as it did not dispose of the issue upon the account stated. (2 C. & M. 722.)

In an action upon the award, the declaration stated that the original action was referred by a rule of Court to A. B., who duly made his award of and concerning the premises so referred to him, and did thereby find, &c. The defendant pleaded that the said A. B. did not duly make and publish his award of and concerning the premises referred, in manner and form, &c.: Held, that the production of the award and the rule of Court was sufficient prima facie evidence to support the issue on the part of the plaintiff, until the validity of the award was impeached by evidence dehors on the part of the defendant. (11 East, 193.) Gisborne v. Hart, 5 M. & W. 50.

BILLS AND NOTES. (Presentment of foreign bill payable after sight.) A bill of exchange was drawn in duplicate on the 12th of August at Carbonear in Newfoundland, payable ninety days after sight, on S. & Co. in England, for the freight of a voyage from Liverpool to Carbonear. The bill was not presented for acceptance to S. & Co. until the 16th of November. Carbonear is twenty miles from St. John's, with daily communication between those places; and from St. John's there is a post-office packet three times a week to England, the average voyage being about eighteen days: Held, that the jury had properly found that the bill was not presented for acceptance within a reasonable time, no circumstances being proved in explanation of the delay. Straker v. Graham, 4 M. & W. 704.

2. (Consideration.) To a declaration in debt on a promissory note for 247., dated 3d January, 1837, made by the defendant, payable twelve months after date to the plaintiff, the defendant pleaded that one J. W., before and at his death, was indebted to the plaintiff in 24/. for goods sold, which sum was due to the plaintiff at the time of the making of the promissory note in the declaration mentioned; that the plaintiff, after the death of J. W., applied to the defendant for payment, whereupon, in compliance with his request, the defendant, after the death of J. W., for and in respect of the debt so remaining due to the plaintiff

as aforesaid, and for no other consideration whatever, made and delivered the note to the plaintiff, and that J. W. died intestate, and that at the time of the making and delivery of the note, no administration had been granted of his effects, nor was there any executor or executors of his estate, nor any person liable for the debt so remaining due to the plaintiff as aforesaid; and the defendant averred that there never was any consideration for the said note except as aforesaid: Held, that the plea was a good answer to the declaration. (1 C. & J. 231. See Serle v. Waterworth, 4 M. & W. 9.) Nelson v. Serle, 4 M. & W. 795. 3. (Notice of dishonor, evidence of from subsequent admission— Pleading.) On an issue joined in an action by indorsee against maker of a promissory note, on the fact of presentment, a promise made by the defendant to pay the bill, after it became due, is prima facie evidence to prove the issue. Croxon v. Worthen, 5 M. & W. 5. CONSPIRACY. (Indictment for, when too general.) An indictment charged in the first count, that the defendants unlawfully conspired to defraud divers persons, who should bargain with them for the sale of merchandise, of great quantities of such merchandise, without paying for the same, with intent to obtain to themselves money and other profit. The second count charged that two of the defendants, being in partnership in trade, and being indebted to divers persons, unlawfully conspired to defraud the said creditors of payment of their debts, and that they and the other defendant, in pursuance of the said conspiracy, falsely and wickedly made a fraudulent deed of bargain and sale of the stock in trade of the partnership for fraudulent consideration, with intent thereby to obtain to themselves money and other emoluments, to the great damage of the said creditors.

Held, 1, That the first count was not bad for omitting to state the names of the persons intended to be defrauded, as it could not be known who might fall into the snare; but that the count was bad for not showing by what means they were to be defrauded..

2, That the second count was bad for not alleging facts to

show in what manner the deed of sale was fraudulent. (2 Stra. 999; 1 East, 583; 2 B. & Ald. 204.) Peck v. The Queen, 1 P. & D. 508.

CONTRACT. (Cannot be repudiated in part, on ground of fraud.) A. engaged to convey away certain rubbish for B. at a specified sum, under a fraudulent representation by B. as to the quantity of the rubbish which was to be so conveyed: Held, that in an action for the value of the work actually done, A. could recover only according to the terms of the special contract; although when he discovered the fraud, he might have repudiated the contract, and sued B. for deceit. (3 Camp. 351; 9 B. & C. 59 ; 1 Ad. & E. 40.) Selway v. Fogg, 5 M. & W. 83. HUSBAND AND WIFE. (Action by husband, when wife to be joined in.) Lands were demised to A. & B. his wife for twenty-one years. A. afterwards granted a lease of them to C. for nine years: Held in an action brought by A. alone, for an injury to his reversionary interest, that the allegation that the reversion belonged to him was well supported, and that the wife need not be joined in the action; but that even if she ought, the objection should have been taken by plea in abatement. lis v. Harrison, 5 M. & W. 142. INFANT. Assumpsit to recover the amount of a tailor's bill, for clothes supplied to the defendant's testator in his lifetime. Plea, infancy of the testator. Replication, necessaries; on which issue was joined. On the trial it appeared that the testator was a minor at the time when the goods were supplied, but it was proved that he had an allowance of 500l. a year, besides his pay as a captain in the army. The learned judge at the trial was of opinion that if the minor had a sufficient income allowed him to supply him with necessaries suitable to his condition for ready money, he could not contract even for necessaries upon credit: Held, that this was a misdirection. Burghart v. Hull,

