said, "it seems to me that if the principle of those cases is to be supported, the act of parliament will be of very little use." Heath and Chambre, Js., also questioned the correctness of those decisions. In Ex parte Daniel,' lord Eldon ́ again expressed his dissent to those cases. Lord Loughborough also, in Ex parte Mather,' said he could not accede to them. And lord Manners, in Ottley v. Brown,' entirely disregarded them. Lord Erskine, however, in Ex parte Bulmer' recognized the doctrine of those cases; but the decision made by him, in that case, has not been followed, but overruled as before mentioned. There are, doubtless, expressions in the opinion given by Marshall, C. J. in Armstrong v. Toler," from which it may be inferred that he considered the cases of Faikney, &c. as sound law. The direct decisions of the courts in England, in addition to the foregoing dissenting dicta, leave those two first decisions on the stockjobbing law without any foundation for their support. 6 In Steers v. Lashley, five years after Petrie v. Hannay was decided, it was held that a bill of exchange accepted for the amount of money paid by a broker for the acceptor, for differences in stockjobbing transactions, could not be recovered, because the bill was "given for the very differences." Lord Kenyon said, "if the plaintiff had lent this money to pay the differences, and had afterwards received the bill for that sum, then, according to the principle established in Petrie v. Hannay, he might have recovered." " "With great submission to lord Kenyon," says Erskine, chancellor, (who was counsel in Steers v. Lashley) that 8 1 14 Ves. Jr. 192. 5 11 Wheat. 258. 366. 23 Ves. Jr. 373. 5 13 Ves. Jr. 313. 7 Sir James Mansfield, C. J. also intimated a distinction between money borrowed to pay an illegal demand, and money advanced to effectuate an illegal transaction. 3 Taunt. 13. 813 Ves. Jr. 313. case is the same with Faikney v. Reynous and Petrie v. Hannay. And in Cannan v. Bryce,' it was expressly held that money lent to settle losses on illegal stockjobbing transactions could not be recovered. Ten days after the decision of Steers v. Lashley, the court of common pleas decided that where one of two partners in copartnership for insuring ships, &c. contrary to the statute of 6 Geo. I. c. 18, had paid the whole loss, he could not recover of his copartner a moiety of the money so paid. So in Booth v. Hodgson,' where three partners were concerned in illegal insurances, in the name of one of them, it was held that the ostensible partner could not recover from a broker premiums, received by him for the firm, on such insurances. 3 In Brown v. Turner' the case of Steers v. Lashley was confirmed, in a case precisely like it in principle, though the question was made as to its correctness, as well as respecting its application to stockjobbing in the stock called omnium. In Aubert v. Maze," the case of Mitchell v. Cockburne was revised and confirmed; and an award of an arbitrator was set aside, because he had awarded a sum due from one partner to another for money paid on account of losses incurred in illegal insurances. In Branton v. Taddyo it was decided that one of two partners in illegal underwriting could not recover premiums from the assured, though the plaintiff underwrote in his own name only, and the agreement between him and his partner was secret, and unknown to the assured when the policies were made. In Webb v. Brooke' it was held that money could not be recovered, which was lent to one prisoner of war by another, for the purpose of obtaining a ransom of the defendant's vessel, contrary to 13 Barn. & Ald. 179. S. P. 3 Taunt. 6. 2 Mitchell v. Cockburne, 2 H. B. 379. 3 6 D. & E. 405. 4 7 D. & E. 630. 6 1 Taunt. 6. 5 2 Bos. & Pul. 371. 73 Taunt. 6. 3 statute, though a bill of exchange had been given for the money, payable to the plaintiff's order. In Clayton v. Dilly' it was decided that the plaintiff could not recover money paid on the loss of an illegal wager made by the defendant's authority. In Simpson v. Bloss," where the defendant had assumed a part of a bet made and won by the plaintiff in an unlawful wager, and the plaintiff advanced to the defendant his share of the winning, in expectation that the loser would pay the plaintiff, but the loser died insolvent, not having paid; it was held that the plaintiff could not recover back the money so advanced. Though the demand was collateral to the illegal transaction, Gibbs, C. J. said that as the plaintiff could not establish his case without the aid of the unlawful wager, he could not maintain his action. It was further decided in Ex parte Bell, that money advanced by one partner to the others, for the purpose