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after the debt became due; and this notwithstanding provisions in the will for the payment of all debts, and for carrying on the testator's business after his death. Man v. Warner, 4 Wharton, 455.

3. (Parol acknowledgment.) To prevent the running of the statute of limitations, a parol acknowledgment of the adverse title by the person in possession, must be such as to show that he intends to hold the possession no longer adversely, but in future under the party making the claim of right to the land against him, and such as to induce the latter to believe that he will so hold it. Declarations made with a view to a compromise or arrangement of the dispute are not sufficient. Sailor v. Hertzog, 4 Wharton, 259.

4. (Surety paying debt of principal.) If a surety pays the debt of his principal, after the death of the latter, and when no letters of administration have been taken out upon his estate, the statute of limitations does not begin to run, until letters of administration are taken out. Levering v. Rittenhouse, 4 Wharton, 130.

5. (Set-off.) A plaintiff may avail himself of the statute of limitations against a set-off given in evidence by the defendant, without pleading the statute in any way. Ib.

6. (Action on the case for deceit.) In an action on the case for deceit,

it is not a sufficient answer to the statute of limitations, that the plaintiff was ignorant of his cause of action, until within six years, although that ignorance was occasioned by the nature of the deceit, or the manner, in which the fraud was perpetrated. Smith v. Bishop, 9 Vermont, 110. MILITIA. (Defective notice.) A witness testified that he warned a soldier in the militia to appear at a company muster, by laying down before him, at his dwelling-house, a printed notification, but which was not signed by any person, making at the same time some remark about training, which the witness did not recollect. Held, that the evidence did not prove either a printed or a verbal notice. Pray v. Curtis, 21 Pick. 332.

2. (Same.) A notification to a soldier in the militia to appear at

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a company muster, is insufficient, if it do not express the hour, as well as the day, on which he is required to appear. Whitmarsh v. Curtis, 21 Pick. 333. MORTGAGE. (Entry for breaking condition to pay several sums.) Where the condition of a mortgage was, that the mortgager should pay several sums of money at several times, and upon the non-payment of one of the sums first becoming payable, the mortgagee entered for condition broken, and after all the sums had become payable, the mortgager brought his bill to redeem, it was held, that the mortgager was not entitled to a decree, except upon paying the whole sum due on the mortgage, and not merely the sum for the non-payment of which the entry had been made. Mann v. Richardson, 21 Pick. 355. 2. (Sale with a right to repurchase.) The sale and conveyance of real estate, in payment of a preëxisting debt, with a simple right of repurchase on the part of the debtor, is valid, and is not a mortgage, even in equity. Baxter v. Willey, 9 Vermont, 276.

3. (Same.) But, in such contract, it is essential that the debt be extinguished absolutely, in presenti. Ib.

4. (Same.) If the object of the contract be to secure the payment of the debt, and not to extinguish it, except upon the happening of some subsequent event, or the default of the debtor to pay by a given day, the transaction is a mortgage, and no form of words will enable the parties to foreclose the debtor's equity of redemption. Ib.

5. (Void against creditors.) Where W. sold personal property to J., and took notes, and a mortgage, to secure the payment of the sums, but the property was immediately put into the possession of J., who continued the use and possession thereof: Held, that the mortgage was void as against the creditors of J. Woodward v. Gates, and another, 9 Vermont, 358.

6. (Merger.) Where an estate is mortgaged, and the mortgagee assigns the mortgage to a third person, and subsequently takes a quit-claim deed from the mortgagor, the mortgage title does not merge in the fee. Pratt and another v. Bank of Bennington, and another, 10 Vermont, 293.

7. (Same.) In such case the mortgagee becomes mortgagor, and the assignee mortgagee. Ib.

8. (Same.) There can be no such merger, unless the two estates unite in one and the same person. Ib.

NEW TRIAL. (Irrelevant evidence.) The admission of irrelevant evidence is not a sufficient ground for setting aside a verdict, where there is no reason to apprehend that it could have had any improper influence upon the jury; but if it had a tendency to prejudice their minds, it may induce the court, in the exercise of their discretion, to grant a new trial. Ellis v. Short, 21 Pick. 142.

2. (Waiver of exception to incompetent juror.) Where, at the trial of an action against an insurance company, it appeared that the sheriff, who had returned a talesman to serve on the jury, was a stockholder in such company, and this circumstance was known to the junior counsel for the plaintiff soon after the trial began, but no objection was made till after the trial had proceeded for some time, it was held that this was a waiver of any exception to the competency of such juror. Orrok v. Commonwealth Ins. Co. 21 Pick. 457.

