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party to whom the indemnity is given pays the bill of costs, and not when it is delivered to him, and the Statute of Limitations therefore does not begin to run against his right of action until after such payment. (Overruling Bullock v. Lloyd, 2 C. & P. 119.) Collinge v. Heywood, 1 P. & D. 502.

MASTER AND SERVANT. A. agreed to enter into the service of B., and wrote to him a letter as follows: “I hereby agree to enter your service as weekly manager, commencing next Monday; and the amount of payment I am to receive I leave entirely to you.” A. served B. in that capacity for six weeks : Held, (Parke, B. dissentiente) that the contract implied that A. was to be paid something at all events for the services performed; and that the jury in an action on a quantum meruit might ascertain what B., acting bona fide, would or ought to have awarded. (1 M. & Sel. 290.) Bryant v. Flight, 5 M. & W. 114.

PARTNERS. (Liability of subscriber to joint stock company.) A project having been formed for the establishment of a company for the manufactory of sugar from beet-root, a prospectus was issued, stating the proposed capital to consist of 10,000 shares of 25l. each. The directors began their works, and entered into contracts respecting them, and manufactured and sold some sugar; but only a small portion of the proposed capital was raised, and only 1400 out of the 10,000 shares were taken : Held, that a subscriber, who had taken shares and paid a deposit on them, was not liable upon such contracts of the directors, without proof that he knew and assented to their proceeding on the smaller capital, or expressly authorized the making of the contract. (7 B. & Cr. 409; 9 B. & Cr. 632; 10 B. & Cr. 128.) Pitchford v. Davies, 5 M. & W. 2.

2. (Actions between partners.) Where A. and B. had been partners in certain transactions for the purchase and sale of wool, having also had other dealings together, and they settled a general account, in which was an item to B.’s debit “to loss on wool,” and which showed a balance of 15l. against him; and

. B. signed the account and admitted the balance due : Held, WOL, XXIII—NO, XLVI. 27

that A. might afterwards maintain an action to recover the amount of the item for the loss on the wool. Held, also, that it was no answer to such action, that, after the account was settled, the plaintiff had assented to a proposal of the defendant, that he should take out the balance in butcher's meat. Wray v. Milestone, 5 M. & W. 21. POWER. (Execution of by will.) A power was to be executed by will, signed, sealed, and published, in the presence of and attested by witnesses. The will commenced, “I, L. H. S. &c. do publish and declare this to be my last will,” and concluded, “I declare this to be my last will. In witness whereof I have to this my last will set my hand and seal,” L. H. S. (L. s.) “Witness, A. B. and C.”—Held, by Vaughan J., Parke B., Alderson B. and Coltman J.—(dissent. Tindal C. J., Bosanquet J., and Gurney B.)—that the publication of the will was not attested so as to satisfy the terms of the power. (Reversing the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, 6 N. &. M. 259.) Doe d. Spilsbury v. Burdett, 1 P. &. D. 670. PRINCIPAL AND FACTOR. (When property in goods vests in factor.) T., a corn-merchant at Longford, who had been in the habit of consigning cargoes of corn to the plaintiffs, as his factors, for sale at Liverpool, and obtaining from them acceptances on the faith of such consignments, on the 31st of January obtained from the masters of two canal boats (No. 604 and No. 54), receipts signed by them for full cargoes of oats therein stated to be shipped on board the boats, deliverable to the agent of T. in Dublin, in care for and to be shipped to the plaintiffs at Liverpool. At that time boat 604 was loaded, but no oats were then actually shipped on board boat 54. On the 2d February, T. inclosed these receipts to the plaintiffs, and drew a bill on them against the value of the cargoes, which the plaintiffs accepted on the 7th, and paid when due. On the 6th of February, W., an agent of the defendant, who was T.’s factor for sale in London, arrived at Longford and pressed T. for security for previous advances. T. on that day gave W. an order on T.’s agent in Dublin, to deliver to W, the cargoes of boats 604 and 54 on their arrival there. Boat 604 had then sailed from Longford, but boat 54 was only partially loaded. The loading was completed on the 9th, and T. then transmitted to W. in Dublin a receipt signed by the master of the boat, (in the same form as those sent to the plaintiffs), making the cargo deliverable to W. W. received this on the 10th. On their arrival in Dublin W. took possession of both cargoes for the defendant. Held, that the property in the cargo of boat 604 vested in the plaintiffs, on their acceptance of the bill, and that they were entitled to maintain trover for it ; but that they could not maintain trover for the cargo of boat 54, since none of it was on board, or otherwise specifically appropriated to the plaintiffs, when the receipt for that boat was given by the master, (1 Bos. & P. 563; 5 M. & Sel. 350; 2 Bing. 20; 37 R. 119, 783; 3 Price, 547; 3 M. & W. 15.) Quare, whether a document, similar in form to a bill of lading, but given by the master of a boat navigating an inland canal, has the effect of such an instrument in transferring the property in the goods. Bryans v. Niw, 4 M. & W. 775.