of paying losses incurred, or to be incurred, in illegal insurances by the firm, could not be recovered back, though it did not appear that the money had been thus applied. And finally it was determined, in Cannan v. Bryce, that money lent by one who was not a party to the transaction, but for the purpose of enabling the borrower to pay a loss incurred in illegal stock-jobbing, could not be recovered. In nearly all these cases, Faikney v. Reynous, and Petrie v. Hannay, were relied upon by counsel. Various distinctions between those cases and the case under consideration were suggested by the judges, at different times, but their authority was not wholly denied, except in one or two instances. Since the decision in Cannan v. Bryce, it is not easy to see any ground left on which those cases can possibly stand.5 14 Taunt. 165. 31 M. & S. 751. 4 22 Marsh. 542; S. C. 7 Taunt. 246. 5 Before Cannan v. Bryce was decided, Mr. Payley, in his Treatise on Agency, 104, note, spoke of those cases as overturned. See Gross v. La Page, Holt's N. P. Rep. 105, and the reporter's note to that case; 2 Evans's Pothier, 1-16. The foregoing principle is not applicable to a case where a debtor conveys his property for the purpose of defrauding his creditors. As between grantor and grantee, in such case, the transaction is valid. No one but a creditor of the grantor can take advantage of the fraud. Therefore, if the grantee have money in his hands, the proceeds of the property so conveyed, which he has promised to pay to the grantor's children, according to the original agreement between him and the grantor, those children may recover the money; and the grantce cannot defend against them, on the ground that the original transaction was fraudulent.' An assignment of a negotiable instrument founded in illegality generally obliges the promisor to pay the assignee, if he take the assignment without notice. The exceptions to this rule arise from the provisions of statutes: As in the case of usurious notes, and bills of exchange, in England, previous to the passing of the statute of 58 Geo. III. c. 93, which changed the law, in such cases; or notes given for money won by gaming, or lent for gaming; or as a consideration or inducement to sign a bankrupt's certificate.' But if the assignee take the assignment without notice of the original vice, he cannot recover of the original promisor. If a contract that is assigned be not negotiable, the original promisor may defend against the assignee, though he had no notice, in the same manner as against the original promisee.3 Under the statute of 9 Anne, c. 14, "to restrain gaming," money lent for the purpose of gaming may be recovered by the lender, in assumpsit on the loan. The statute renders void all notes, bills, bonds, mortgages, or other securities for money won by gaming, or for reimbursing or repaying 1 Fairbanks v. Blackington, 9 Pick. 93. 2 See Kyd on Bills, 280-283; Chit. Con. (1st ed.) 237; 4 Mass. Rep. 371, 372; 13 Mass. Rep. 515; Ord on Usury, 109. 3 Fales v. Mayberry, 2 Gallison, 560. money knowingly lent for gaming or betting. But the statute does not render contracts void.' Fair gaming is not prohibited by the common law, and by that law assumpsit lies for money won." T. M. Barjeau v. Walmsley, 2 Stra. 1249; Robinson v. Bland, 2 Bur. 1077; Wettenhall v. Wood, 1 Esp. Rep. 18. 2 Bac. Ab. Gaming, A. ART. II.-RIGHTS OF THE SLAVE-HOLDING STATES AND OF THE OWNERS OF SLAVE PROPERTY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. THE great importance of this subject, and the increased and increasing interest with which it is viewed in every part of our country, justify the belief, that an examination of the provisions of the constitution, on which the owners. of slave property were induced to rely when the federal compact was formed, a sketch of the laws which congress has passed to carry out those constitutional provisions, and a review of the judicial decisions which have been made under the constitution and laws, may prove acceptable to the readers of the Jurist and not be without utility at the present time. As matter which is introductory and somewhat explanatory, we shall commence by giving an outline of the laws as to slavery, which, at the time the federal constitution was adopted and subsequently thereto, have prevailed in the three most important northern states, we mean New York, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts. 1. Laws as to slavery in the northern states. The law as to slavery in Massachusetts is stated by chief justice Parsons in a case which came before the supreme court of that state.1 "Slavery," he says, was introduced 66 1 Winchendon, &c. v. Hatfield, &c. 4 Mass. Rep. 123. |