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induced him to modify the principles which he originally founded upon it, it is impossible for us now to say; but the fact must be considered at least to render their value somewhat doubtful. Agreeing as we do with Bentham, in his last opinion, we shall not undertake to criticise the work before us, any further than simply to show from it, what it was, which, in the mind of the author, constituted the greatest happiness of the greatest number, or, in other words, to give a definition of the principle of utility.

It is clear, that the truth of the principle, which makes the greatest happiness of the greatest number the governing principle of action, must depend upon the idea we have of happiness; and we can scarcely doubt, that a great majority of our readers will have little difficulty in coming to a just conclusion, when they are informed that Bentham regarded happiness as synonymous with the mere personal gratification of the individual, independent of all considerations of right or duty. The following extracts from the principles of legislation will show that we are not mistaken in this matter.

"I am a partisan of the principle of utility when I measure my approbation or disapprobation of a public or private act by its tendency to produce pleasure or pain; when I employ the words just, unjust, moral, immoral, good, bad, simply as collective terms including the ideas of certain pains or pleasures; it being always understood that I use the words pain and pleasure in their ordinary signification, without inventing any arbitrary definition for the sake of excluding certain pleasures or denying the existence of certain pains. In this matter we want no refinement, no metaphysics. It is not necessary to consult Plato, nor Aristotle. Pain and pleasure are what every body feels to be such-the peasant and the prince, the unlearned as well as the philosopher.

He who adopts the principle of utility, esteems virtue to be a good only on account of the pleasures which result from it; he regards vice as an evil only because of the pains which it pro

duces. Moral good is good only by its tendency to produce physical good. Moral evil is evil only by its tendency to produce physical evil; but when I say physical, I mean the pains and pleasures of the soul as well as the pains and pleasures of sense. I have in view man, such as he is, in his actual constitution."

“This principle [the ascetic] is exactly the rival, the antagonist of that which we have just been examining. Those who follow it have a horror of pleasures. Every thing which gratifies the senses, in their view, is odious and criminal. They found morality upon privations, and virtue upon the renouncement of one's self. In one word, the reverse of the partisans of utility, they approve every thing which tends to diminish enjoyment, they blame every thing which tends to augment it."

"The philosophical party never reproved pleasures in the mass, but only those which it called gross and sensual, while it exalted the pleasures of sentiment and the understanding. It was rather a preference for the one class, than a total exclusion of the other."

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Every one makes himself the judge of his own utility; such is the fact, and such it ought to be; otherwise man would not be a rational agent. He who is not a judge of what is agreeable to him, is less than a child; he is an idiot.”

Among pleasures, Bentham enumerates,

"Pleasures of Sense. Those which can be immediately referred to our organs independently of all associations, viz. the pleasures of taste, of smell, of sight, of hearing, of touch, especially the blessing of health, that happy flow of spirits, that perception of an easy and unburdensome existence, which cannot be referred to any of the senses in particular, but which appertains to all the vital functions; finally the pleasures of novelty, those which we experience when new objects are applied to our senses. They do not form a separate class, but they play so conspicuous a part, that it is necessary to mention them expressly."

"Pleasures of Power. Those which a man experiences who perceives in himself the means of disposing others to serve him

through their hopes or their fears; that is, by the fear of some evil, or the hope of some good which he can do them."

"Pleasures of Malevolence. They result from the sight or the thought of pain endured by those beings who do not love us, whether men or animals. They may also be called pleasures of the irascible passions, of antipathy, or of the anti-social affections."

Among pains are enumerated,

"Pains of Malevolence. These are the pains we experience at reflecting on the happiness of those we hate. They may also be called pains of antipathy, pains of the anti-social affections."

The following extracts are equally clear.

"The whole system of morals, the whole system of legislation, rests upon a single basis, and that basis is, the knowledge of pains and pleasures. It is the only foundation of clear ideas upon those subjects. When we speak of vices and virtues, of actions innocent or criminal, of a system remuneratory or penal, what is it that we speak of? Of pains and pleasures, and of nothing else. A reason in morals or politics, which cannot be translated by the simple words pain or pleasure, is an obscure and sophistical reason, from which nothing can be concluded.

You wish for example, to study the subject of offences,—that great object which directs all legislation. This study, at bottom, will be nothing but a comparison, a calculation, of pains and pleasures. You consider the criminality or the evil of certain actions,—that is, the pains which result from them to such and such individuals; the motive of the delinquent,—that is, the expectation of pleasure, which led him to commit the action in question; the advantage of the offence, that is, the acquisition of pleasure which has resulted from it; the legal punishment which ought to be inflicted,—that is, what pain the guilty person ought to undergo. It thus appears that the theory of pains and pleasures is the sole foundation of all knowledge upon the subject of legislation."

"The sole object of the legislator is, to increase pleasures and to prevent pains; and for this purpose he ought to be well acquainted with their respective values. As pleasures and pains are the only instruments which he employs, he ought carefully to study their power."

"The inclinations of a man being known, we can calculate with tolerable certainty the pleasure or the pain which a given event will cause him."

"When that desire to which nature has intrusted the perpetuation of the species attacks the security of the person, or of the domestic condition, the good which results from its gratification cannot be compared to the evil it produces."

"The pleasure of acquiring by a violation of another's rights, with the pain which such a proceeding occasions, will not prove to be equivalents."

"Let a beggar, pressed by hunger, steal from a rich man's house a loaf, which perhaps saves him from starving, can it be possible to compare the good which the thief acquires for himself, with the evil which the rich man suffers ?"

"If the pleasure which attends the satisfaction of such powerful desires as hatred, the sexual appetite, and hunger, when that satisfaction runs counter to the interests of others, is not equal to the pain which it causes, the disproportion will appear much greater, as respects motives less active and strong."

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'Morality, in general, is the art of directing the actions of men in such a way as to produce the greatest possible sum of good."

"It has been the object of this introduction to give a clear idea of the principle of utility, and of the method of reasoning conformable to that principle. There results from it a legislative logic, which can be summed up in a few words. What is it, to offer a good reason with respect to a law? It is, to allege the good or evil which the law tends to produce; so much good, so many arguments in its favor; so much evil, so many arguments 22

VOL. XXIII.-NO. XLVI.

against it; remembering all the time, that good and evil are nothing else than pleasure and pain.”

We are willing to leave it to our readers to decide, for themselves, what value is to be attributed to a work, which professes to test the propriety of all laws, by their tendency to gratify the greatest number of persons, in a community, in any manner, in which those persons desire to be gratified, without the slightest regard to considerations of right and wrong, or to the principles of moral and religious duty. We are only astonished, that the translator, distrusting the principle of utility as the foundation of morals, should have been willing to admit it as "the only safe rule of legislation." It is hardly necessary to add, for the information of those who know Mr. Hildreth, that the translation is admirably executed. We have rarely seen a French work so well done into English.

L. S. C.

ART. IV.-RIGHTS OF THE SLAVEHOLDING STATES AND OF THE OWNERS OF SLAVE PROPERTY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

No. 2.

WHEN the Virginia convention were considering whether they would assent to and ratify the federal constitution, Mr. Madison, amongst other things, said, "it is worthy of our consideration that those who prepared the paper on the table, found difficulties not to be described in its formation -mutual deference and concession were absolutely necessary. Had they been inflexibly tenacious of their individual opinions, they would never have concurred. Under what circumstances was it formed? when no party was formed or particular prepossession made, and men's minds were calm and dispassionate. Yet, under these circum

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