RELEASE. (Cannot be avoided by parol.) To a declaration against a defendant as maker of a promissory note, he pleaded that the note was a joint and several note by himself and A., and that A. had been released. Replication, that A. had been so released at the defendant's request, and that the defendant, in consideration of such release at his request, ratified the promise in the declaration, and promised that he would remain liable on the note, as if there had been no such release : Held, that the replication, setting up a parol contract to avoid the release, was bad. Brooks v. Stuart, 1 P. & D. 615.

STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. The vendor by a delivery order directed the defendants, who were wharfingers, to deliver to the vendee “1028 bushels of oats, bin 40, to be weighed over, and the expense of weighing to be charged to the vendor.” The vendee afterwards gave an order to the same effect on a sale to the plaintiffs. There were no other oats in the bin, and they were transferred to the plaintiffs in the defendants’ books, but never weighed over. The vendor, on the failure of the first vendee, claimed a right of stoppage in transitu : Held, (without reference to any estoppel against the defendants, the wharfingers) that the property had passed as between buyer and seller, so as to defeat the vendor's right of stoppage. (2 Campb. 243; 1 N. R. 69.) Swanwick v. Sotheron, 1 P. & D. 648. USURY. A. agreed with B. to lend him 200l. at the rate of 1s. in the pound per month (60l. per cent. per annum), to be secured as follows, viz: whenever any portion of the money should be advanced, the borrower was to give a promissory note payable one month after date, to be renewed as often as it should * fall due ; and for each renewal, 1s. in the pound was to be paid by way of discount: Held, that the promissory notes so given were within the protection of 3 and 4 Will. IV. c. 98, s. 7, and 7 Will. IV. and 1 Vict. c. 80. (6 Ad. & Ell. 932; 5 Bing. N. C. 332.) Holt v. Miers, 5 M. & W. 168. VENDOR AND PURCHASER. (Of goods,-Specific appropriation by purchaser–Trover—Conversion.) B., a builder, contracted with A. and others, trustees of a new hotel about to be erected by a company of proprietors, to build the hotel, except as to the ironmonger's, plumber's, and glazier's work, for a specified sum, and covenanted to complete certain portions of the work within certain specified periods, being paid by instalments at corresponding dates: and that if he should neglect to complete any portion within the time limited, he should forfeit and pay the sum of 250l. as liquidated damages. The agreement then contained a clause empowering the trustees, in case (inter alia) B. should become bankrupt, to take possession of the work already done by him, and to put an end to the agreement, which should be altogether null and void; and that the trustees in such case should pay B. or his assignees only so much money as the architect of the company should adjudge to be the value of the work actually done and fived by B., as compared with the whole work to be done. The course of business during the progress of the work was for the clerk of the works to inspect every article which came in under the contract, and none were received except on his approval. After the works

had proceeded some time, B. became bankrupt. Before his bankruptcy certain wooden sash-frames had been delivered by him on the premises of the company, approved by the clerk of the works, and returned to B. for the purpose of having iron pulleys belonging to the trustees affixed to them; and at the time of the bankruptcy, these frames, with the pulleys attached to them, were at B.'s shop. He afterwards, but before the issuing of the fiat, redelivered them to the trustees; and the sashframes being afterwards demanded of them by B.'s assignees, they gave an unqualified refusal to deliver them up. Held, 1st, that the property in the wooden sash-frames had not passed to the trustees at the time of the bankruptcy. 2dly, That they were not entitled to retain them under the agreement, as being work already done, they not having been fired to the hotel; but that even if they were within that clause of the agreement, it could not bind the assignees, inasmuch as their right accrued on the bankruptcy, whereas the option of the trustees was not to be exercised until after the bankruptcy. 3dly, That the refusal of the trustees not having been limited to the pulleys, the demand and refusal were sufficient evidence of a conversion by them of the wooden sash-frames, so as to entitle B.'s assignees to recover them in trover. Tripp v. Armitage, 4 M. & W. 687. WAGER. (When void as against public policy.) A wager as to the conviction or acquital of a prisoner on trial on a criminal charge, is illegal, as being against public policy. Evans v. Jones, 5 M. & W. 77. WORK AND LABOR. (Assumpsit for, when right of action in, is complete.) Where A. contracts to do work on materials supplied to him by B., (as where he contracts to survey a parish, and to set down the results of such survey in a map, upon paper furnished to him by B.), his right to sue for work and labor is complete as soon as he has finished the work, and has given B. a reasonable opportunity of ascertaining its correctness; and if (there being no contract for a specific price) he demand more. for the work than a reasonable price, and refuse to deliver it

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