lated, and we are not left to the uncertainty arising from an inquiry in one state into the particulars of an offence committed in another. The constitution of the United States provides that a person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice and be found in another state, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime.' Here then is the law on the subject-a positive regulation and tantamount to a treaty stipulation; and we are not to resort to the comity of nations for our guidance. Every person who is charged with a crime in any state and shall flee in another, shall be delivered up. It is not necessary to be shown that such person is guilty. It is not necessary, as under the comity of nations, to examine into the facts alleged against him constituting the crime. It is sufficient that he is charged with having committed a crime." 1

But how charged? The law of congress has answered this question. In order, says the chief justice of New York, to give the governor of this state jurisdiction in such a case, three things are requisite; 1, The fugitive must be demanded by the executive of the state from which he fled; 2, A copy of an indictment found, or an affidavit made before a magistrate, charging the fugitive with having committed the crime; 3, such copy of the indictment or affidavit must be certified as authentic by the executive. If these prerequisites have been complied with, then the warrant of the governor properly issues, and the prisoner is legally restrained of his liberty."

In Clark's case, a habeas corpus was awarded, directed to the persons having him in custody, commanding them to bring him before the chief justice, and to exhibit the cause of his detention. The return upon the writ of habeas corpus

19 Wend. 218, 219.

2 Id. 219.

showed that he was detained in custody by virtue of a warrant issued by the governor of the state of New York, in the following words:

"Enos T. Throop, governor of the state of New York, to the sheriff of the city and county of New York, and the sheriffs, constables and other peace officers of the several counties in the said state: Whereas it has been represented to me by the governor of the state of Rhode Island, that John L. Clark, late of Providence, in the said state, has been guilty of frauds in abstracting from the Burril ville bank, in that state, money, notes, and bank bills, while president of said bank, in a fraudulent manner, which said acts are made criminal by the laws of that state; and that he has fled from justice in that state and has taken refuge in the state of New York; and said governor of Rhode Island has, in pursuance of the constitution and laws of the United States, demanded of me that I should cause the said John L. Clark to be arrested and delivered into the custody of Henry G Munford, sheriff of the county of Providence, who is duly authorized to receive him into his custody and convey him back to the said state of Rhode Island: And whereas the said representation and demand is accompanied by an affidavit, taken before a justice of the peace of the said state of Rhode Island, whereby the said John L. Clark is charged with the said crime; which affidavit is certified by the said governor of Rhode Island to be duly authenticated: You are therefore required to arrest the said John L. Clark, wherever he may be found within the state, and to deliver him into the custody of the said Henry G. Munford, to be taken back to the said state from whence he fled, pursuant to the said representation. Given under my hand and the privy seal of the state, at the city of Albany, this fifth day of May, in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and thirty two."

The opinion of the court as to the validity of the cause

of detention appearing by this return, was delivered by chief justice Savage as follows: "It is," said he, "there expressly recited, 1, that the governor of Rhode Island has demanded that John L. Clark be arrested and delivered up as a fugitive from justice; 2, that a copy of an affidavit was presented, charging Clark with certain acts, which the governor of Rhode Island certifies are made criminal by the laws of that state; 3, that the affidavit is certified by the governor of Rhode Island to be duly authenticated. Here then is a literal compliance with the constitution and laws of the United States; and the governor of New York had full power and authority to issue his warrant to direct Clark to be arrested and delivered over to the agent of the state of Rhode Island."

Clark made an affidavit to the following effect: "that according to the information and belief of this deponent, and as he is advised by counsel and believes to be true, this deponent has not committed any act or thing recited in said warrant; and that he is not guilty of any act or thing which is a crime or made criminal under and by the laws of the state of Rhode Island, and which is made the pretence for said warrant and the arrest of this deponent; and this deponent wholly denies the guilt as recited in said warrant. This deponent expressly denies that he has fraudulently abstracted from the Burril ville bank of Rhode Island money, notes and bank bills, while president of said bank, or at any time or in any manner which is made criminal by the laws of that state. On the contrary thereof, this deponent says that he has not at any time abstracted or taken from said bank, money, notes and bank bills, other than what has been paid to him by the cashier or other officer of that bank, and upon vouchers or discounted paper entered in course of business upon the books of the bank, and sanctioned by the direction or some part thereof, or committees, or persons duly authorized in the premises."

Chief justice Savage delivered the opinion of the court as to the effect of this affidavit as follows: "The prisoner has made an affidavit denying all criminality or fraud in relation to the Burrilville bank, which are charged against him in the affidavit presented to the governor of this state. But whether he is guilty or not is not the question to be decided here. It is whether he has been properly charged with guilt, according to the constitution and the act of congress. The prisoner does not deny any fact set forth in the warrant upon which he has been arrested. It is not denied that the governor of Rhode Island has demanded him as a fugitive from justice. It is not denied that an affidavit charging him with criminality was presented to the governor of New York; nor is it denied that the govenor of Rhode Island has certified that that affidavit is properly authenticated. These are the material facts. Governor Throop does not assert the prisoner's guilt, but that he had before him such evidence as the law directed

to authorize the issuing his warrant. Whether the prisoner is guilty or innocent is not the question before us; nor is any judicial tribunal in this state charged with that inquiry. By the constitution, full faith and credit are to be given in all the states to the judicial proceedings of each state. When such proceedings have been had in one state as ought to put any individual within it upon his trial, and those proceedings are duly authenticated, full faith and credit shall be given to them in every other state. If such person flee to another state, it is not necessary to repeat in such state to which he has fled, the initiatory proceedings which have already been held, but he is to be sent back to be tried where the offence is charged to have been committed-to have the proceedings consummated where they were begun."

5. Duty of executive officers in relation to fugitive criminals.

All executive officers of the states are bound by oath or affirmation to support the constitution of the United States. Art. 6, $2.

This constitution, and the laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof, are the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every state are bound thereby; any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. Art. 6, § 2.

The supreme law of the land has been so expounded by the judges of the supreme court of the state of New York as to give to it full effect. A very different exposition has been made by the executive of that state.

We premise that, by the laws of Virginia, any person who shall steal a slave is guilty of felony, and upon conviction thereof is to undergo a confinement in the penitentiary for a period not less than three nor more than eight years. 1 R. C. 1819, p. 427, 8, § 29.

The executive authority of Virginia, in July last, demanded three persons, to wit: Peter Johnson, Edward Smith and Isaac Gansay, as fugitives from justice, of the executive authority of New York. There was produced to the executive of New York an affidavit made before a magistrate of Virginia by one John G. Colley, of Norfolk borough. The affidavit was dated the 22d of July, 1839, and charged "that on or about the 15th instant, Peter Johnson, Edward Smith and Isaac Gansay, now attached to the schooner Robert Center, at present in New York, did feloniously steal and take from the said Colley a certain negro man slave named Isaac, the property of said Colley." And this affidavit was certified as authentic by the executive of Virginia. It thereupon became the duty of the executive of New York, according to the constitution and laws of the United States, and according also to the deci