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a promise to pay what it is worth. A contract or agreement requires, as essential to its existence, the assent of two or more minds; duorum vel plurium in idem placitum consensus.1 If particular pacts or conditions are annexed to the contract, qualifying its general nature or varying and modifying its general obligations, there must be the same assent of the parties to these conditions to give them validity, as to the substance of the contract. It must be a consent in idem placitum. If the parties have not taken care to express these accessory conditions in the terms of the contract, or what juridically amounts to the same thing, if they cannot be proved, the law will not presume the assent of the parties to them, unless, from the circumstances of the case, or the ordinary course of dealing, these are plainly to be inferred.

- Let us now apply these general and familiar principles of law to the evidence in this case. The fact, that the libellant labored for Spear, and under his direction from April to November, and that he was part of the time employed upon the vessel, is admitted. That the labor was performed by virtue of an agreement, will be inferred as a presumption of law. But the law will infer from the general fact nothing more than a general contract for labor; and what is there in the present case that will authorize the presumption of anything beyond this. Nothing, except what results from the manner in which he was actually employed, and the fact that he was a blacksmith by trade. As to the kind of labor in which he was employed, it appears that for the first month he was exclusively occupied in various work on the farm; for the two following months, about one half of the time on the farm, and one half in the blacksmith's shop; and during the residue of the term of his service, principally in the shop at his trade in doing the iron work for the vessel, or in the yard working on the ship; but part of it also, on the farm. Taking then the whole course of his employment, the result will be against this presumption of a special contract with him as a mechanic, for labor on the vessel. Whatever presumption might arise from the fact that he was by trade a blacksmith, is overcome by the various kind of

1 Dig. 2, 14, 1, 51.

labor in which he was actually employed without any objection on his part. The inference certainly is, that he was hired rather as a sort of jack-at-all-trades, than as a master of one. And this receives confirmation, partially at least, by all the evidence which has been offered touching the rate of wages for which he was engaged. It appears from his own declaration, that Spear would consent to give him but fourteen dollars a month, though he said that he ought to have sixteen. But all the proof is, that the rate of wages for a blacksmith at this time was not less than a dollar a day, about double the rate at which he was to be paid. It appears to me, that the fair conclusion to be drawn from all the facts, is, that this was a general agreement for service as a hired laborer, and not a special contract for any specific kind of labor.

Does a person hired as a laborer generally, and employed under that general contract part of the time in work upon the vessel, come within the fair intent and meaning of the legislature, so as to be entitled to a lien on the vessel for his wages during that part of the time that he is so employed. The language of the law is, any persons of the description named in the act, who shall perform labor and furnish materials for or on account of any vessel, by virtue of a written or parol agreement. The labor must be performed, or the materials furnished in pursuance of an agreement, and it must be an agreement to do this for or on account of the vessel to which the lien attaches. The intention of the law is to give to that class of persons, called, in the language of the admiralty, material men, a privilege against the vessel for their security, not universally, and in all cases where their labor or the materials furnished by them have been applied to the building of a vessel, but where this has been done under a contract for or on account of the vessel to the use of which they have been appropriated. The contract must therefore have itself a reference, tacit or express, to the vessel against which the privilege is claimed. It is not intended to be said, that in all cases, a mechanic, who is employed in building a vessel, or a material man, who sells lumber which is used in the construction of it, must, in order to maintain their lien, prove that the vessel was

expressly named in the contract. In ordinary cases, or certainly in very many cases, this will be presumed. And these contracts being made while the vessel is in the process of building, and the labor or materials appropriated to her construction, it would require some countervailing circumstances to overcome the natural presumption, that the contracts were made with a view to the particular vessel. I fully agree also with the libellant's counsel, that the lien, being one beneficial to the general interests of commerce, and having its foundation in natural equity, the law ought to receive a liberal construction to carry into full effect the beneficent intentions of the legislature. It belongs to that class of liens, which the law habitually favors. And the act being in fact but a mere recognition or adoption of a principle of the general maritime law, as old as the law itself, a court of admiralty would be the last tribunal to feel any reluctance in giving to it its fullest and most beneficial operation. But to extend the privilege to a case like the present, would be carrying the lien beyond what seems to me to be the obvious and clear intention of the legislature, and also further than it would be supported by the principles of the general maritime law.

An appeal having been taken, in the above case, to the circuit court of the United States, the question is still pending.

LEGISLATION.

ILLINOIS. The eleventh general assembly of this state, at a special session thereof, begun and held at Springfield, on the ninth of December last, passed a considerable number of statutes, chiefly of a local and private character.

Sheriffs, Constables, &c. Whenever any sheriff, coroner, constable, justice of the peace, or probate justice of the peace, shall, after proper demand made, fail, neglect, or refuse, to pay over any sum or sums of money, collected or received by such officer, in and by virtue of his office, his said office shall be forfeited and vacated.

Attachment. Every head of a family, who follows the cultivation of the soil, for the maintenance of himself and family, is entitled to retain one horse or yoke of oxen, not exceeding in value sixty dollars, in addition to other articles previously exempted; or if he be a mechanic, laboring at his trade to support his family, sixty dollars worth of tools suited to his profession.

RHODE ISLAND. Among the statutes passed by the general assembly of the state of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, since January, 1839, we find the following:

Railroad Commissioners. A board of railroad commissioners is established, to be chosen annually by the general assembly at its May session, and to consist of not less than three persons, with authority, upon complaint or otherwise, to examine into any or all of the transactions and proceedings of any railroad corporation, authorized and established in Rhode Island, in order to secure to the citizens thereof the same privileges, in regard to transporta

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tion of persons and property, at all times, as may be granted by any such corporations to the citizens of any other state. June 14,

1839.

Imprisonment for Debt. Any person, committed to jail for debt upon mesne process or execution, nonpayment of any military fine, or town or state taxes, surrender or commitment by bail, or by former sureties for the liberty of the jail yard, may be liberated from his imprisonment, upon filing in the clerk's office of the supreme judicial court his petition for the benefit of the acts for the relief of insolvent debtors, if he have not a petition already pending at the time, and giving bond with surety, satisfactory to the sheriff of the county, conditioned to return to jail within ten days after his petition shall be withdrawn or finally disposed of by said court, if not granted. June 15, 1839.

Corporations. No turnpike, railroad, or bridge corporation shall be capable in law to take or hold any land in Rhode Island, in fee, or for life or lives, or for term of years, or by any other title or tenure, or for any other use than such as is expressly provided in the charter of such corporation. Jan. 14, 1840.

Conveyances of Real Estate. Any conveyance of lands within this state, or any instrument relating thereto, executed without the limits of the United States, may be acknowledged before any ambassador, minister, or recognised consul of the United States, in the country where the instrument shall be executed. Jan. 17, 1840.

Separation of Married Persons. The supreme judicial court is authorized, upon application of any married person, and for the causes for which by law a divorce may be decreed, or for such other causes as may seem to them to require it, to assign to such persons a separate maintenance out of the estate or property of the husband or wife of such person, in such manner as they may deem best, with full power also to regulate the custody of children of the persons so complaining. Jan. 17, 1840.

MASSACHUSETTS. The general court of Massachusetts, at the January session thereof, in the present year, passed ninety-seven statutes and sixty-two resolves, of which fifty-nine were approved by the governor.

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