career of politics. And one can scarcely refrain from remarking how little of personal satisfaction or lasting honor is to be gained in such a career. He partook deeply in all the agitations and conflicts of the day, and devoted to the success of his party those powers which otherwise directed might have made him a happier and far more useful man. Like other political managers, he encountered much obloquy and bitterness of reproach. He excited the jealousy of Cotton Mather, and was an object of personal hatred and abuse from Jeremy Dummer, the agent of the province, at London. One extract has already been given from the correspondence of this gentleman, and another will justify the correctness of the above remark. "What colonel Byfield says of me as well as of sir William Ashurst is false, and I can assure you I found him out in a good many lies whilst he was here, notwithstanding he was nauseously boasting of his honesty." One thing in the character of judge Byfield ought not to be omitted, as it indicated a more enlarged and liberal spirit than was generally prevalent in the province at that time, and that is his consistent and uniform opposition to the spirit of fanaticism which displayed itself in the trials and punishment of the unhappy victims of the witchcraft delusion. In his pecuniary affairs he was frugal to parsimony; and though his talents were respectable, they were not of that commanding character that made him a prominent leader among his political associates. Of commanding person, imposing manners, an ardent temperament and an enterprising disposition, he is said to have preserved a large share of public respect through his long and diversified life. Little, however, is preserved of him as a politician, and far less is known of him as a judge. E. W. ART. V.-ON THE OBEDIENCE DUE FROM SEAMEN TO THE MASTER OF A VESSEL. [Extracted from a work now in preparation on Merchant Seamen, by GEORGE T. CURTIS, Esq.] Ir is an obligation assumed by the seamen, to obey all lawful commands of the master, and not to violate the discipline and economy of the ship. This obligation is almost uniformly made a part of the written contract;' but apart from all express contract, it results from the nature of the master's authority over the crew, and their relation to the ship. This authority and the rights which result from it are indispensable, and ascend to the most remote periods in the history of maritime law. The provisions of different positive codes, in respect to the mode of exercising it, have varied with times and manners; but they have always been based upon this principle, that the master must be invested with a power, which implies an implicit obedience on the part of all subject to his authority, within the limits of lawful commands. By some older writers, this authority is likened to that of a parent, or of a master over his pupils or apprentices—" quemadmodum pater in filios, magister in discipulos, dominus in servos vel familiares ;" 3 993 but a more modern celebrated jurist prefers the analogy of the parental relation." The distinction is not perhaps very important for whatever be the exact description of the master's authority, it is the duty of the seamen to obey his 1 Abbot on Shipping, p. 137 and Appendix, No. V; Steel's Ship-Master's Assistant, (Lond. 1837) p. 23, 33. commands, in all lawful matters relating to the navigation of the ship and the preservation of good order.1 The question may often be of much practical importance, whether the duty of obedience on the part of seamen extends at all beyond the service of their own ship; as where the master should order them to go to the aid of another vessel in distress. The duty of obedience is stated by lord Tenterden, as just cited, to attach to all lawful commands relating to the navigation of the ship and the preservation of good order; and this is all that is usually contracted for by any express stipulation in the articles. If we go back to the acknowledged sources of the maritime law, we find the duty thus stated in the Consolato: "the seaman is obliged to obey every order of the master or mate, provided it be not for the service of another ship; but he is obliged to render all the service which relates to the ship for which he is hired." Another chapter of the same compilation contains an exception to the general rule, founded on the necessity of rendering aid to other vessels. It declares that seamen may be sent out of their own ship to another, when the master of such other vessel has need of a person who knows how to do something indispensable to his manœuvres, which his own crew cannot do. So, too, another chapter empowers the mate to send the seamen to tow another vessel into port, provided it be not an enemy vessel. These are the only traces of an exception to the general rule, which I have met with in the old law. They confirm the opinion that is to be deduced from the whole tendency of modern jurisprudence, on the subject of salvage efforts: namely, that those efforts, at least where life 1 Abbot on Ship. p. 136. 2 Consolato, chap. 117, [162] Pardessus tom. 2, p. 145; see also chap. 110, [155] Ib. p. 140. 3 Chap. 103 [148] Pardessus tom. 2, p. 137. 4 Chap. 114 [159] Pard. tom. 2, p. 143. is to be saved, are so far a maritime duty incumbent on the master of a vessel, and resting on the usage of the world, that a deviation for this purpose does not discharge his insurance.' But is it any thing more than a moral duty, in the master, or the crew? Could a refusal by seamen to render such services, when commanded by their own officers, draw after it a total or partial forfeiture of wages, as a refusal to do duty on board their own vessel would do? Would it authorize any punishment by the master? Would a refusal by the master himself to render salvage assistance, give the party who stood in need of it a claim for damages capable of being enforced? A duty, that cannot be enforced by the law, is not a legal duty, though it may have the most imperative claims as a moral obligation. The Consolato affixes no punishment or penalty to a breach of the orders which the officers are authorized to give, in the chapters above cited: though in the countries where that code was received as a text of positive law, disobedience on such points might perhaps have been punished under the general penalties against disobedience or insubordination. Still, however, the question, as one aside from all positive law, must, I apprehend, revert to the contract itself which the seaman has stipulated to perform: and it is difficult to see why his plea that he had hired his services only to the ship to which he was attached, would not be a perfect answer to any punishment or forfeiture that should be sought to be inflicted on a disobedience of orders concerning any other vessel or service whatever. When such disobedience should also connect itself with disobedience of orders in the service of his own vessel, it might have an important bearing, as showing the general spirit of the party, and perhaps might enhance a forfeiture grounded on the latter instances of insubordination; but as a substantive 'The Boston and Cargo, 1 Sumner's R. 328. ground of forfeiture or punishment, I cannot see that it has any foundation. In stating this limitation of the duty of obedience, I have intended to say nothing that shall impair the moral obligation of services, whether large or small, to life or property in peril on the seas; which have ever been rewarded with a large munificence by the law, and the selfish and wilful refusal of which has ever been visited with the contempt and execration of mankind. ART. VI.-INTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW. No. 2. [By Mr. Victor Foucher, King's advocate-general in the royal court of Rennes.] OF SOVEREIGNTY AND ITS LIMITS. WHEN men, obeying the impulse of their nature, unite their individual powers and wills, to form a civil society, nation, or people, sovereignty is introduced among them, under a double relation. On the one hand, sovereignty is constituted by the fusion of all the wills and powers into one common will and power, which commands each private will; and which is made known externally by the organ charged with the publication of the general will. On the other hand, sovereignty is personified in regard to other nations, in order to make the attributes and the rights inherent in its existence respected. This supreme power does not in any degree deprive men of their liberty, since it is only the compound of their united powers, and the law which includes their wills in general, |