Wal

4 M. & W. 727. LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. (When it begins to run on contract of indemnity.) A right to sue upon a contract of indemnity against the costs of an action is first vested when the

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party to whom the indemnity is given pays the bill of costs, and not when it is delivered to him, and the Statute of Limitations therefore does not begin to run against his right of action until after such payment. (Overruling Bullock v. Lloyd, 2 C. & P. 119.) Collinge v. Heywood, 1 P. & D. 502. MASTER AND SERVANT. A. agreed to enter into the service of B., and wrote to him a letter as follows: I hereby agree to enter your service as weekly manager, commencing next Monday; and the amount of payment I am to receive I leave entirely to you." A. served B. in that capacity for six weeks: Held, (Parke, B. dissentiente) that the contract implied that A. was to be paid something at all events for the services performed; and that the jury in an action on a quantum meruit might ascertain what B., acting bona fide, would or ought to have awarded. (1 M. & Sel. 290.) Bryant v. Flight, 5 M. &

W. 114.

PARTNERS. (Liability of subscriber to joint stock company.) A project having been formed for the establishment of a company for the manufactory of sugar from beet-root, a prospectus was issued, stating the proposed capital to consist of 10,000 shares of 251. each. The directors began their works, and entered into contracts respecting them, and manufactured and sold some sugar; but only a small portion of the proposed capital was raised, and only 1400 out of the 10,000 shares were taken : Held, that a subscriber, who had taken shares and paid a deposit on them, was not liable upon such contracts of the directors, without proof that he knew and assented to their proceeding on the smaller capital, or expressly authorized the making of the contract. (7 B. & Cr. 409; 9 B. & Cr. 632; 10 B. & Cr. 128.) Pitchford v. Davies, 5 M. & W. 2.

2. (Actions between partners.) Where A. and B. had been partners in certain transactions for the purchase and sale of wool, having also had other dealings together, and they settled a general account, in which was an item to B.'s debit "to loss on wool," and which showed a balance of 157. against him; and B. signed the account and admitted the balance due: Held,

that A. might afterwards maintain an action to recover the amount of the item for the loss on the wool. Held, also, that it was no answer to such action, that, after the account was settled, the plaintiff had assented to a proposal of the defendant, that he should take out the balance in butcher's meat. Wray v. Milestone, 5 M. & W. 21. POWER. (Execution of by will.) A power was to be executed by will, signed, sealed, and published, in the presence of and attested by witnesses. The will commenced, "I, L. H. S. &c. do publish and declare this to be my last will," and concluded, "I declare this to be my last will. In witness whereof I have to this my last will set my hand and seal," L. H. S. (L. s.) "Witness, A. B. and C."-Held, by Vaughan J., Parkė B., Alderson B. and Coltman J.-(dissent. Tindal C. J., Bosanquet J., and Gurney B.)—that the publication of the will was not attested so as to satisfy the terms of the power. (Reversing the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, 6 N. &. M. 259.) Doe d. Spilsbury v. Burdett, 1 P. &. D. 670.

PRINCIPAL AND FACTOR. (When property in goods vests in factor.) T., a corn-merchant at Longford, who had been in the habit of consigning cargoes of corn to the plaintiffs, as his factors, for sale at Liverpool, and obtaining from them acceptances on the faith of such consignments, on the 31st of January obtained from the masters of two canal boats (No. 604 and No. 54), receipts signed by them for full cargoes of oats therein stated to be shipped on board the boats, deliverable to the agent of T. in Dublin, in care for and to be shipped to the plaintiffs at Liverpool. At that time boat 604 was loaded, but no oats were then actually shipped on board boat 54. On the 2d February, T. inclosed these receipts to the plaintiffs, and drew a bill on them against the value of the cargoes, which the plaintiffs accepted on the 7th, and paid when due. On the 6th of February, W., an agent of the defendant, who was T.'s factor for sale in London, arrived at Longford and pressed T. for security for previous advances. T. on that day gave W. an order on T.'s agent in Dublin, to deliver to W, the cargoes of boats 604 and 54 on