PARISH. (Parish records, how recoverable.) An action of trover or replevin may be maintained in the name of a parish, for the recovery of the parish records. First Parish in Sudbury v. Stearns, 21 Pick. 148. PARTIES. (Principal and agent.) In contracts, made by

agents, without disclosing the principal, the suit, to enforce them, may be in the name of the principal or agent. Lapham v. Green, 9 Vermont, 407. PARTNER. (Proof of dormant partnership.) In assumpsit against T. and B. as copartners in trade in 1836, the plaintiff, in order to prove that T. was a dormant partner of B., produced witnesses to testify that T. made offers to them in 1835, to go into copartnership in their names, and that he stated that he had done business before in the names of other persons, because he owed old debts, for the purpose of keeping his property secure from attachment. Held, that this evidence was relevant and admissible. Butts v. Tiffany, 21 Pick. 95.

2. (Evidence in action by surviving partner against heir of deceased.) In an action by a surviving partner against the heir of his deceased partner, upon a bond given by the deceased to indemnify the plaintiff against the payment of any sum of money due from the firm, the plaintiff offered in evidence a judgment recovered against him as surviving partner, in an action in which the heir took upon himself the defence. It was held, that the judgment was conclusive against the heir, unless he could show that it had been recovered through the fraud or collusion of the plaintiff; and consequently, that evidence was inadmissible to show on what grounds the judgment had been recovered, or to show that the defence of the statute of limitations had been avoided by an acknowledgment of the debt, made by the plaintiff many years after the dissolution of the partnership. Valentine v. Farnsworth, 21 Pick. 176. PARTNERS AND PARTNERSHIP. (Surviving partner administrator of deceased.) A surviving partner, who is also administrator of the deceased partner, cannot submit a matter between the partnership and the estate, because, in such case, he would be acting in the double capacity of a representative and a debtor or creditor of the estate. Boynton, Adm'r. v. Boynton, 10 Vermont, 107.

2. (Agreement to divide gross earnings.) Where one party fur

nishes a boat, and the other sails it, an agreement to divide the gross earnings does not constitute a partnership. Bowman and another v. Bailey, 10 Vermont, 170. PARTNERSHIP. (Joint charter party.) A charter party enter

ed into between the owners of the ship of the one part, and A and B of the other part, witnessed, that the owners agreed to send the ship on the voyage, and A and B agreed to go as supercargoes, and charter or freight 540 tons of the said ship at a certain price per ton, "that is," A agreed to freight 375 tons, and B agreed to freight 165 tons. The defendant contracted with A for the freight of certain goods for him, which freight was paid by A to the owners: Held, that A and B were not joint contractors or partners, in respect to the freight;

that the action was properly brought by A alone, and that B was a competent witness for him. Coe v. Cook, 3 Wharton,

569.

2. (Notice of dissolution.) Notice of the dissolution of a partnership, given in a newspaper printed in the city or country where the partnership business is carried on, is of itself notice to all persons who have had no previous dealing with the partnership. Watkinson v. Bank of Pennsylvania, 4 Wharton, 482.

3. (Same.) But as to persons who have had previous dealing with the partnership, general newspaper notice is not sufficient. It must be shown that actual notice of the dissolution was communicated to the party in some way or other. Ib.

4. (Same.) Whether there has been such previous dealing or not, is a matter of fact for the jury; and therefore a judge ought not to reject evidence of newspaper notice, but should direct the jury that if the evidence established a previous dealing, then in point of law there should have been actual notice, and that merely taking in the paper was not proof of such actual notice without something further. Ib.

5. (Note by one of three partners.) One of three partners (the partnership being notorious,) purchases a horse, for which he gives his individual note: The partners are not liable, although the avails of the horse, when sold, go into the partnership fund. Holmes v. Burton and another, 9 Vermont, 252. PATENT-RIGHT. (Recording.) A conveyance of a right to use a patent right in a limited territory is not required to be recorded in the patent office. Stevens v. Head, 9 Vermont, 174. 2. (Evidence.) Where a right to use an invention, secured by patent, is conveyed, and the vendee has not been disturbed in the exercise or use, the vendee must shew that, the person conveying has no such right, if he seeks to recover against the vendor, on the ground that no right was conveyed. Ib. POSSESSION. (Of part of a tract of land.) If a person enter upon a tract of land, with visible boundaries, under a deed of the entire tract, his occupation and improvement of a part, is

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