ironia, and tends to please one's self. The other is scurrility, and tends to please others. The latter of these has in it a kind of baseness: the former may become a man of good breeding. CHAPTER XVIII. OF THE EPILOGUE. THE epilogue must consist of one of these four things. Either of inclining the judge to favour his own, or disfavour the adversary's side. For then, when all is said in the cause, is the best season to praise or dispraise the parties. Or of amplification or diminution. For when it appears what is good or evil, then is the time to show how great or how little that good or evil is. Or in moving the judge to anger, love, or other passion. For when it is manifest of what kind, and how great the good or evil is, then it will be opportune to excite the judge. Or of repetition, that the judge may remember what has been said. Repetition consisteth in the matter and the manner. For the orator must show that he has performed what he promised in the beginning of his oration; and how, namely, by comparing his arguments one by one with his adversary's, repeating them in the same order they were spoken. |